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I. INTRODUCTION 
Inflation poses two conceptually distinct problems for an income 
tax system.1 First, inflation can cause the mismeasurement of a tax-
1 In this Article, I ignore the possibility of deflation, a reasonable assumption given the 
United States' post-war experience. In general, deflation affects the tax system in the same 
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payer's income. For example, assume a taxpayer purchases an asset 
for $100, holds on to it for one year, and then sells it for $110. Under 
general tax rules, the taxpayer would be deemed to have $10 in in-
come.2 Assume, however, all prices had increased by 10% during the 
year that the asset was held. The taxpayer would be no better off 
when she sold the asset for $110 than she was when she purchased it 
for $100. In real economic terms, she would have zero income. I use 
the term "indexing the tax base" to refer to correcting the measure-
ment of income to account for such inflationary gains and losses prop-
erly. While conceptually straightforward, indexing the tax base is 
administratively complex and has not been dealt with adequately in 
the Code. 
Second, even assuming that income is measured properly, inflation 
can change a taxpayer's real tax liability by affecting the structure of 
the tax system. In general, the structure of a tax system is susceptible 
to inflation whenever a taxpayer's liability is determined with refer-
ence to fixed dollar amounts. Thus, for example, if a personal exemp-
tion is fixed in terms of dollars, the value of the exemption declines 
with inflation. As discussed below, it is administratively uncompli-
cated to index the structure of a tax system for inflation and, for the 
most part, the federal income tax structure is indexed currently. 
The next section of this Article discusses the effects of inflation on 
the structure of the federal income tax. In particular, Section II shows 
how inflation can distort a tax structure and how indexation can pre-
vent such distortion. Section II also discusses the extent to which the 
income tax structure is currently indexed. 
The remainder of the Article assumes a fully indexed tax structure 
and explores the extent to which inflation can cause mismeasurement 
of the tax base under an income tax. Section III begins by introducing 
the effect of inflation on the measurement of income, showing how 
inflation can affect the measurement of income in a wide variety of 
circumstances. Section III then explores the effect of inflation on the 
measurement of capital gains and ends with a comparison between 
indexation and a capital gains exclusion. Section IV extends the dis-
cussion of indexing capital gains by describing a variety of practical 
questions that arise in indexing capital assets including the timing of 
indexation adjustments and the appropriate indexation period. 
Sections V through IX look at the need for indexation in measuring 
income other than capital gains. Sections V and VI conclude that it is 
generally unnecessary to index either wages or rents because both 
manner as inflation, but in the opposite direction. But see note 50 (arguing that because of 
loss limitations, the effects of inflation and deflation are not symmetric). 
2 IRC § lOOl(a). 
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represent current payments properly measured in current dollars. 
Section VII looks at the need to index depreciable assets, considers 
accelerated depreciation as a substitute for indexation, and concludes 
that the former is an inferior substitute for the latter. 
Section VIII deals with indexing inventories, showing the need for 
indexation and arguing that, just as accelerated depreciation is an in-
ferior substitute for indexed depreciation, the LIFO inventory method 
is an inferior substitute for indexation. 
Section IX introduces the question of indexing liabilities and con-
cludes that, in many ways, debt instruments present the strongest case 
for indexation. In particular, it considers and rejects the argument 
that it is unnecessary to index debt because the market will compen-
sate for the lack of indexation. 
Section X discusses the merits of "partial indexation," the indexing 
of assets without the corresponding indexation of debt. Partial index-
ation is rejected both because of the arbitrage opportunities that it 
creates and because the case for indexing debt is stronger than the 
case for indexing assets. Section X also discusses "global indexation," 
indexing taxpayers based on their overall assets and liabilities without 
regard to individual transactions. Section XI is a brief concluding 
section. 
II. INDEXING THE TAX STRUCTURE 
A. The Need to Index the Tax Structure 
It is important to understand that the structural problems caused by 
inflation are not due to the fact that inflation increases nominal taxes, 
but rather to the fact that inflation increases nominal taxes by more or 
less than the rate of inflation. In other words, problems arise when 
inflation increases or decreases real and not merely nominal tax bur-
dens. Compare, for example, the effect of inflation on a sales tax with 
the effect on a per unit excise tax. Assume a city imposes a 5% tax on 
all sales and sales total $1 million. The city would collect $50,000 in 
taxes. If 10% inflation causes sales to increase to $1.1 million, the city 
would collect $55,000 in taxes. The 10% increase in tax collections 
would offset exactly the effects of inflation. In real or constant dollar 
terms, tax revenues would be unchanged.3 By contrast, consider the 
effect of a $1 per unit excise tax. Assume that prior to the inflation, 
the $1 million in sales is generated by the sale of 50,000 units at $20 
3 Imbedded in the example is the assumption that real sales will be unaffected by infla-
tion. If inflation has a real, as well as a nominal, effect on sales, then real tax liabilities also 
would be expected to change as a result of inflation. Indexing the tax structure generally 
would not be expected to compensate for real, as opposed to nominal, changes. 
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per unit. The city would collect $50,000 from the excise tax. If 10% 
inflation increased the per unit price to $22 and sales volume were 
unchanged, the tax revenue would remain at $50,000. While the tax 
would have stayed constant in nominal dollars , it would have de-
creased in real dollars. If the city wished to maintain its excise tax 
revenues in real terms, it could adjust the excise tax each year to com-
pensate for the effects of inflation. In the example, the city could 
maintain its real tax revenues by increasing the excise rate from $1 to 
$1.10 per unit, thereby raising its revenues from $50,000 to $55,000. 
The adjustment could be made by revising the tax law each year or it 
could be automatic. Such an automatic adjustment for inflation is re-
ferred to as "indexation." 
Similarly, an income tax may or may not be affected by inflation . 
Consider first a strictly proportional income tax. Assume that there is 
a 20% income tax and that in Year 1 a taxpayer has income of $40,000. 
The taxpayer would be liable for $8,000 in taxes. If, as part of a gen-
eral 10% inflation, her income increased to $44,000 in Year 2, her tax 
liability would increase to $8,800. Recognizing that she is no better 
off with $44,000 in Year 2 dollars than she was with $40,000 in Year 1 
dollars, one can argue that the increase in taxes is a real incremental 
burden. That argument is fallacious, however, because it fails to take 
into account her ability to pay the $8,800 Year 2 liability with less 
valuable Year 2 dollars. While her nominal tax has increased in pro-
portion to her nominal income, her real tax has remained a constant 
proportion of her real income. Thus, in the case of a strictly propor-
tional income tax, indexing is unnecessary.4 
Like a sales tax, the structure of an income tax becomes sensitive to 
inflation when it diverges from a strictly proportional tax. Thus, for 
example, when an income tax has features such as floors, ceilings, de-
ductions, exemptions and brackets that are specified in fixed dollar 
amounts, the structure of the tax is sensitive to inflation.5 For exam-
ple, assume that a taxpayer is subject to a 20% income tax, but is 
permitted a $2,000 exemption. The exemption will always be worth 
$400 in nominal terms.6 Thus, if there is 10% inflation, the real value 
4 The social security tax up to the maximum wage limit is an example of a strictly pro-
portional income tax. See IRC § 3101 (imposing tax on employees); IRC § 3111 (imposing 
tax on employers); IRC § 3121(a) (defining the tax base to be limited by the contribution 
and benefit base under § 230 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1988)). If the 
wage limit were not indexed, however, real tax liabilities would diminish with inflation for 
wage earners whose inflated wages exceeded the cap. The wage limit is currently indexed. 
42 U.S.C. § 430 (1988) . 
s Structural elements of an income tax that are expressed as a percentage of income 
generally are not affected by inflation. See, e.g., IRC § 67 (floor on itemized deductions 
equal to 2% of adjusted gross income). 
6 $400 = 20% X $2,000. 
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of the $400 reduction in tax will decline by approximately 10%.7 The 
real value of the exemption can be maintained by indexing the exemp-
tion amount so that when prices rise by 10%, the exemption increases 
by 10% from $2,000 to $2,200 and the tax savings increases by 10% 
from $400 to $440. 
In addition to reducing the real value of fixed deductions, inflation 
has the effect of reducing the size of tax brackets expressed in fixed 
dollar amounts. For example, consider an income tax of 10% on the 
first $10,000 of income and 20% on all income in excess of $10,000. 
Under such a structure, a taxpayer earning $40,000 would owe $7,000.8 
If, however, as a result of 10% inflation, her income increased to 
$44,000, her tax liability would increase to $7,800.9 The increase from 
$7,000 to $7,800 represents a nominal increase of 11.4% and a real 
increase of 1.3% .w 
B. Current Indexation of the Code 
The Code contains many significant features specified as fixed dol-
lar amounts, including the rate brackets, the standard deduction (or 
zero bracket amount) and the personal exemptions. Prior to the in-
dexation of the Code as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 (ERTA),11 the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that a 
10% inflation rate caused a 16% increase in tax revenues.12 ERTA 
indexed the rate brackets, the personal exemptions and the standard 
deduction.B In addition to these principal structural features, Con-
gress has indexed a variety of other Code provisions including, for 
example, the earned income credit, the threshold for the phaseout of 
7 An alternative way to view the problem is to look at the taxpayer's total liability. 
Assuming that there is a flat 20% tax rate, no deductions other than the $2,000 exemption, 
and the taxpayer's Year 1 income is $40,000, her Year 1 tax liability would be $7,600. If by 
Year 2 all prices had increased by 10%, her Year 2 liability would be $8,400, an increase of 
approximately 10.5%. Measured in Year 1 dollars, her tax liability would have increased 
from $7,600 to $7,636, an increase of approximately 0.5%. 
8 $7,000 = (10% X $10,000) + (20% X $30,000). 
9 $7,800 = (10% X $10,000) + (20% X $34,000). 
10 The 1.3% real increase is computed by restating the $7,800 as $7,091 Year 1 dollars 
and calculating that $7,091 represents a 1.3% increase over $7,000. 
11 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). 
12 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 38 (Comm. Print 1981). Emil Sunley claimed that as 
of 1979, for every 1% increase in the inflation rate, tax receipts rose by 1.5%. Emil Sunley, 
Indexing the Income Tax for Inflation, 32 Nat'] Tax J. 328, 328 (1979). 
13 To be precise, ERTA indexed the tax brackets, including the then zero bracket 
amount, IRC § l(f) (before amendment), and the personal exemptions, IRC § 151(f), ef-
fective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1984. Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 101(a), 
104(c)(2), 95 Stat. 172, 176,189 (1981). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 returned to the use of 
a standard deduction in lieu of a zero bracket amount and indexed the standard deduction 
in§ 63(c)(4). Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 102(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2099. 
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itemized deductions, and, at least in part, the phaseout of personal 
exemptions. 14 
The structural indexation enacted to date has not imposed a signifi-
cant administrative burden on the tax system because the Service can 
perform the necessary computations and publish them along with the 
appropriate tax forms and publications. 15 For example, § 1(f) pro-
vides that Treasury must issue new tax tables by December 15 each 
year for the following tax year based on the change in the consumer 
price index through August 31 of the current tax year. Thus, as of the 
beginning of each calendar year, taxpayers are able to determine the 
tax rates they face for the upcoming year. Of course, because infla-
tion is measured as of August 31 of the previous year, the changes to 
the tax rates always lag behind the actual level of prices. 
Despite the relative ease of indexing the tax structure, there remain 
a large number of instances where it has not been indexed.16 In some 
14 See IRC § 32(i) (indexation of earned income credit); IRC § 68(b)(2) (threshold for 
phaseout of itemized deductions); IRC § 151(d)(4)(B) (threshold for phaseout of personal 
exemptions). Section 151(d)(3)(B) provides that the personal exemption is phased out at a 
rate of 2% for every $2,500 of adjusted gross income over a threshold amount. While both 
the amount of the exemptions and the threshold are indexed, the $2,500 figure is not. All 
else equal, as inflation increases adjusted gross income, the amount of income over the 
threshold increases by the rate of inflation and, therefore, the percentage phaseout in-
creases. For example, assume that a taxpayer has $10,000 in adjusted gross income in 
excess of the threshold . Under§ 151(d)(3)(B), the taxpayer loses 8% of his personal ex-
emptions. If all price levels double, the taxpayer has $20,000 in adjusted gross income over 
the threshold and loses 16% of his personal exemptions. Because the exemptions have 
doubled, the nominal cost to the taxpayer has increased by a factor of four and the real 
cost has doubled. The legislative history does not explain why the phaseout was only par-
tially indexed. 
Other sections that provide for indexation include § 29(b )(2) (indexing the determina-
tion of the nonconventional fuels credit (other than the credit for gas from a tight forma-
tion)), § 41(e)(5) (indexing certain amounts for purposes of determining the base period 
amount used to compute the research and development credit), § 135(b )(2)(B) (indexing 
the limit on adjusted gross income for purposes of determining the exclusion of income 
from savings bonds), § 280F(d)(7) (indexing the depreciation limits for luxury auto-
mobiles), § 402(g)(5) (indexing the limitation on certain elective contributions to pension 
plans), § 415(d) (indexing the limitation on annual benefits from a defined benefit plan), 
and § 513(h)(2)(C) (indexing definition of "low cost articles" for purposes of defining an 
unrelated trade or business). 
15 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 581 (providing inflation adjustments for 1994). 
Taxpayers and others bear some administrative costs in responding to the annual indexa-
tion adjustments. For example, employers must reprogram their computers each year to 
provide for revised withholding schedules. 
16 Other countries, such as Canada, Argentina and Australia, have adopted full, annual 
automatic inflationary adjustments. Vito Tanzi, Inflation and the Personal Income Tax: 
An International Perspective 27-28 (1980). Other countries, such as Sweden, have indexed 
the brackets, but not exemptions. Id. at 29. Yet another group of countries has automatic 
indexation, but with discretionary elements. These include France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Israel. Id. at 30-33. Finally, some countries, such as Chile and Iceland, 
index their tax systems, but not with reference to conventional price measures. Id. at 33-
46. See also Vito Tanzi , Inflation and the Indexation of Personal Income Taxes in Theory 
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cases, the failure to index is of little consequence. For example, the 
$100 deductible on casualty losses has not been indexed, but has been 
made essentially irrelevant by virtue of a floor equal to 10% of ad-
justed gross incomeY Because the floor is stated as a percentage of 
income, there is no need to index it. 
In other instances, the failure to index perhaps is more properly 
regarded as an intentional measure designed to phase out a particular 
benefit. For example, the Revenue Act of 1987 imposed limitations 
on home mortgage indebtedness of $1 million in the case of acquisi-
tion indebtedness and $100,000 in the case of home equity indebted-
ness.18 The effect of not indexing these provisions is to reduce by the 
rate of inflation the real amount of permissible home mortgage in-
debtedness taken into account each year. Thus, for example, when 
measured in 1987 dollars, the $1 million limit on acquisition indebted-
ness already has been reduced to approximately $750,000.19 More-
over, if inflation continues at a modest 4%, the limitation will be 
worth approximately $500,000 in 1987 dollars by the year 2000.20 In 
other words, the real limit on home mortgage indebtedness will have 
been cut in half by the year 2000 without any affirmative congres-
sional action.21 A possible explanation for Congress' failure to index 
the provision is that it is a way to achieve what otherwise might be 
politically infeasible, the gradual elimination of the home mortgage 
interest deduction.z2 
Another example of a failure to index a substantive Code provision 
is the § 1211 $3,000 limitation on net capital losses, which dates back 
and in Practice, 118 Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Q. Rev. 241 (1976) (discussing both the 
need for structural indexation and its implementation in numerous countries). 
17 Compare § 165(h)(1) with § 165(h)(2). 
18 Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10102(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-85 (1987); IRC § 163(h)(3) 
(B)(ii), (C)(ii). 
19 This is based on actual consumer price index (CPI) through July 1993 and assumed 
4% inflation for 1993-94. Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States 1993, at 479-81 (1993) [hereinafter Census Abstract]. 
20 Based on actual CPI figures through July 1993 and assumed 4% inflation thereafter. 
I d. 
21 A related example is the one-time exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal resi-
dence by taxpayers who are at least 55 years old. When Congress increased the lifetime 
exclusion from $100,000 to $125,000 as part of ERTA, they failed to index the new limit. 
IRC § 121 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 123(a), 95 Stat. 172, 197). 
22 Moreover, given the revenue constraints on tax legislation, it may be difficult to raise 
the mortgage limits later to compensate for inflation. See Congressional Budget Office, 
The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update, 91 TNT 173-16, Aug. 19, 1991, available 
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File [hereinafter CBO Budget Report] (describing the 
current budget rules that place constraints on revenue reducing changes in the tax laws). 
The failure to index a provision of this nature raises the question of whether it is appropri-
ate for Congress to achieve by indirect means what it is politically incapable of achieving 
by direct means. See generally Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Infor-
mation as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 917 (1990). 
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to 1970. Measured in 1970 dollars, the limitation has decreased from 
$3,000 to approximately $775.23 If the $3,000 limitation had been in-
dexed for inflation since 1970, it now would be approximately 
$11,600.24 Recent attempts to index the $3,000 limit have been 
unsuccessful.25 
In addition to the substantive provisions not indexed for inflation, 
there are a variety of nonsubstantive Code provisions that are based 
on fixed dollar amounts and not indexed. For example, many report-
ing provisions contain a de minimis rule.26 Similarly, penalty provi-
sions often are based on fixed dollar amounts.27 It is hard to imagine 
why the scope of reporting obligations or the extent of penalties 
should increase merely because of inflation.28 
C. Is Structural Indexation a Good Idea? 
Although, as discussed above, the structure of the Code, for the 
most part, already has been indexed for inflation, it is worth reviewing 
briefly the arguments for and against indexation. To begin with, it is 
important to note that the real question is not whether adjustments to 
the tax structure need to be made to compensate for inflation, but 
rather whether those adjustments should be discretionary or auto-
matic. For example, Emil Sunley and Joseph Pechman compared ac-
23 Based on actual CPI through July 1993 and assumed 4% inflation for 1993-94. Cen-
sus Abstract, note 19, at 479-81. 
24 A partial list of other substantive Code provisions that have not been indexed include: 
§ 21 (child care credit), § 22 (credit for the elderly and disabled),§ 25 (mortgage credit), 
§55 (alternative minimum tax computation including brackets and amount and phaseout 
of exemption), § 86 (floor on taxation of social security benefits),§ lOl(b) ($5,000 exclu-
sion for employee death benefits),§ 120 (exclusion for group legal service benefits),§ 127 
($5,250 limit on exclusion for educational assistance programs), § 129 ($5,000 limit on de-
pendent care assistance programs), and § 469(i) (exception from the passive loss rules for 
active participation in real estate activities). 
25 See, e.g., H.R. 854, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1993) (proposing to index the $3,000 
capital loss limitation for inflation occurring after December 31, 1992, but only in the case 
of individuals age 60 or over); H.R. 151, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1993) (proposing to 
index the capital loss limit for inflation occurring after December 31, 1992); H.R. 6106, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1992) (proposing to index the capital loss limitation for infla-
tion occurring after December 31, 1991). 
26 Unindexed de minimis rules for reporting purposes include § 6041 (payments to in-
dependent contractors equal to or more than $600), § 6049 (interest payments aggregating 
$10 or more), and § 6050H (mortgage interest received of $600 or more). 
27 Unindexed de minimis rules for penalty purposes include § 6657 (bad checks), 
§ 6662(b )(3) (substantial valuation misstatement) and § 6662(b )(2) (substantial understate-
ment penalty). 
28 One might argue that it is reasonable to increase the scope of reporting obligations 
over time as taxpayers and others with reporting obligations become more familiar with 
the reporting requirements and, as a result, the real costs of complying with the require-
ments decline. The failure to index de minimis rules for reporting then could be seen as a 
way to increase the scope of the requirement over time, albeit in an unpredictable fashion. 
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tual individual income tax liabilities in 1975 with estimates of income 
tax liabilities under the 1960 Code, indexed to 1975 prices.29 They 
found that the aggregate tax liabilities under the actual 1975 Code 
were lower than the liabilities under the indexed 1960 Code. Thus, 
historically Congress has shown that it is able to respond to inflation-
ary pressures on the income tax by a process of ad hoc tax reductions. 
There are several arguments that have been posited for or against 
indexation.3° Commentators have argued that an unindexed tax struc-
ture is desirable because it acts as an automatic macroeconomic stabi-
lizer. The argument is essentially that excess aggregate demand 
causes inflation, which in turn causes a real increase in taxes, which 
dampens aggregate demand.31 There are at least two major weak-
nesses to the automatic stabilization argument. First, any stabilizing 
effect of inflation-induced real increases in income taxes may have a 
built-in lag that leads it to be ineffective or possibly counterproduc-
tive. Second, in periods of stagflation, inflation occurs simultaneously 
with inadequate aggregate demand. In such circumstances, an 
unindexed Code can act as a further destabilizing, rather than stabiliz-
ing, influence. Overall, it is likely that indexation of the tax structure 
has little effect on the overall stability of the U.S. economy.32 
The remaining arguments for and against indexation of the tax 
structure are essentially politicaP3 For example, both proponents and 
opponents of indexation have argued that in the absence of indexa-
tion, Congress would have fewer opportunities to revisit the tax law. 
It is unclear whether fewer opportunities would prevent Congress 
from making harmful changes to the tax law or would prevent benefi-
cial change.34 In fact, the premise of the argument seems to be 
flawed. Since indexing the Code in 1981, Congress has made signifi-
cant revisions in 1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1993, as 
29 Emil M. Sunley, Jr. & Joseph A. Pechman, Inflation Adjustment for the Individual 
Income Tax, in Inflation and the Income Tax 153, 157-61 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1976) [here-
inafter Inflation and the Income Tax]. 
30 See Congressional Budget Office, Indexing the Individual Income Tax for Inflation 
13-25 (1980) [hereinafter CBO Indexation Report] (giving arguments for and against struc-
tural indexation). 
31 See, e.g., James L. Pierce & Jared J. Enzler, The Implication for Economic Stability of 
Indexing the Individual Income Tax, in Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 173, 173-
7 4 (describing the argument for an unindexed tax structure acting as an automatic 
stabilizer). 
32 Id. at 187-88. But see Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Studies in Fiscal Policy: Indexing the Individual Income Tax for Inflation: Will This 
Help to Stabilize the Economy? 1-2, 9-15 (Comm. Print 1976) (study prepared by Thomas 
F. Dernburg concluding that indexing the Code would act as a macroeconomic stabilizer). 
33 See Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for Policymaking, 73 
Minn. L. Rev. 1217, 1289-95 (1989). 
34 See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron, Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in Inflation 
and the Income Tax, note 29, at 1, 26. 
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well as having two major tax bills vetoed in 1992.35 Thus, indexing the 
Code apparently has not led to a decline in the frequency of signifi-
cant amendments to the tax law.36 Another argument is that by re-
quiring Congress to affirmatively lower tax rates to compensate for 
inflation, Congress has more flexibility to raise real taxes simply by 
failing to fully compensate for inflation.J7 In effect, Congress simulta-
neously can lower nominal taxes and raise real taxes. It is interesting 
to speculate as to the extent that recent tax legislation would have 
differed if the Code had not been indexed and, as a result, the need 
for legislation to be revenue neutral was less of a constraint.38 
D. Choice of Index 
There has been some debate over the appropriate price index to use 
for purposes of indexing the Code. If the purpose of indexing the 
Code is to make certain that an individual taxpayer whose income has 
risen only as much as consumer prices will be able to buy the same 
bundle of consumer goods with her after-tax income, the CPI is ap-
propriate. An objection to its use, however, is that it fails to ade-
quately account for increases in the prices of investment assets. Some 
critics thus argue for the use of a broader index, such as the implicit 
deflator for national income, on the grounds that the purpose of in-
dexing the rate structure is to prevent a change in prices from affect-
35 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494; Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-647, 102 Stat. 3342; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 
103 Stat. 2106; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. The 
vetoed bills were the Revenue Bill of 1992, H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (vetoed by Presi-
dent Bush on November 4, 1992) and Family Tax Fairness, Economic Growth, and Health 
Care Access Bill of 1992, H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (vetoed by President Bush on 
March 20, 1992). 
36 There were a total of 114 public laws amending the Code during the 10 years prior to 
ERTA and only 75 during the 10 years following ERTA. 1 Internal Revenue Code 63-66 
(CCH Aug. 1993) (listing public laws amending the Code) . Thus, a raw count would ap-
pear to support the hypothesis that indexing led to a decline in tax legislation. These num-
bers, however, are unreliable because they do not distinguish between significant and 
insignificant changes in the tax law. 
37 Eugene Steuerle has suggested that at least through the late 1970's and early 1980's, 
Congress tended to permit inflation to increase the real tax burden on the poor and those 
with dependents, while reducing real tax burdens on the wealthy. C. Eugene Steuerle, The 
Tax Decade: How Taxes Came to Dominate the Public Agenda 44-45 (1992) [hereinafter 
Tax Decade]. 
38 See CBO Budget Report, note 22 (describing the current budget rules that place con-
straints on revenue reducing changes in the tax laws). 
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ing the portion of the nation's output collected as income taxes.39 In 
addition, any nationwide price index will fail to account for differ-
ences in changes in regional prices. Given, however, that the Code 
does not take regional price differences into account as an initial mat-
ter, there seems to be little justification to correct for changes in re-
gional prices. 40 
Regardless of the particular price index selected, it is important to 
note that indexing the tax structure in terms of a general price index 
does not compensate for increases in real income. Given a fully price-
indexed progressive income tax, aggregate tax revenue will increase 
by more than the percentage increase in real income as real growth 
forces taxpayers into higher brackets. At least one country, Denmark, 
has chosen to index its tax structure on the basis of changes in average 
earnings of industrial workers, thus limiting the extent to which in-
creases m real income will cause disproportionate increases in real 
taxes.41 
Overall, within reasonable bounds, the choice of index does not 
seem critical, especially in an era of frequent changes in the Code. 
III. INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS 
A. Introduction 
The discussion of indexing the income tax structure in the previous 
section is based on the assumption that the tax base has been mea-
sured accurately. Even where the income tax structure has been com-
pletely indexed, however, inflation can cause serious problems in the 
measurement of the income tax base.42 
39 See, e.g., Edward F. Denison, Price Series for Indexing the Income Tax System, in 
Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 233, 254-58 (arguing for use of the implicit defla-
tor for national income). 
40 See generally David J. Shakow, Adjusting for Inflation in International Transactions 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tax Law Review) (discussing significance of dif-
ferent regional inflation rates on measurement of income). 
4! See Vito Tanzi, Adjusting Personal Income Taxes for Inflation: The Foreign Experi-
ence, in Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 215, 224 (noting Danish experience). 
42 Depending on the details of implementation, inflation is less of a problem under a 
consumption tax than under an income tax. For example, if a consumption tax is imple-
mented through a value-added tax, inflation will not be a problem because both the 
amount of each sale and the tax will be measured accurately in current dollars. Similarly, if 
a consumption tax is implemented as a cash-flow tax whereby expenditures for capital 
assets are immediately deductible and proceeds from the sale of capital assets are fully 
includible in the tax base, indexation generally would be unnecessary because there would 
be no need to use basis computations specified in historical dollars. Put differently, since 
basis always would be zero, indexation would have no effect. See generally David F. Brad-
ford, Untangling the Income Tax 59-99 (1986) [hereinafter Untangling] (describing six al-
ternative implementations of a consumption tax). 
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The most familiar instance of inflation induced mismeasurement of 
income is with capital gains.43 Consider, for example, T who 
purchases an asset for $1,000 in 1990, holds onto the asset for 10 years 
and then sells the asset for $1,500 in the year 2000. Under conven-
tional methods of income measurement, T has taxable income (a capi-
tal gain) of $500. In fact, without knowing the amount of intervening 
inflation, it is impossible to determine whether, in a real sense, T is 
better or worse off for having owned the asset. In other words, 
whether Ts command over goods and services, her ability to pay, has 
increased or decreased since she first purchased the asset is un-
known.44 If, for instance, there has been a total of 80% inflation over 
the 10-year period, T would need approximately $1,800 in 2000 to 
purchase the same bundle of goods and services that she was able to 
purchase with $1,000 in 1990.45 Therefore, in a real sense, T has a loss 
of $300, rather than a gain of $500.46 Fundamentally, the mismeasure-
ment of income is caused by the fact that gain or loss, which is com-
puted in current dollars, is determined by reference to basis stated in 
terms of historical dollars. Although the problem may be somewhat 
harder to see, a similar mismeasurement of income is caused any time 
that a historical basis figure is used to compute current income. Thus, 
for example, absent indexing or a similar adjustment, net income de-
rived from ownership of depreciable property or from the sale of in-
ventory is also mismeasured.47 
Similarly, inflation will cause the mismeasurement of (negative) in-
come from liabilities.48 For example, assume that T borrows $1,000, 
promising to repay $1,100 in one year. Under conventional income 
43 I use the term "capital gains" to refer to gains and losses from the sale or other dispo-
sition of an asset. I do not necessarily mean to refer to the technical Code definition of a 
"capital gain." See IRC § 1221 (defining "capital asset"); IRC § 1222 (defining "capital 
gain"). 
44 Ability to pay usually is seen as the appropriate basis for imposing an income tax. 
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 17 (2d ed. 
1988) ("Tax equity requires that persons with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal 
amounts of tax and that persons with greater ability to pay should pay more tax."); Adam 
Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2, at 
777 (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed., Modern Library 1937) (1789) ("the subjects of every state 
ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in pro-
portion to their respective abilities"). 
45 Inflation of 80% over 10 years is equivalent to an annual inflation rate of approxi-
mately 6%. 
46 A $300 loss is equal to the $1,500 amount realized minus her cost of $1,800 measured 
in current dollars. Both the gain and loss are stated in terms of Year 2000 dollars, which is 
appropriate given that her tax liability is measured and paid in Year 2000 dollars. See 
Section V. 
47 See Sections VII (discussing the indexation of depreciation) and VIII (discussing the 
indexation of inventory). 
48 See Section IX (discussing the indexation of debt). 
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accounting, $1,000 of the repayment would be denominated as princi-
pal and have no tax consequences and the remaining $100 of the re-
payment would be denominated as interest and potentially would be 
deductible.49 Economically, however, the amount of real principal T 
repays would depend on the level of inflation. If, during the interven-
ing year, there had been 6% inflation, in real terms she would owe 
principal of $1,006 and, therefore, would be paying only $4 in interest. 
Thus, inflation would have caused her to overstate her interest by 
125%. 
B. Specific Issues in Indexing Capital Gains 
As discussed above, one of the primary areas where inflation causes 
the mismeasurement of income is capital gains.50 The error in mea-
surement arises out of the fact that to determine income from the dis-
position of a capital asset, it is necessary to compare dollars from two 
distinct periods of time. In particular, gain (or loss) is defined as the 
difference between the amount realized from the sale or other disposi-
tion of an asset and the taxpayer's basis in the asset.51 Since the tax-
payer's basis generally represents the taxpayer's historical investment 
in the asset, it is measured in historical dollars, while the amount real-
ized, measured by a current receipt, is measured in current dollars. 
The resulting computation with historical and current dollars is inac-
curate. The simplest solution is to index the taxpayer's basis, thus 
converting the historical basis of the asset into current dollars that can 
be compared meaningfully with the proceeds from the sale of the asset 
to compute gain or loss.52 
Some commentators have suggested that indexing basis provides an 
inadequate correction for inflation because inflation affects the mar-
49 IRC §§ 1272, 163(e). Under current law, there are many independent restrictions on 
deductibility of the interest. See, e.g., IRC § 163. 
so Generally, the effects of inflation and deflation are symmetric. See note 1. Due to 
the peculiarities of the Code, however, it is not always the case that increases and decreases 
in prices have symmetric effects. For example, the capital loss limitation generally causes 
inflation-induced capital gains to be treated differently from deflation-induced capital 
losses. Assume that when there is 10% inflation, T purchases an asset for $100,000 and 
sells the asset one year later for $110,000. T has no real gain or loss, but is taxable on a 
nominal gain of $10,000. On the other hand, if there is 10% deflation and the taxpayer 
sells the same asset for $90,000, the taxpayer may not be permitted to use some or all of the 
$10,000 nominal loss because of the capital loss limitation. IRC § 1211 (permitting capital 
losses for individuals only to the extent of $3,000 plus any recognized capital gains) . 
51 IRC § 1001 (determining the amount of taxable gain or loss). 
52 As an alternative, it is possible to restate the amount realized in historical dollars , 
rather than restating the basis in current dollars. By doing so, however, the resulting gain 
also is stated in more valuable historical dollars. Because the tax liability is to be deter-
mined in current dollars, it then would be necessary to restate the gain in current dollars , 
ending up in exactly the same place. 
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ket value of an asset, not its basis. Thus, for example, the New York 
State Bar Association Tax Section has argued: 
[I]n most cases actual basis adjustments will match inflation-
ary increases only by happenstance. This unfortunate result 
occurs because in the absence of gain realization, annual ad-
justments are made to the basis of the asset without regard to 
its fair market value. Nevertheless, inflation in any period by 
its nature will increase the nominal price of an asset relative 
to its value at the beginning of the measurement period.53 
Assuming that the goal of indexation is to make a taxpayer's real tax 
liability invariant to inflation, this view is incorrect because it fails to 
take into account the fact that the tax is paid with inflated dollars. 
Consider a simple example. Assume that T has a zero basis in an asset 
worth $1,000. If T were to sell the asset today, she would have a gain 
of $1,000 and, assuming a 30% tax rate, would pay tax of $300. As-
sume that T holds onto the asset and that all prices double. In that 
case, the asset would be worth $2,000. Because her basis is zero, if T 
then sold the asset, she would have gain of $2,000 and pay tax of $600 
without regard to indexation. While Ts nominal tax liability has in-
creased from $300 to $600, her real tax liability remains unchanged. 
If, on the other hand, she only was required to pay $300 in tax despite 
the doubling of all prices, her nominal liability would have stayed con-
stant, but her real liability would have been cut in half.54 
It is important to realize that the effect of inflation on the measure-
ment of capital gains income is significant even at moderate levels of 
inflation. For example, over the decade from 1982 through 1991, total 
inflation was approximately 50%, or 4.1% per year, relatively moder-
ate when compared to the previous decade.55 Yet, consider the effect 
of this moderate level of inflation on the amount of gain. Assume that 
T purchased an asset for $1,000 in 1981 and held the asset for 10 years. 
Table 1 shows the sales price of the asset, the nominal gain and the 
inflation adjusted real gain for the asset under three different scena-
rios: a 2% annual real decline in value, zero real growth, and a 4% 
annual real growth rate. In all three scenarios, the failure to index for 
53 N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n, Tax Sec., Ad Hoc Comm. on Indexation of Basis, Report on Infla-
tion Adjustments to the Basis of Capital Assets, 48 Tax Notes 759, 773 (Aug. 6, 1990) 
[hereinafter NYSBA Report]. 
54 The argument that basis, not amount realized, should be indexed is the same as the 
argument for not indexing wages. See Section V (arguing that generally wages do not 
require indexation for tax purposes). 
55 Census Abstract, note 19, at 479-81. Inflation over the decade from 1972 to 1981 was 
124% or approximately 8.4% per year. Id. 
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even moderate inflation leads to a nominal gam that significantly 
overstates the real economic gain (or loss) . 
Table l 
Real and nominal gain over 10-year period 
4.1 % annual inflation 
Negative 2% Zero 
R eal Growth Real Growth 
Sales Price $1,221 $1,495 
N aminal Gain 221 495 
Real Gain (Loss) (273) 0 
Real Tax Rate (24%) 00 
4% 
Real Growth 
$2,212 
1,212 
718 
51% 
One way to measure the extent of the overstatement of gain is to 
compute the real tax rate, the ratio of the statutory tax liability to the 
real gain (or loss), and to compare the real tax rate to the statutory 
rate.56 The last row in Table 1 shows the real tax rate assuming a 
statutory rate of 30% applied to the nominal gain under each scena-
rio. Under the 4% real growth scenario, the tax rate increases from a 
30% statutory rate to a real tax rate of approximately 51%; under the 
zero growth scenario, the real tax rate is infinite; and under the nega-
tive growth scenario, the real tax rate becomes negative.57 
1. The Relationship Between Indexing and Holding Period 
Since inflation compounds over time, it is natural to conclude that 
inflation causes a greater problem the longer the holding period of the 
asset. In fact, with respect to assets that have real gains, inflation is in 
certain ways a greater problem the shorter the holding period.58 It is, 
of course, true that the size of the inflation adjustment increases with 
the cumulative amount of inflation and, therefore, generally with 
time. The significance of the inflation adjustment, however, declines 
with time in two ways. First, assuming a constant inflation rate and a 
56 By comparing the statutory tax rate to the real tax rate as of the date of the sale, I am 
ignoring the effect of deferral. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the interaction of deferral and inflation. 
57 If the real growth rate is sufficiently negative so as to cause a nominal as well as a real 
loss, the real tax rate becomes positive, but remains less than the statutory rate. Given that 
the taxpayer is deducting a loss, the taxpayer wishes the rate to be as high as possible. In 
the example in Table 1, if the real growth rate is less than approximately negative 3.9%, the 
effective tax rate is positive. See note 75 (discussing distribution of returns on assets across 
income classes). 
58 The reverse is true with real losses; see Section III.B.2. 
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constant real growth rate, the correction for inflation as a percentage 
of nominal gains decreases rather than increases with time.59 Second, 
because gain generally is not taxed until realization, a longer holding 
period offers the advantage of deferral, which can offset the overtaxa-
tion due to inflation.6° 
It is easiest to demonstrate that the correction for inflation de-
creases over time with a numerical example. 
Example 1: David purchases an asset for $1,000. The asset 
has real annual growth of 5% and inflation is 5%. At the 
end of the first year, the asset is worth $1,102 and has an 
indexed basis of $1,050.61 At the end of 20 years, the asset is 
worth $7,040 and has an indexed basis of $2,653.62 
If the asset is sold after one year, the nominal gain on the asset is $102 
of which $50, or approximately one-half, is properly excluded. If the 
asset is sold after 20 years, the nominal gain is $6,040, of which $1,653, 
or approximately one-quarter, is properly excluded.63 The fact that 
the fraction of gain that should be excluded decreases over time is one 
argument against using a capital gains exclusion in lieu of indexing.64 
The second reason that indexation of capital gains becomes less im-
portant the longer the holding period is that while inflation causes the 
overtaxation of capital gains, deferral causes the undertaxation of 
such gains. By "deferral," I refer to the fact that under the realization 
doctrine, gains and losses on capital assets generally are not taxed on a 
59 In the case of real losses, however, the significance of the correction for inflation 
increases with time. See Section III.B.2. 
60 In the case of real losses, however, deferral accentuates the problem of inflation and 
losses. See text following note 74. 
61 $1,102 = $1,000 x 1.05 x 1.05. $1,050 = $1,000 x 1.05. Cf. Oil & Gas Futures, Inc. v. 
Andrus, 610 F.2d 287, 287 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding, as a matter of law, that 0.82 is 
equivalent to 82% ). 
62 $7,040 = $1,000 X 1.0520 X 1.0520. $2,653 = $1,000 X 1.0520. 
63 For a mathematical proof that the correction for inflation declines with time when the 
asset has real growth, see Roger E . Brinner, Inflation and the Definition of Taxable Per-
sonal Income, in Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 121, 126-27. Essentially, the 
inflation adjustment declines because while the inflation adjustment to basis compounds at 
the rate of inflation (1t), the amount realized (that is, the nominal fair market value) com-
pounds at the higher nominal growth rate (1t + r + rn, where r is the real growth rate). 
Over time, the higher compounding rate of the amount realized far outstrips the com-
pounding of the basis (1t + r + r 1t > 1t). Where an asset has nominal gains, but real losses (r 
< 0, 1t + r + rn > 0), the amount realized compounds more slowly than the basis (1t + r + rn 
< 1t) and the inflation correction becomes more significant over time. When an asset has 
both nominal and real losses (1t + r + rn < 0), the nominal loss is limited to the original 
nominal investment, while the inflation adjusted loss continues to increase each year, again 
causing the inflation correction to become more significant over time. See Section III .B.2. 
64 For a discussion of the capital gains exclusion in lieu of indexing, see Section III.B.S. 
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current basis, but rather only upon disposition.65 The ability to defer 
the payment of tax on gains has the effect of lowering the burden of 
the tax. The longer the holding period, the greater the extent to which 
deferral compensates for the failure to index for inflation. 
To understand the interrelationship between deferral and indexa-
tion, it is useful to define the effective tax rate by reference to the 
relationship between the pretax and after-tax yields.66 Thus, for ex-
ample, if the pretax yield on an investment is 10% and the after-tax 
yield is 6%, then the effective tax rate would be 40%.67 The effective 
tax rate can be measured in nominal or real terms, depending on 
whether the yields are measured in nominal or real terms, 
respectively. 
Table 2 shows how the effective tax rate on an investment in a capi-
tal asset depends on the length of the holding period.68 The example 
in Table 2 assumes 5% inflation, a single purchase of an asset that has 
a pretax real yield of 5% per year and a statutory tax rate of 30%. 
Table 2 
Effect of deferral on effective tax rates 
(5% real growth; 5% inflation; 30% statutory tax rate) 
Effective Tax Rate 
With 
Without Indexation Indexation 
(A) (B) (C) 
Years Held Nominal Rate Real Rate Real Rate 
1 30% 59% 30% 
2 29% 57% 29% 
3 28% 55% 29% 
4 27% 53% 28% 
5 26% 51% 28% 
10 22% 43% 26% 
15 19% 36% 24% 
20 16% 31% 22% 
25 14% 27% 20% 
30 12% 23% 18% 
35 10% 20% 17% 
65 IRC § 1001 (providing rules for determining gain and loss on disposition of assets) . 
66 In particular, I define the "effective tax rate" as one minus the ratio of the after-tax 
yield over the pretax yield. 
67 40% = 1- (6%/10%). 
68 The effective tax rates also can be shown in equation form. See Appendix I. 
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An effective tax rate of less than 30% indicates a net benefit and an 
effective tax rate in excess of 30% indicates a net detriment from the 
combination of inflation and deferral. Consider first Column A, la-
beled "Nominal Rate." The numbers in Column A show the nominal 
effective tax rate without indexation, given the specified holding pe-
riod. For example, if the asset is held for 15 years, the nominal effec-
tive rate is reduced to 19% (62% of the statutory rate) due to deferral. 
As can be seen from the table, the nominal effective rate is never 
greater than the statutory rate and the longer the period of deferral, 
the lower the nominal effective rate. 
Column B, labeled "Real Rate," shows the real effective tax rate 
without indexation and demonstrates the problem with examining 
only nominal effective tax rates. While the real effective tax rate de-
clines with the holding period due to deferral, it is also consistently 
higher than the nominal effective tax rate because of inflation-induced 
mismeasurement of gain. For example, with the same 15-year holding 
period for which the nominal effective tax rate is 19% (62% of the 
statutory rate), the real effective tax rate is 36% (121% of the statu-
tory rate). The real effective tax rate either can be greater than or less 
than the statutory tax rate, depending on whether the inflation factor 
or the deferral factor dominates. 
Finally, consider the effect of indexation shown in Column C. With 
indexation, the effective tax rate is always less than or equal to the 
statutory tax rate because the overstatement of income due to infla-
tion has been fully corrected while the benefit of deferral continues. 
As can be seen from Table 2, while indexation always lowers the effec-
tive tax rate (Column C) relative to the real effective tax rate without 
indexation (Column B), the gap between the two rates closes as the 
holding period increases.69 The declining difference is another reflec-
tion of the fact that the significance of indexation declines with the 
holding period. 
In summary, it is important to keep in mind that there are two in-
dependent factors at work. First, inflation causes the amount of gain 
to be exaggerated, thus increasing the effective tax rate; and second, 
the opportunity for deferral lowers the effective rate. There are sev-
eral implications that flow from this analysis. First, where there is no 
significant deferral, inflation is a much more serious problem than 
where there is significant deferral. For example, where the holding 
69 Another way to view the difference between indexing and not indexing is to look at 
the ratio of the effective real tax rate without indexing to the effective real tax rate with 
indexing. With a one-year holding period, the ratio is approximately 2:1. In other words, 
the effective tax rate is approximately doubled by the failure to index. With a 15-year 
holding period, the ratio drops to approximately 1.5:1; the effective tax rate is increased by 
approximately 50% by the failure to index. 
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period is one year, the real effective tax rate in the above example is 
approximately 60%, twice the statutory rate. By contrast, where the 
holding period is 20 years, the effective tax rate is approximately 30%, 
equal to the statutory rate. Thus, to some extent, the desirability of 
indexing depends on the length of the holding period. For brief hold-
ing periods, indexing can be critical to prevent excessive tax rates. For 
long holding periods, the failure to index may merely offset the bene-
fit of deferral. In fact, it is arguable that for long holding periods, it is 
inappropriate to index given the value of deferral. 
Second, accrual or mark-to-market taxation often is recommended 
as the appropriate method for taxing income from capital assets be-
cause it solves the problem of deferral. As a result, in recent years 
Congress has shown an increasing willingness to impose either mark-
to-market taxation or taxation that approximates mark-to-market 
treatment.7° In the absence of inflation, accrual taxation eliminates 
deferral and guarantees that the effective tax rate is the same as the 
statutory tax rate. With inflation and without indexation, however, 
accrual taxation means that the effective rate on income from capital 
may far exceed the statutory rate because the offsetting benefit of 
deferral has been eliminated.71 
Table 3 shows the effective tax rate without indexation as a function 
of the inflation rate, assuming a real growth rate of 5% and accrual 
taxation with a 30% statutory rate. 
70 See, e.g., IRC § 475 (requiring security dealers to account for their inventory on a 
mark-to-market basis); IRC § 1256 (mark-to-market taxation for certain financial instru-
ments including regulated futures contracts) ; David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realiza-
tion: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111 (1986) (arguing in favor of 
mark-to-market taxation); see also Thomas L. Evans, The Evolution of Federal Income 
Tax Accounting-A Growing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market, 67 Taxes 824 (1989) (dis-
cussing various accounting provisions that approximate mark-to-market accounting); Tax 
Simplification and Technical Corrections Bill of 1993, H.R. 3419, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 402(a) (passed by the House Ways and Means Committee on November 3, 1993) (same 
adding § 1291 that would require certain shareholders of certain passive foreign corpora-
tions to account for their shares on a mark-to-market basis); H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 4402 (1992) (adding § 1291 requiring certain shareholders of certain passive foreign cor-
porations to account for their shares on a mark-to-market basis). H.R. 11 was passed by 
the House and Senate on October 6, 1992, and October 8, 1992, respectively, and vetoed by 
President Bush on November 4, 1992. 
71 See Steuerle, Tax Decade, note 37, at 31 & n.17 (noting that debt instruments and 
assets that are marked to market are the two classes of assets where the inflation compo-
nent of the return is fully taxed). But see text following note 173 (discussing certain § 1256 
contracts that are marked to market but for which indexing is not required because the 
taxpayer has no basis). 
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Table 3 
Effective tax rate with a ccrual taxation and no indexation 
(5% real growth rate; 30% statutory tax rate) 
Inflation Rate Effective Rate 
0% 30% 
1% 36% 
2% 42% 
3% 47% 
4% 53% 
5% 59% 
6% 64% 
7% 69% 
8% 74% 
9% 80% 
10% 85% 
12.5% 97% 
15% 108% 
557 
As demonstrated, even at moderate rates of inflation, the effective 
rate on gains becomes quite large. With indexation, the effective rate 
would be equal to the statutory rate of 30% without regard to the 
inflation rate. 
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the problems of inflation and deferral 
cannot successfully be dealt with independently. If gains are not in-
dexed for inflation, it may be inappropriate to impose accrual taxa-
tion. Alternatively, if gains are indexed for inflation, the justification 
for not imposing accrual taxation, or its equivalent, is reduced.72 The 
relationship between indexation and the holding period also suggests 
that proposals to restrict indexation to long-term gains require in-
dependent justification. 73 
n Accrual taxation can be approximated by a variety of devices including, for example, 
imposing an interest charge on deferraL See, e.g., IRC § 453A (imposing an interest 
charge on installment sales); IRC § 1291 (imposing an interest charge on deferral from 
passive foreign investment companies); Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains 
Taxation, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 167 (1991); Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: 
Charging Interest on Tax Deferral Loans, 25 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (1988); Mary Louise 
Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 722 (1990). 
73 See, e.g., Family Tax Fairness, Economic Growth, and Health Care Access Bill of 
1992, H .R. 4210, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2101 (permitting indexing of certain assets held 
more than one year). The indexing provision was not contained in the Senate version of 
the bill and was stripped from the bill in conference. H.R. Rep. No. 461, 102d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 357-64 (1992) (Con£. Rep.). The bill was vetoed by President Bush on March 20, 
1992. Similar provisions were passed by the House in 1978 and 1989. H.R. 13511, § 404 
(described in H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-32 (1978)); H.R. 3299, lOlst 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 11961 (1989). The Senate voted in favor of indexation in 1982, approving 
558 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48: 
2. Indexation of Loss Assets 
In the previous section, I argue that because, as a percentage of real 
gain, the indexation correction becomes smaller the longer the hold-
ing period and because deferral compensates for the failure to index, 
indexing real gain is less important the longer the holding period. In 
the case of losses, however, neither of these conditions hold and in-
dexing becomes more critical the longer the holding period. Consider 
first the size of the inflation adjustment relative to the amount of 
nominal gain or loss. Where there is a loss in real terms, the size of 
the inflation adjustment relative to the amount of loss increases with 
the length of the holding period.74 Thus, the indexation adjustment 
becomes more necessary with holding period. Second, in the case of 
losses, deferral represents a burden to the taxpayer, not an advantage. 
Just as deferral of gains is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the 
government to the taxpayer, deferral of losses is equivalent to an in-
terest-free loan from the taxpayer to the government. The fact that 
indexing is, in certain ways, more important for loss assets than it is 
for gain assets makes it particularly odd that indexing proposals often 
are limited to gain assets.75 
a floor amendment to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. 128 Cong. 
Rec. 17,533-41 (1982). The indexation provision was stripped in conference. H.R. Rep. 
No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982-2 C.B. 600, 605. 
More recently a host of bills have contained similar provisions. See, e.g., H .R. 3739, 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 3645, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1576, 103d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1993); H.R. 3101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2434, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993); H.R. 2392, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1950, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 
H .R. 1885, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 854, 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 777, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 253, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 151, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 48, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993); see also Section X (discussing partial indexation). Congressional consideration of 
indexing the Code dates back to at least 1918. 56 Cong. Rec. 10,349-54 (1918) (objecting to 
the use of unindexed basis in determining the amount of capital gain). 
74 In absolute value terms, the size of the adjustment increases relative to both the nomi-
nal loss or gain and the real loss. See note 63 (discussing difference between gains and 
losses). 
75 See, e.g., H.R. 4210, note 73, at § 2101. While it might be expected that gains and 
losses on capital assets are distributed evenly across income classes, the available evidence 
suggests that taxpayers with moderate income tend to dispose of assets at a real loss, while 
higher income taxpayers tend to dispose of assets at a gain. See Internal Revenue Service, 
Statistics of Income 1990: Individual Income Tax Returns 26 (1993); Congressional Budget 
Office, Indexing Capital Gains (1990) [hereinafter CBO Capital Gains Report]; Dep't of 
Treasury, Report to Congress on the Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 1978, at 10-11 (1985) 
(using 1977 data). Roger Brinner reports similar results using 1962 data, but points out 
that one possible explanation is that because of their lower marginal rates, lower income 
people tend to hold stocks that pay dividends while higher income persons hold stocks that 
return a yield in the form of capital gains. Roger E. Brinner, Inflation and the Definition 
of Taxable Personal Income, in Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 121, 135-37. 
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3. Indexation and the Lock-In Effect 
One justification for indexing capital assets is to reduce the lock-in 
effect.76 The lock-in effect refers to the fact that the holder of an ap-
preciated asset has an incentive to continue to hold the asset even 
when, in the absence of taxes, she would choose to dispose of the as-
set. Essentially, the lock-in effect derives from the fact that if the tax-
payer continues to hold the asset, she will continue to receive the 
benefit of deferral on her previous gain, whereas if she disposes of the 
asset, she will be taxed immediately on the appreciation. Looked at 
another way, the government offers an interest-free loan to the holder 
of an appreciated asset in the amount of the tax that would be due on 
the appreciation. Thus, in order for it to be worthwhile to sell the 
appreciated asset and acquire a new asset, the expected return from 
the new asset not only must be greater than the expected return from 
the old asset, but also must be large enough to compensate for the loss 
of the implicit interest-free loan. In addition, the lock-in effect is 
greatly accentuated by the fact that the tax on appreciation is forgiven 
at death.77 In effect, not only is the loan interest-free, but it may be 
forgiven.78 By reducing the amount of taxable gain, indexing clearly 
reduces the lock-in effect, thus adding to economic efficiency. 
Just as appreciated assets are subject to a lock-in effect, depreciated 
assets are subject to a reverse lock-in effect.79 In order to receive the 
76 Many authors have discussed the lock-in effect with respect to capital gains in general. 
See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 
247 (1957); Graetz, note 44, at 677 (noting that the lock-in effect "reduces liquidity, impairs 
the mobility of capital, and may lead to broader fluctuations in market prices"). But see 
Tax Incentives for Increasing Savings and Investment: Hearings Before the Committee on 
Finance, United States Senate, 10lst Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 88 (prepared statement of Alan J. 
Auerbach); Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Reform, 42 Nat'! Tax J . 391 
(1989) (discussing lock-in effect and other distortions from capital gains taxation) . 
77 IRC § 1014 (providing that the basis of property acquired from a decedent is the fair 
market value of the property, thus eliminating income tax on any prior appreciation). 
78 An additional factor that may strengthen the lock-in effect is the limitation on capital 
losses. In any taxable year, an individual may deduct recognized capital losses only to the 
extent of recognized capital gains plus $3,000. IRC § 12ll(b). Capital losses essentially 
are unusable by a taxpayer without capital gains. It, therefore, may be in a taxpayer's 
interest to hold onto an appreciated asset to use it to offset a possible future capital loss. 
Correspondingly, the lock-in effect is lessened if a taxpayer has current capital losses since 
the effective tax rate on capital gains is zero for a taxpayer with sufficient capital losses. 
There are many other details of the Code that may strengthen or lessen the lock-in effect. 
For example, the availability of nonrecognition treatment for certain transfers of property 
and the ability with respect to certain charitable donations to take a deduction for the full 
fair market value of appreciated property both lessen the lock-in effect. See, e.g., IRC 
§ 1031 (permitting nonrecognition of gain on a like kind exchange); IRC § 170(e)(1) (gen-
erally permitting a charitable deduction for the full fair market value of long-term capital 
gain property). 
79 The combination of the lock-in effect on appreciated assets and the reverse lock-in 
effect on depreciated assets leads to the behavior sometimes referred to as "cherrypick-
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tax benefit of a loss, it generally is necessary to dispose of a depreci-
ated asset. By holding onto a depreciated asset, the holder in essence 
is making an interest-free loan to the government. As long as there is 
inflation, indexation has the effect of increasing losses (and possibly 
converting gains to losses). Thus, there is a potential for indexation to 
have the undesirable effect of increasing the incentive to dispose of 
depreciated assets. The magnitude of this reverse lock-in effect is lim-
ited, however, by the existence of various rules limiting the ability of 
taxpayers to take losses, primarily the capital loss limitation.80 
A Congressional Budget Office study notes that relative to an ex-
clusion, indexing may create a positive incentive to sell assets with 
large gains in order to receive an increased indexable basis.81 The 
CBO study offers the following example: 
For example, suppose that a taxpayer in the 28 percent tax 
bracket holds an asset with a current price of $1,000 and a 
real gain of $900; its basis is thus $100. If future inflation 
doubles the price level, the taxpayer's basis would increase 
to $200. If the taxpayer sells the asset and reinvests the pro-
ceeds, however, the basis would be $748 ($1,000 minus tax on 
the $900 real gain). Future inflation would increase the basis 
in this case to $1,496. In other words, indexing for future 
inflation would provide a $100 tax deduction if the old asset 
was held as compared with a $748 deduction if the old asset 
was sold and a new one purchased.82 
While the CBO study is clearly correct that, under some circum-
stances, indexing reduces the lock-in effect to a greater extent than an 
exclusion, it is important to note that indexation will not create an 
incentive to sell appreciated assets.83 The problem with the example 
given above is that it fails to take into account the value of further 
ing," the selective recognition of losses combined with the deferral of gains. See Robert 
Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations Under a Realiza-
tion-Based Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 677 (1993); Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach 
to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 243, 275-83 (1992) [hereinafter 
General Approach] (discussing the capital loss limitation and other provisions designed to 
limit the timing option inherent in the realization doctrine). 
so IRC § 1211; see also IRC § 1092 (limiting losses on a straddle to the extent of unreal-
ized gains from the straddle). 
81 CBO Capital Gains Report, note 75, at 31-32. 
82 Id . 
83 It is straightforward to show that indexing may be more or less successful than an 
exclusion at reducing the lock-in effect. Consider a zero inflation world. In such a world, 
an exclusion would be more successful at reducing the lock-in effect than would indexing, 
which would have no effect whatsoever. On the other hand, consider a hyperinflationary 
world. In such a world, indexing would be extremely effective at reducing the lock-in ef-
fect, while an exclusion would be relatively ineffective. 
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deferral of the tax liability on the prior appreciation of the asset. Con-
sider what happens to the taxpayer in the above example, assuming 
that over the period in which there is 100% inflation, there is also 
20% real growth. If the taxpayer held onto the asset, she would be 
able to sell the asset for $2,400.84 She would have an indexed basis of 
$200, gain of $2,200, and pay tax of $616. She would be left, therefore, 
with $1,784 after tax. If she sold the asset, she would be able to 
purchase a new asset for $748 that would increase in value to $1,795. 
She would have an indexed basis of $1,496, gain of $299, and pay tax 
of $84. She would be left, therefore, with $1,711 after tax, $73 less 
than she would have had if she had held onto the asset. 
It is, in fact, straightforward to prove that with indexation, despite 
the benefit of the stepped-up indexable basis, it generally will be opti-
mal to hold onto an appreciated asset, trading off the enhanced index-
ation adjustment for the benefit of further deferral. Define 8 as the 
difference between the future real after-tax value of the asset if it is 
held and the future real after-tax value of the alternative investment if 
the asset is sold. Thus, there is a positive lock-in effect if 8 is greater 
than zero. 8 can be expressed by the following equation:85 
where, 
7t 
'T 
Gain 
r 
n 
8 = (1 + 1tt X 't X (1 - t) X ((1 + rt- 1) X Gain (1) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
the inflation rate, 
the marginal tax rate,s6 
the taxable appreciation of the asset at the time that 
the decision is made,s7 
real growth rate; and 
number of years from the time the decision is made 
until the final disposition. 
As long as both Gain and rare greater than zero and 'tis between zero 
and one, 8 always will be greater than zero and, therefore, there will 
be a positive lock-in effect.88 As can be seen from equation (1), 8, and 
84 $2,400 = $1,000 X (1 + 20%) X (1 + 100%). 
85 See Appendix II, Section I, for a derivation of Equation (1). 
86 These results depend critically on the assumption that the marginal tax rate is equal in 
all periods. For example, if the tax rate is increasing over time, it may well be optimal to 
recognize the gain on the asset at the current lower rate. 
87 If indexation applies on a retroactive as well as a prospective basis, Gain is the fair 
market value of the asset minus its basis indexed to date. If indexation applies to currently 
held assets, but only on a prospective basis, then Gain is the fair market value of the asset 
minus its unindexed cost basis. See note 88 (discussing indexing for new assets only). 
88 By contrast, if indexing is implemented for new assets only, there may be an incentive 
to sell old assets to receive the benefits of indexing with respect to subsequent inflation, 
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consequently the lock-in effect, is an increasing function of r, the real 
growth rate.89 The lock-in effect increases with the real growth rate 
because the higher the real growth rate, the more valuable the defer-
ral on the gain. 
The lock-in effect in equation (1) is expressed in terms of dollars at 
the time of final disposition. 8 also can be expressed in terms of con-
stant dollars, that is dollars at the time the decision is made: 
bconst = 't X (1 - 1) X ((1 + rt- 1) X Gain (2) 
Expressed in constant dollars, it becomes clear that in real terms, the 
size of the lock-in effect, beans~> is not a function of the inflation rate. In 
other words, with indexation, the lock-in effect, in real terms, is in-
dependent of the inflation rate. The independence under indexation 
between the rate of inflation and the lock-in effect should not be sur-
prising. Indexation eliminates the effects of inflation on real after-tax 
values. As a result, it should be expected that with indexation, the 
lock-in effect is independent of inflation.90 By contrast, without in-
dexation, the magnitude of the real lock-in effect increases with 
inflation.91 
Under some partial indexation proposals, an indexation adjustment 
cannot be used to create or increase the amount of a loss.92 With such 
a limitation, indexation can create a lock-in effect. Consider, for ex-
ample, a taxpayer who holds an asset with a value of $1,000, an 
unindexed basis of $1,000 and an indexed basis of $1,500. Without 
indexation, the taxpayer has no taxable gain or loss with respect to the 
asset and has no tax-induced reason to hold or dispose of the asset. 
Under full indexation, she has a loss of $500, giving her an incentive to 
dispose of the asset as soon as possible to recognize the loss. Under 
indexation for gain only, if she disposes of the asset, she would have a 
$500 unusable indexation adjustment. If, on the other hand, she holds 
onto the asset, she could use the $500 indexation adjustment against 
that is, there may be a negative lock-in effect. In general, the less appreciation on the 
existing asset, the more likely that there will be a negative lock-in effect. See Appendix II, 
Section II. 
89 See Appendix II, Section I (showing that the derivative of o with respect tor, do/dr, is 
greater than zero). 
90 Moreover, the observation that indexation removes the effects of inflation means that 
in thinking about a world with indexation, it is possible to derive results by thinking about 
a world with no indexation and no inflation. In such a world, there would still be a lock-in 
effect because of real deferral. 
91 See Appendix II, Section III. 
92 See, e.g., H.R. 4210, note 73, at § 2101. 
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future appreciation in the asset. Thus, she would have a strong incen-
tive not to dispose of the asset.93 
4. The Failure to Index Capital Assets as a Proxy Tax on Wealth . 
Another argument against indexation of capital assets is that infla-
tion in an unindexed tax system may have beneficial effects on the tax 
base. It is possible to view an unindexed tax on capital gains as a 
combination of a wealth tax and an income tax. 94 In a world in which 
all nominal gains and losses were taxable annually, the failure to index 
would be equivalent to a tax on wealth levied at a rate approximately 
equal to the taxpayer's marginal income tax rate times the rate of in-
flation. Even under the assumption of full accrual taxation, it would 
be a very peculiar wealth tax whose rate was proportional to the rate 
of inflation. Without regard to the income tax, inflation has the effect 
of redistributing income. For example, people with assets paying a 
fixed rate are hurt by increases in inflation, while people with fixed-
rate liabilities are helped. It is not at all clear that it is desirable to 
compound this implicit redistribution with a variable rate tax on 
wealth. Finally, it is a wealth tax that is levied only upon realization. 
5. Indexing Versus an Exclusion 
The discussion so far has assumed that capital gains are taxed at the 
same rate as ordinary income. Historically, of course, this assumption 
has not been true as generally, capital gains have been subject to re-
duced rates of tax. Thus, for example, prior to the 1986 Act, individu-
als were entitled to exclude 60% of recognized capital gains.95 Under 
current law, the statutory tax rate on capital gains for individuals is 
capped at 28%, as compared to a top rate of 39.6% on ordinary in-
come.96 One argument voiced in favor of a capital gains exclusion is 
93 CBO Capital Gains Report, note 75. A similar lock-in effect is created whenever the 
Code provides for a lower basis for losses than for gains. For example, when depreciated 
property is transferred by gift, the recipient takes a basis for gain equal to the donor's basis 
and a basis for loss equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of transfer. 
IRC § 1015. As a result, a lock-in effect is created because future appreciation will be tax-
free to the donor to the extent of the prior loss. 
94 See, e.g., Peter Diamond, Comments, in Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 322-
23; William Vickrey, An Updated Agenda for Progressive Taxation, Am. Econ. Ass'n Pa-
pers & Proc. 257 (May 1992). Vickrey argues that an unindexed tax is simply a tax on 
income plus a percentage of net worth: "it is in many respects a superior tax base, being 
broader and hence requiring lower marginal rates to achieve a given level of revenue and 
progressivity." I d. at 258. 
95 IRC § 1202 (before repeal by Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2218). 
96 IRC § 1(h) (providing for a maximum tax rate on capital gains of 28% ); IRC § 1(a)-
(d) (providing tax rates of up to 39.6% on ordinary income). The actual marginal tax rates 
on both ordinary income and capital gains exceed the statutory rates because of various 
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that an exclusion helps compensate for the effects of inflation without 
the complexity of full-scale indexation. 97 While this view is not with-
out merit, it is important to understand that an exclusion and indexa-
tion have very different effects. In particular, relative to indexation, 
an exclusion will either under- or over-compensate the taxpayer de-
pending on the holding period, the amount of real gain and the rate of 
inflation. 
To see that no single exclusion rate will work in all circumstances, 
define the optimal exclusion as the percentage exclusion such that a 
taxpayer is indifferent between indexation and the exclusion.98 Thus, 
for example, consider a taxpayer who purchases an asset for $1,000, 
holds the asset for five years during which time there is 5% annual 
inflation and the asset appreciates in real terms at 5% per year, and 
then sells the asset for $1,629.99 Absent indexation, the taxpayer 
would have taxable gain of $629. If, however, her basis in the asset 
were indexed, she would have an indexed basis of $1,276 and gain of 
only $353. If, rather than indexing her basis, she simply was permitted 
to exclude a portion of her gain, she would need to be able to exclude 
44% of her gain in order to be in the same position as under indexa-
tion. Thus, her optimal exclusion would be 44%. As indicated above, 
however, her optimal exclusion depends on her exact holding period, 
real gain and the inflation rate. Table 4 shows how the optimal exclu-
sion rate varies as a function of those factors. 
phaseouts based on adjusted gross income. See, e.g., IRC § 67(a) (2% floor on miscellane-
ous itemized deductions); IRC § 68(a) (phaseout of itemized deductions); IRC § 151(d)(3) 
(phaseout of personal exemptions). 
97 See Leonard E. Burman & Eric J. Toder, Indexing vs. Exclusion of Capital Gains: 
Effects on Income Distribution and Economic Efficiency, in 1992 Proceedings of the 85th 
Ann. Conf. on Tax., Nat'! Tax Ass'n 10 (1992) (comparing capital gains exclusion to index-
ing); W. David Klemperer & Cherie J. O'Neil, Effects of iin Inflation-Adjusted Basis on 
Asset Values after Capital Gains Taxes, 63 Land Econ. 386, 393-94 (1987) (comparing the 
effect of indexation and an exclusion on asset values) ; see generally CBO Capital Gains 
Report, note 75 (providing a comprehensive comparison of indexing and a 30% capital 
gains exclusion). 
While it is possible to justify a capital gains exclusion as an administratively attractive 
substitute for indexation, it is extremely difficult to justify the current cap on the capital 
gains rate as a substitute for indexation. A cap only benefits those taxpayers who have 
marginal rates in excess of the cap, while an exclusion provides relief to all taxpayers. 
Unfortunately, lower income taxpayers are as affected by inflation as are upper income 
taxpayers. See note 75 (discussing the fact that lower income taxpayers are more likely to 
have capital losses when inflation is taken into account). 
98 The purpose of the exclusion is presumed to be to put the taxpayer in the same posi-
tion under indexation and the exclusion. Neither the exclusion nor indexation takes into 
account the benefit of deferral. 
99 $1,629 = $1,000 X 1.055 X 1.055. 
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Table 4 
Exclusion rate as function of holding period , inflation r a te an d real 
growth rate 
'-
(Except as shown , assumes 5-year holding period , 5% inflation and 
5% r eal growth) 
A B c 
Holding Period Inflation Rate Growth Rate 
Holding Exclusion Inflation Exclusion Real Exclusion 
Period Percent Rate Percent Growth Rate Percent 
1 49% 0% 0% -5.0% -2221% 
2 48% 1% 15% - 2.5% 222% 
3 46% 2% 25% 0.0% 100% 
4 45% 3% 33% 2.5% 62% 
5 44% 4% 39% 5.0% 44% 
6 43% 5% 44% 7.5% 33% 
7 42% 6% 48% 10.0% 26% 
8 40% 7% 51% 12.5% 21% 
9 39% 8% 54% 15.0% 18% 
10 38% 9% 56% 17.5% 15% 
15 32% 10% 58% 20.0% 13% 
20 27% 11% 60% 22.5% 11% 
25 23% 12% 61% 25.0% 10% 
30 19% 13% 62% 27.5% 8% 
Thus, for example, Column A shows that if she held the asset for only 
one year, her optimal exclusion would increase to 49%, while if she 
held the asset for 20 years, it would drop to 27% . Similarly, Column B 
shows that as the inflation rate varies from 0% to 13%, the optimal 
exclusion varies from 0% to 62%. Thus, if an exclusion is set to com-
pensate for an expected rate of inflation, the exclusion either will be 
insufficient or overgenerous as inflation rises or falls relative to the 
expected rate. 
Even more significant is the variance of the optimal exclusion with 
respect to the real growth rate. Column C shows that as the asset's 
real growth rate varies from 0% to 27.5%, the optimal exclusion falls 
from 100% to 8%. Thus, under a fixed exclusion, taxpayers whose 
investments do well are taxed at a low rate, while those whose invest-
ments do poorly are taxed at a high rate. An exclusion operates in a 
particularly perverse fashion when taxpayers have nominal losses. In 
real terms, a taxpayer with a nominal loss has a larger (in absolute 
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terms) real loss. Yet, the effect of an exclusion is to reduce the abso-
lute size of a nominal loss, rather than to increase it. 100 
An exclusion also gives a preference to investments in assets that do 
not pay a current return. 101 Ignoring the question of deferral, the ag-
gregate benefit of indexation is essentially unchanged whether the re-
turn from an asset is paid out currently or is received through 
appreciation. An exclusion, on the other hand, gives no benefit to the 
portion of the return paid currently, only reducing a fraction of the 
return received through appreciation. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PRACTICAL CoNSIDERATIONS IN INDEXING 
CAPITAL GAINS 
As a practical matter, the decision to index and how to index de-
pends to a large extent on the practical details of indexation. In par-
ticular, as anyone who has dealt with the tax law knows, the concept 
of basis is central to the taxation of income from capital. As a result, 
the implications of indexing basis are manifold. The purpose of this 
Section is not to try to deal exhaustively with such issues, but rather to 
illustrate the type of issues that arise and the solutions that are 
needed.102 
A. Timing of the Indexation Adjustment 
One issue that arises is the timing of the indexation adjustment.l03 
If all nominal gains were taxed on a current basis, the timing of the 
indexation adjustment would be straightforward. Once the realization 
concept is introduced, however, the timing of the indexation adjust-
ment becomes less clear and, to a certain extent, arbitrary. In general, 
the optimal timing of the adjustment depends on the goal of indexa-
tion. One possible goal is to make the real effective tax rate in-
dependent of the rate of inflation. In that case, the inflation 
adjustment should be made whenever the inflationary gain otherwise 
would be taxable. A second possible goal is to make the real effective 
100 See note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the need for indexing loss assets). 
The discussion in the text assumes that an exclusion would operate to reduce capital losses 
as well as reduce capital gains. See, e.g., IRC § 1211 (b)(1)(C)(ii). 
101 See CBO Capital Gains Report, note 75, at 13-14 (discussing the effect of indexing 
versus an exclusion on assets that pay a current yield). 
102 In particular, the problems of indexing pass-through entities, such as partnerships, 
are not discussed in this Article. Partnerships and partnership interests pose significant 
complexities that must be dealt with under any indexation scheme. 
103 See generally Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for In-
flation, in Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax 347, 353-
72 (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1988) [hereinafter Uneasy 
Compromise]. 
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tax rate as close to the statutory rate as possible. In that case, the 
timing of the inflationary adjustment would depend on the timing of 
the nominal gain (that is, both the inflationary and the real gain) rela-
tive to the timing of gain under a full accrual system. 104 A final con-
sideration is the administrability of any proposed adjustment. 
To understand the implications of these goals, consider several pos-
sible assets: 1) an asset taxed on a full accrual basis; 2) vacant land 
held for investment; 3) an asset paying a current yield equal to the 
nominal rate (such as debt); and 4) dividend-paying stock. 
The easiest case is the full accrual asset. Since all gains and losses 
are taxed on a current basis, it must be the case that inflationary gains 
are being taxed currently. Therefore, if the goal is to neutralize the 
effects of inflation, the inflationary adjustments should be made cur-
rently. Correspondingly, if the inflation adjustment is made currently, 
the remaining real gain will be taxed currently and the effective tax 
rate will equal the statutory rate.l05 Accounting for the inflation ad-
justment currently is also the simplest approach administratively. 
Thus, all three goals imply the same timing of the inflation 
adjustment. 
With the vacant land, both nominal and real gains are taxed only 
upon disposition. Therefore, if the goal is to make the effective tax 
rate invariant to the inflation rate, the inflation adjustment must be 
taken at the time of disposition. From an administrative point of view, 
waiting until disposition of the asset is also most convenient. If, on the 
other hand, the goal is to time the inflation adjustment so as to make 
the effective tax rate as close as possible to the statutory rate, the ap-
propriate timing is somewhat unclear. Given that gain on the prop-
erty has been deferred, if the inflation adjustment is taken at the time 
the property is disposed of, the effective tax rate will be less than the 
statutory rate. If the goal is to increase the effective tax rate, the infla-
tion adjustment would have to be taken after the disposition of the 
property. Given the impracticality of delaying the adjustment until 
after the disposition of the property, the best solution again would be 
to take the adjustment at the time of disposition. 
In the case of the asset that pays a current yield equal to the nomi-
nal rate, such as debt, the appropriate time to take the indexation ad-
justment under either of the suggested standards is on an annual 
104 The simplest way to ensure that the effective rate is equal to the statutory rate is to 
tax the asset under a fully indexed current accrual system. 
105 Accounting for the inflation adjustments on an annual basis is not a unique solution. 
For example, it would be possible to maintain an effective tax rate equal to the statutory 
rate by accelerating some adjustments and delaying others. It is difficult, however, to see 
the advantage of such an approach. 
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basis.l06 Because all of the yield is paid out currently, it must be the 
case that the inflationary yield is paid currently and, therefore, if the 
goal is to correct the inflationary yield, the adjustment must be cur-
rent. Similarly, since the entire real yield is paid and taxed currently, 
the effective tax rate will equal the statutory rate if the yield is paid 
currently. Finally, although there are administrative advantages to 
making a single inflation adjustment upon termination, there are also 
administrative advantages to adjusting for inflation on an annual ba-
sis, rather than taxing the holder on an overstated yield currently and 
later permitting a loss due to the accumulated inflation adjustment. 
The dividend-paying stock is perhaps the most difficult case. Con-
sider, for example, stock that pays a 4% dividend and appreciates by 
4% per year in an environment where the inflation rate is 4%. It is 
possible to characterize the dividend payments as payment of the real 
income from the stock and the growth in the stock as inflationary, but 
such a characterization is inherently arbitrary. It would be equally 
possible to characterize the dividend payments as payment of the in-
flationary gains and the growth of the stock as the real yield (or any 
combination of the two). Thus, if the goal is to time the inflation ad-
justment to coincide with the recognition of the inflationary income, 
there is no unique solution. If the goal is to tax the stock so that the 
effective rate is as close as possible to the statutory rate, the appropri-
ate time to permit the inflation adjustment is at the time of disposi-
tion.107 Finally, on administrative grounds, it is probably simpler to 
defer the adjustment, rather than permitting an annual adjustment. 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, absent a uniform system 
for taxing all real and inflationary gains on capital assets, there is no 
uniform answer for when the inflation adjustment should be taken. In 
general, to the extent the current income from the asset includes the 
full nominal gain, the inflation adjustment should be permitted on a 
current basis. Assets that fall in this category include debt instru-
ments and assets subject to mark-to-market or expected mark-to-mar-
ket taxation such as § 1256 contracts and inventories accounted for on 
a mark-to-market basis.108 Where the current yield on the asset is less 
than or equal to the real yield, such as in the example of vacant land 
!06 It is possible to argue that only expected inflation should be accounted for on an 
annual basis and the difference between expected and actual inflation should be accounted 
for upon disposition. The better approach, however, is not to make any attempt to distin-
guish between actual and expected inflation. See Section IX for a discussion of indexation 
of debt. 
107 Given the assumption that the current dividend is equal in amount to the real yield, 
by deferring the inflation adjustment, the tax burden on the stock is the same as under a 
fully indexed, full accrual world. This discussion ignores the existence of the corporate tax. 
!OS For a more complete discussion of indexing full accrual assets, see text following note 
173. Depreciable property is another type of asset where the nominal income can be 
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held for investment, the indexation adjustment should be deferred un-
til a taxable disposition of the asset. Where the current yield falls be-
tween the real yield and the nominal yield, the outcome is less clear. 
In theory, the optimal solution would be to permit part of the inflation 
adjustment currently and defer the remaining adjustment. As a prac-
tical matter, such a division is likely to be impractical. The choice, 
therefore, is either to overtax the asset by deferring the adjustment 
until disposition, or to undertax the asset by permitting the deduction 
currently. 
The potentially more serious problem raised by having different 
rules for different types of assets, is the need to identify the category 
within which a particular investment falls. Due in large part to the 
rules for taxing debt instruments, debt generally will fall in the current 
adjustment category. Similarly, given the general rules for taxing 
stock, stock will fall into the deferred adjustment category. On the 
other hand, there may be cases where it is more reasonable to defer 
the adjustment for debt and to make the stock adjustment currently. 
For example, income on debt that pays contingent interest is often 
deferred, while preferred stock that pays a fixed dividend and does 
not participate in growth would seem to fit the current yield model.109 
Thus, relying on traditional debt/equity distinctions to determine the 
timing of indexation adjustments may not always be advisable. 
B. Indexing the Treatment of Dividends 
As discussed above, the timing of indexation adjustments with re-
spect to assets that pay periodic dividends or similar amounts is uncer-
tain. This uncertainty as to the timing of the inflation adjustment 
follows from the basic uncertainty as to the timing of income caused 
by the realization doctrine. Without regard to the level of inflation, it 
is necessary to decide whether a payment to the owner of an asset is in 
the nature of income or is a return of capital. The characterization of 
payments with respect to stock is a case in point.110 Periodic pay-
viewed as being taxed on a current basis. See Section VII (discussing indexing depreciable 
property). 
109 See Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (providing rules for debt instruments that pay contingent 
interest); text accompanying notes 322-29 (discussing the treatment of instruments that 
provide for contingent interest); see also Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 269 
(discussing the treatment of contingent interest under the proposed regulations) . For a 
further discussion of the question of the timing of inflation adjustments, see Halperin & 
Steuerle, note 103, at 371-72 (suggesting that the correct distinction is between assets 
whose values rise with inflation and those that do not and noting that no division is perfect 
in a tax system based on realization). 
110 The other key example is debt. See generally IRC §§ 1271-1278 (original issue dis-
count and related rules). For a discussion of indexation of debt, see Section IX. 
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ments with respect to corporate stock generally are presumed to be 
payments of income (dividends) to the extent of earnings and prof-
its.111 If there are inadequate earnings and profits, payments are 
treated as a return of capital. 112 Finally, payments in excess of basis 
are treated as gain on the sale of the stock.1 13 These rules are essen-
tially arbitrary, but are necessary given the arbitrary nature of the re-
alization requirement. Similarly, under indexing, any payment (or 
deemed payment) must be characterized as income or as a return of 
indexed basis. To properly characterize a payment, several steps are 
required. First, the earnings and profits of the corporation should in-
clude only real, not inflationary, gains. 114 Second, because they in-
clude historical calculations used for current purposes, the earnings 
and profits account itself must be indexed. Finally, if the payment is 
treated as a return of capital, the shareholder's basis must be indexed. 
The following example demonstrates this procedure. 
Example 2: Sarah contributes $100 to a corporation. The 
corporation invests in a single asset. After one year, the cor-
poration sells the asset for $115.50. Inflation during the pe-
riod that the corporation held the asset was 10%. The 
corporation has indexed gain of $5.50115 and, at a 34% rate, 
pays tax of $1.87, leaving it with $113.63. The corporation 
would have earnings and profits of $3.63 (the indexed gain 
minus the corporate tax).l16 
Assume that the corporation pays out all of its cash.117 The 
first $3.63 would be treated as a taxable dividend to Sarah. 
The remaining $110 would be treated as a return of basis. 
Sarah would have no gain or loss because her original basis 
of $100 would have been indexed to $110. 
Assume that instead of paying out the cash, the corporation 
invests the $113.63 in a second asset and holds the asset for 
five additional years during which time the asset appreciates 
by exactly the rate of inflation (10% per year). After five 
years, the corporation sells the asset for $183.00.118 The cor-
111 IRC § 316 (defining "dividend"). 
112 IRC § 301(c). 
113 IRC § 301(c)(3)(A). 
114 Thus, for example, depreciable property and inventory owned by the corporation 
must be indexed. See Section VII (indexing depreciable property) and Section VIII (in-
dexing inventory). 
115 $5.50 = $115.50- ($100 X 1.10). 
116 See IRC § 312 (providing rules for adjusting earnings and profits). 
117 The example assumes that the payments from the corporation are not treated as a 
redemption or liquidation. 
118 $183.00 = $113.63 X 1.105. 
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poration would have no gain on the sale of the asset because 
its indexed basis would exactly equal its sales price. There-
fore, it would have no additional earnings and profits. Its 
earnings and profits account, however, would have been in-
dexed over the intervening five years and would now equal 
$5 .85. 119 If the corporation pays out the $183.00, the first 
$5.85 would be treated as a taxable dividend and the remain-
ing $177.15 would be treated as a return of basis. The 
amount treated as a return of basis would equal Sarah's in-
dexed basis in the corporation.120 
C. Determining the Proper Indexing Period 
571 
To determine the proper indexing adjustment, in theory, it is neces-
sary to know the precise period for which the indexing adjustment is 
to be made and the precise amount of inflation over that period. In 
practice, it generally is desirable to trade off some degree of accuracy 
for administrability. In this light, the current system can be viewed as 
the ultimate tradeoff of accuracy for administrability, since it is 
equivalent to an indexation system where it is presumed either that 
the inflation rate is zero or that the indexation holding period is al-
ways zero. Against this benchmark, almost any change would be an 
improvement. 
Thus, for example, it is reasonable to use conventions to simplify 
issues such as the holding period and the amount of inflation over the 
holding period. On the other hand, it is important not to create a 
system where there are strong incentives for taxpayers to make tax 
driven decisions. For example, it would be simplest perhaps to require 
taxpayers to round their holding period to the nearest year, which 
would permit the Service to publish tables of annual indexing adjust-
ments and would permit taxpayers to aggregate investments made 
within a year. If, however, the holding period were rounded to the 
nearest year, there would be strong incentives for taxpayers to hold 
onto assets until just after they could receive another full year's index-
ation.121 The use of a shorter rounding period, such as a quarter, 
would increase the administrative burden, but perhaps would provide 
less incentive to hold onto assets merely to receive greater indexation 
119 $5 .85 = $3.63 X 1.105. 
12o Sarah's indexed basis would be $177.15. $177.15 = $100 x 1.106. 
121 NYSBA Report, note 53, at 767 (noting that taxpayers would have an incentive to 
hold onto assets just long enough to qualify for a indexation adjustment.) 
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adjustments. 12 2 An approach that may have merit would be to permit 
taxpayers to elect to use a more exact indexing method. Thus, sophis-
ticated taxpayers could index based on an exact holding period, while 
unsophisticated taxpayers could index based on an approximate hold-
ing period. 123 If the approximate holding period rules required tax-
payers to round their holding period down to the nearest unit (such as 
a year or quarter), an option to use an exact holding period would 
mean that a taxpayer who wished to dispose of an asset and was sensi-
tive to the indexing rules could elect to use an exact holding period, 
rather than continuing to hold onto the asset until the next unit was 
reached. 124 For example, assume that the normal rules rounded down 
the holding period to the nearest whole year. A taxpayer who wished 
to sell an asset that he had held for a year and 11 months would not 
need to hold onto the asset for another month to receive an indexing 
period longer than one year. He could, instead, simply elect to index 
based on his actual 23-month holding period.l25 Thus, the holding pe-
riod rules could be designed to avoid any lock-in effect. 
In any event, it should be evident that a clear disadvantage of index-
ing is that the holding period is much more significant than under cur-
rent law. Even with a capital gains differential, the holding period 
generally is relevant only for determining whether an asset has been 
held for more than or less than the statutory holding period-histori-
cally six months to a year. 126 Once an asset has been held for the 
prescribed period, its holding period is no longer relevant. 
122 Of course, the shorter the indexing period, the less additional time that an asset has 
to be held to receive the benefit of a greater indexing adjustment. Treasury recommended 
a quarterly indexing adjustment as part of their 1984 tax reform proposals. Treasury Dep't, 
2 Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 183 (1984) (hereinafter 
Treasury I]. 
123 While it is likely that the Service would publish tables of indexation adjustments only 
for the longer approximate holding periods, it would be reasonable to permit taxpayers to 
interpolate between dates on the table to compute the adjustment for exact holding 
periods. 
124 If such an election were permitted, there would be little reason not to permit it to be 
made on an asset-by-asset basis since the election essentially is uniformly in favor of the 
taxpayer and merely permits the taxpayer to compute his taxes on a more accurate basis. 
Permitting such an election might raise a concern that unsophisticated taxpayers (who pre-
sumably would not make the election) always would be treated less favorably than sophis-
ticated taxpayers (who presumably would make the election). 
125 If he chose to hold onto the asset for another month, he would receive another 
month's indexation, but the extra month of indexation merely reflects his actual additional 
holding period of one month. 
126 The holding period for long-term capital gains treatment is currently greater than 
one year. IRC § 1222(3). The holding period is significant for a number of provisions. 
See, e.g., IRC § 1(h) (providing for a maximum rate of 28% on net long-term capital 
gains); IRC § 170(e)(1) (providing more favorable rules for charitable donations of long-
term appreciated property) . The rules for determining holding period are contained in 
§ 1223. 
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With indexation, a taxpayer would need to know and retain evi-
dence of the acquisition date (or at least the acquisition year) until the 
property is sold. More significantly, holding period issues can become 
tremendously complex in substituted basis transactions, particularly 
where the basis (and holding periods) of several items of property are 
combined to form the basis (and holding period) of a single new piece 
of property (such as in a tax-free incorporation). 127 To some extent, 
the administrative burden of holding period issues can be reduced by 
tracking indexed basis as an ongoing matter. For example, where the 
basis of several assets is combined to determine the substituted basis 
in a new asset, the only information that would have to be carried 
forward is the aggregate indexed basis, and not the holding period of 
each separate component of basis. 
Another difference between determining the holding period for 
conventional capital gains analysis and for indexing is the manner in 
which the starting point for the holding period is ascertained. For pur-
poses of determining eligibility for long-term capital gains treatment, 
the holding period of an asset generally begins when the taxpayer first 
acquires the assets.128 For purposes of indexing, in theory, every pay-
ment with respect to an asset needs to be indexed separately from the 
day the payment is made until the day that the payment is accounted 
for. 
Example 3: Randy agrees on January 1, 1990 to purchase the 
Mona Lisa for $1,000 for delivery on January 1, 1992. Be-
cause of the various up-front expenses incurred by the seller, 
Randy agrees to pay $500 on January 1, 1991 and to pay the 
remaining $500 on January 1, 1992. On January 1, 1995, 
Randy agrees to sell the Mona Lisa for $2,000 cash on Janu-
ary 1, 1996. Assume for tax purposes, that Randy is treated 
as the owner of the property for the period January 1, 1992, 
through January 1, 1996 and that the early payment of the 
purchase price is not treated as a loan. Assume that inflation 
is 10% per year. 
Randy's tax liability for the sale is determined as of January 
1, 1996. His amount realized is $2,000. The only question is 
his properly indexed cost basis. Randy paid $500 in January 
1, 1991 dollars and $500 in January 1, 1992 dollars for the 
pamtmg. To properly measure his 1996 gain, both of these 
amounts must be indexed to 1996 dollars. Therefore, 
121 See, e.g., IRC § 358(a). 
12s IRC § 1223. 
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Randy's indexed basis is $1,537.31.129 Randy's gain ex-
pressed in 1996 dollars is $462.70. Note that his unindexed 
gain would have been $1,000 and, if all payments had been 
treated as being made on January 1, 1992, his indexed gain 
would have been $535.90. 
In the above example, the key is not the dates of ownership, but the 
dates that cash is paid. Although, in theory each separate payment 
must be separately indexed, as a practical matter, it would be possible 
to aggregate payments made within specified intervals, thereby lessen-
ing the administrative burden in cases involving multiple payments.13° 
An alternative approach for dealing with both prepayments and de-
ferred payments is to treat the prepayment or deferred payment as 
a separate debt instrument and to separately index the debt 
instrument.131 
D. Options to Purchase Assets 
The amount paid by the purchaser of an option (the "premium") 
should be indexed from the date of payment.132 In addition, if the 
option is exercised later, the payment of the strike price should be 
indexed from the date of exercise. 
Example 4: Tristan pays $10 on January 1, 1990 for the right 
to buy one share of IBM stock on January 1, 1991 for $100. 
There is 10% inflation. 
Assume, first, that the option expires worthless. Tristan 
would have a capital loss on January 1, 1991 when the option 
expires. The amount of his loss would be $10 in 1990 dollars. 
His correctly indexed loss is $11. 
Assume in the alternative that Tristan exercises the option 
on January 1, 1991 and sells the stock so acquired one year 
later on January 1, 1992. Tristan has made two capital invest-
129 $1,537.31 = ($500 x l.lcP) + ($500 x 1.104). 
130 The effect of rounding off a holding period to the nearest year or quarter is to aggre-
gate all payments made within the year or quarter. If exact holding periods are used, the 
taxpayer can simplify the administrative burden of keeping track of separate payments by 
maintaining a running total of indexed basis. See text following note 141. 
131 If the prepayment or deferred payment were treated as a separate debt instrument, it 
would be possible to impute a real interest component to the separate debt instrument as 
well as to index the instrument. See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: 
Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 Yale L.J. 506 (1986); Robert H . Scarborough, Pay-
ments in Advance of Performance, 69 Taxes 798 (1991) [hereinafter Payments]; Shuldiner, 
General Approach, note 79. 
132 Similarly, the premium paid for a cash-settlement option also must be indexed for 
both the buyer and writer of the option. 
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ments in the stock. First, he invested $10 in 1990 dollars. 
Second, he invested $100 in 1991 dollars. Each investment 
must be indexed over the correct period. His indexed basis 
is therefore $122.10. 133 
575 
In the case of the sale of a call option, the amount realized, not the 
basis, must be indexed. 134 In general, the seller of an option has no 
income until the option is exercised or expires worthless. 135 At that 
time, the seller takes the premium into income.136 Under an indexing 
system, the amount of the premium should be indexed from the date 
received through the date taken into income. 
Example 5: Assume Grace is the seller of the option 
purchased by Tristan in Example 4. Grace therefore receives 
a $10 option premium on January 1, 1990. 
Assume that the option expires worthless. Under current 
law, Grace would have income of $10 on January 1, 1991. 
This income, however, is measured in 1990 dollars. To prop-
erly adjust for the fact that the tax is being paid in 1991 dol-
lars, the income should be indexed. Therefore, her correctly 
indexed gain is $11.137 The amount of the seller's gain is, of 
course, exactly equal to the amount of the buyer's loss. 
Alternatively, assume that Tristan exercises the option pay-
ing Grace the $100 strike price on January 1, 1991. Grace has 
now received two payments. First, she received $10 in 1990 
dollars. Second, she received $100 in 1991 dollars. The $10 
payment must be indexed to 1991 dollars. Grace's amount 
realized, properly measured in 1991 dollars, is therefore 
$111_138 For purposes of determining Grace's gain, her basis 
in the stock, of course, also would be indexed. 
E. Treatment of Improvements and Other Subsequent Capital 
Investments 
The treatment of capital improvements is straightforward. As with 
an option premium, every dollar invested in an asset must be ex-
133 $122.10 = ($10 X 1.102) + ($100 X 1.10). 
134 The sale of an option is an example of a much broader principle, namely that liabili-
ties as well as assets require indexation. 
135 Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195 (1938) (holding that 
option premium was income in the year that option was surrendered), aff'd, 99 F.2d 919 
(4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939). 
136 Id. 
137 $11 = $10 X 1.10. 
138 $111 = ($100 + $10) X 1.10. 
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pressed in terms of dollars in the year of sale. Therefore, each addi-
tion to basis should be indexed separately according to the time the 
original investment was made. 
Example 6: Liza purchases property in 1990 for $1,000. In 
1995, she makes a $500 improvement to the property. Under 
§ 1016(a)(1), $500 is added to Liza's basis in the property. 
Liza sells the property in 1997. Assume that inflation is 10% 
per year between 1990 and 1995, and 5% a year between 
1995 and 1997. 
Liza's indexed basis consists of two parts, her indexed basis 
from her original purchase, $1,776,139 plus her indexed basis 
from her improvement, $551.140 Her total indexed basis is, 
therefore, $2,327. 
An equivalent procedure to determine indexed basis is to keep a 
running total of indexed basis. Under this procedure, the cost of a 
capital improvement simply is added to the indexed basis to date. 
That total is then indexed forward. This procedure works equally well 
for reductions to basis_14 1 
Example 7: In Example 6, Liza's indexed basis could be de-
termined by keeping a running total. In that case, her in-
dexed basis immediately prior to the $500 capital 
improvement would be $1,611.142 Her indexed basis immedi-
ately after the capital improvement would be $2,111.143 Her 
indexed basis at the time of sale, $2,327, would be deter-
mined by indexing the $2,111 figure for an additional two 
years.144 Her total indexed basis determined under the cu-
mulative approach is the same as it is when separately 
tracked and indexed in Example 6. 
It is important to remember that capital improvements include not 
only physical improvements to property, but any amount that must be 
capitalized under existing law. For example, any expense required to 
be capitalized under the uniform capitalization rules145 should be in-
139 $1,776 = $1,000 X 1.105 X 1.052. 
140 $551 = $500 X 1.052. 
141 For a discussion of holding period, see text following note 120. 
142 $1,611 = $1,000 X 1.105. 
143 $2,111 = $1,611 + $500. 
144 $2,327 = $2,111 X 1.052. 
145 IRC § 263A; see also lndopco v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992) (requiring 
certain costs of arranging for a friendly takeover to be capitalized because they were ex-
pected to generate a future benefit). 
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dexed in the same manner as physical capital improvements. As a 
practical matter, it probably would be necessary to adopt conventions 
to simplify the tracking of such expenditures. For example, it would 
be possible to treat all expenditures under a certain threshold as if 
they were made at the end of the taxable year or at some other speci-
fied time. 146 
F. Dividend Reinvestment Plans 
Similar issues of complexity are raised by the existence of dividend 
reinvestment plans, which are generally available with regulated in-
vestment companies ("mutual funds") and many other large corpora-
tions.l47 If an individual invests in a mutual fund with a monthly 
dividend reinvestment plan for 10 years, the individual will have 120 
distinct blocks of stocks, each with its own basis and holding period.l48 
For the average taxpayer, indexing would appear to present a formi-
dable obstacle. 
The example, however, overstates the problem caused by indexing. 
First, much of the complexity exists in the absence of indexing. Under 
current law, the taxpayer still would have 120 distinct blocks of stock, 
each with its own basis. Upon sale, the taxpayer would be required to 
specifically identify which shares he was selling or would be subject to 
a first-in first-out rule for allocating basis.149 Second, depending on 
the convention adopted for determining the length of the indexation 
period, the number of separate indexing computations may be far 
fewer. For example, if all purchases are presumed to be made on the 
last day of the taxable year, the taxpayer would have only 10 indexing 
factors to use in computing his gain or loss on sale. 
Finally, even without indexing, there is a strong argument to be 
made for requiring broker reporting of gain, rather than gross sale 
proceeds, on the sale of shares of mutual fund stock.l50 Such a report-
146 For a discussion of holding period, see text following note 120. 
147 A dividend reinvestment plan is an arrangement whereby dividends automatically 
are used to purchase new stock in the corporation. 
148 The basis for each block of stock would depend on the price of the mutual fund on 
the day that the dividend was reinvested. The holding period for each block would begin 
on the same day. 
149 Reg.§ 1.1012-l(c). In the case of stock of a regulated investment company, the tax-
payer also can elect an average basis method. Reg. § 1.1012-l(e). 
150 Compare IRC § 6045 (requiring broker reporting of gross sale proceeds) with Tax 
Simplification and Technical Corrections Bill of 1993, H.R. 3419, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 522(a) (passed by the House Ways and Means Committee on November 3, 1993) 
(amending§ 6045 to require certain mutual funds to report the basis of shares sold as well 
as gross sales proceeds). H.R. 11 included the same provision when it was passed by the 
House and Senate on October 6, 1992 and October 8, 1992, respectively, and vetoed by 
President Bush on November 4, 1992. H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4622 (1992). 
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ing requirement would be likely to greatly increase the accuracy of 
reported gain on the sale of mutual fund shares. If such a reporting 
requirement were adopted, indexing would pose only a small addi-
tional burden to the reporting entities.l 51 
G. Short-Term Investments 
Proposals for indexing frequently require minimum holding peri-
ods.152 While such rules may be dictated by administrative concerns 
or by mher policy considerations (such as a desire to encourage long-
term investment), there is no underlying theoretical basis for such 
rules. In fact, as discussed above,153 inflation has a more significant 
effect on the mismeasurement of gain from short-term investments 
than it does on long-term investment. The following two examples 
illustrate this point. The examples assume a continuous 5% real 
growth rate and 10% inflation rate. 
Example 8: Chris purchases an asset for $100. He holds the 
asset for one month and sells the asset for $101.21. Chris' 
nominal gain is therefore $1.21, his indexed basis is $100.80 
and his real gain is $0.41. Inflation has caused his gain to be 
overstated by a factor of three. 
Example 9: Angelica purchases an asset for $100. She holds 
the asset for 10 years and sells it for $422.49. Her nominal 
gain is $322.49, her indexed basis is $259.37 and her real gain 
is $163.12. Inflation has caused her gain to be overstated by 
a factor of two. 
151 I do not mean to suggest that shifting the burden to the mutual fund is without cost, 
but only that the cost would not be as great as some have suggested, and that the burden 
would be borne most efficiently by the mutual fund. See, e.g., Edwin S. Cohen, The Pend-
ing Proposal to Index Capital Gains, 45 Tax Notes 103, 104-05 (Oct. 2, 1989) (stating that 
individual taxpayers would make a large number of mistakes in any indexing system, and 
would expect "professionals" such as brokerage houses to include indexing results on bro-
kerage and other reports). An intriguing possibility would be to permit mutual funds to 
elect to report indexed gains and provide that a taxpayer would be entitled to indexing 
only if reported by the mutual fund. I would guess that most mutual funds would make the 
election. Some mutual funds already report taxable gain as a courtesy to their sharehold-
ers. If mutual funds were required to report indexed gains, it would be necessary to pro-
vide uniform rules for determining holding periods so that the indexed basis reported by 
the mutual fund was not affected by any shareholder election. 
152 See, e.g. , H.R. 4210, note 73, at § 2101 (providing for a minimum one-year holding 
period). Treasury I had a somewhat more lenient requirement of a full calendar quarter. 
Treasury I, note 122, at 183. Even under Treasury I, however, a taxpayer could hold an 
asset for almost six months and still not be entitled to an inflation adjustment. 
153 See text accompanying notes 58-69. 
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Examples 8 and 9 demonstrate that as a percentage of the gain, the 
inflation adjustment is greater the shorter the holding period.154 In 
addition, the taxpayer in the later example benefits from deferraJ.1 55 
The fact that, in the absence of indexation, the mismeasurement of 
short-term gain is more pronounced than the mismeasurement of 
long-term gain suggests the need to develop indexing rules that work 
for short-term as well as long-term gain. 
H. Short Sales 
A short sale is a transaction where a person sells property that he 
has borrowed.156 A short sale is closed when the short seller returns 
the borrowed property (the "replacement property"). The replace-
ment property may be newly purchased or may be property already 
owned by the seller. When a person makes a short sale of property 
that is substantially identical to property he currently owns, the trans-
action is referred to as "selling short against the box." Where the per-
son does not own substantially identical property, the transaction is 
referred to as a "naked short sale." 
A short sale against the box can be used to lock in gain or loss on 
property owned by the taxpayer, while postponing the sale of the 
property. This may be done for tax-motivated reasons, such as defer-
ring the gain on the sale, or for nontax reasons. A naked short sale is 
equivalent to a bet that the value of the property will decline before 
the short seller is required to cover his position. A naked short sale 
may be entered into for speculative reasons or may be entered into to 
hedge other activities of the taxpayer. For example, short sales of 
Treasury bonds can be used to hedge anticipated borrowings.l57 
A short seller receives cash in one period (at the time of the short 
sale) which is not taken into income until a later period (when the 
short sale is closed).158 At that time, gain or loss is determined by 
comparing the amount realized on the short sale with the basis of the 
property used to close the short sale.159 As with the sale of an option, 
154 For a discussion of the need for indexing with short holding periods, see text follow-
ing note 57. 
155 See text following note 64. 
156 See generally 3 Jonathan M. Karpoff, Short Selling, in The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Money & Finance 445 (Peter Newman, Murray Milgate & John Eatwell eds., 1992). 
157 If interest rates decline, bond prices will rise and the short seller will have a loss on 
the short sale. He will, however, get the offsetting benefit of lower borrowing costs. Simi-
larly, if rates rise, he will have a profit on the short sale, but will suffer increased borrowing 
costs. 
158 IRC § 1233. 
159 Under current law, there are rules designed to prevent taxpayers from converting 
short-term gain into long-term gain by selling short against the box. IRC § 1233(b ); see 
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in order to properly reflect the short seller's economic gain stated in 
terms of dollars at the time of the closing of the short sale, the amount 
received at the iime of the short sale must be indexed. 
Example 10: Diva thinks IBM stock, which is currently trad-
ing at $100, is overvalued. Accordingly, in June 1990, she 
sells 50 shares of IBM short for $5,000. Her broker borrows 
the necessary shares for delivery. One year later, when IBM 
is selling for $95, she closes out the short sale by having her 
broker purchase 50 shares to replace the borrowed shares. 
Her cost for closing out the short sale is $4,750. Her 
unindexed gain is, accordingly, $250. 
Given inflation, Diva's gain is mismeasured because the 
amount received is measured in 1990 dollars while her basis 
is measured in 1991 dollars. To correctly measure her gain in 
1991 dollars, her amount realized must be indexed. Accord-
ingly, assuming 10% inflation, her gain should be $750.160 
Indexing has the effect of increasing her gain by $500 or 
200%. 
Example 10 assumes that the indexation adjustment would be taken 
when the short sale is closed. In some cases, however, it may be more 
appropriate for the indexation adjustment to be taken while the short 
sale is still open. A short seller generally is required to make payment 
to the lender of the property being sold short in lieu of any missed 
dividends. Similarly, if a debt instrument is sold short, the short seller 
would make payments in lieu of any missed coupons. As a general 
rule, the timing of the indexation adjustment on a short sale should 
correspond to the timing of the indexation adjustment on the underly-
ing property. Thus, assuming that the indexation adjustment on the 
underlying stock would be made upon disposition of the stock, it 
would be appropriate for the indexation adjustment on the short sale 
of stock to be made when the short sale is closed. 161 Correspondingly, 
assuming that the indexation adjustment on the underlying debt 
would be made currently, it would be appropriate for the indexation 
adjustment on the short sale of debt to be made currently. 
Absent indexing, a person who sells short against the box has an 
inflation induced overstatement of gain on his long position and an 
inflation induced understatement of gain on his short position at the 
also IRC § 1233( d) (preventing taxpayers from taking short-term losses on short sales 
while taking long-term gains on substantially identical property) . 
160 $750 = ($5 ,000 X 1.10) - $4,750. 
161 See text accompanying notes 106-07 (discussing the timing of indexation adjustments 
on stock and debt). 
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time at which he closes out his short position. The fact that these two 
mismeasurements are in the opposite direction suggests that instead of 
indexing both positions, it might be possible to index neither position 
for the period in which the short sale is open. 162 In general, however, 
the two inflation adjustments will be of different magnitudes and, 
therefore, will not offset each other. If, at the time the short sale is 
entered into, the long position has a real unrealized gain, indexing 
both positions will produce a net increase in taxable income. If, at the 
time of the short sale the long position has a real unrealized loss, in-
dexing both positions will produce a net decrease in taxable income. 
It is only in the case where there is no real unrealized gain or loss on 
the long position that the two indexing adjustments will be exactly 
offsetting. Since taxpayers tend to sell short against the box when the 
long position has an unrealized gain, on average a rule with no index-
ing during a short sale against the box is likely to be beneficial to 
taxpayers and subject to abuse.163 
Example 11: Assume the same facts as in Example 10, ex-
cept that Diva also owns 50 shares of IBM at the time of the 
short sale. Moreover, assume that her indexed basis in the 
IBM stock is $5,000. Thus, if she sold her long position, she 
would have no gain or loss. One year later, Diva closes out 
her short position and has an indexed gain of $750. Her 
unindexed gain would have been $250. Indexing, therefore, 
increases her gain by $500. 
At the same time, Diva sells her long position for $4,750. Af-
ter indexing her basis for the remaining year, Diva has a $750 
loss on the sale of the stock.l64 If Diva were not permitted to 
index the long position while she was also in a short position, 
her loss would have been only $250.165 Therefore, indexing 
for the additional year increases her loss by $500. 
Combining the two transactions, both with and without in-
dexing, Diva would have net income of zero. In this exam-
ple, where there is no unrealized gain or loss in the long 
t62 See, e.g., H.R. 4210, note 73 (providing that the holding period for indexing will be 
tolled when a taxpayer has a short sale against the box). 
163 If the long position is selling at a loss, it generally will be in the taxpayer's interest to 
sell the long position, thereby recognizing her loss. If the long position is selling at a gain , 
it will be in the taxpayer's interest to hold the long position, thereby deferring her gain. It 
seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that most short sales against the box involve ap-
preciated assets. 
l64 $750 = $4,750 - ($5,000 X 1.10). 
l65 $250 = $4,750 - $5,000. 
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position, Diva and the fisc are indifferent as to indexing over 
the period in which she has a short sale against the box. 
Example 12: Assume the same facts as in Example 11, ex-
cept that Diva's indexed basis at the time of the short sale is 
only $1 ,000. Thus, if she were to sell her long position, she 
would have a gain of $4,000. 
As in Example 11, when Diva closes out her short position, 
she has an indexed gain of $750 and an unindexed gain of 
$250. As before, indexing increases her gain by $500. Also 
as in Example 11, Diva sells her long position for $4,750 at 
the same time she closes out the short sale. After indexing 
her basis for the additional year, Diva has an indexed gain of 
$3,650 on the sale of the stock.166 If Diva were not permitted 
to index the long position while she was also in a short posi-
tion, her gain would have been $3,750.167 Therefore, index-
ing for the last year decreases her gain by only $100. 
Combining the two transactions, with indexing, Diva would 
have net income of $4,400.168 Without indexing during the 
short sale period, Diva would have net income of $4,000_169 
Where there is unrealized gain, Diva benefits from a no in-
dexing rule and the fisc loses a corresponding amount. 
Thus, as shown by Example 12, suspending indexation when there is a 
short sale against the box may lead to a small reduction in administra-
tive costs, but it generally will lead to an incorrect computation of gain 
or loss. 
I. Forward Contracts 
In a typical forward contract, the forward purchaser agrees to 
purchase a specified quantity of property for a specified price (the 
"forward price") at a specified time in the future from the forward 
seller. Generally, payment is made at the time of delivery. In a cash-
settlement forward contract, in lieu of delivery of the property, a cash 
payment is made based on the difference between the forward price 
and the actual market price (the "spot price") at the time when deliv-
ery otherwise would be made. 
166 $3,650 = $4,750- ($1,000 X 1.10). 
167 $3,750 = $4,750 - $1,000. 
168 $4,400 = $750 + $3,650. 
169 $4,000 = $250 + $3,750. 
r 
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Example 13: Assume that University knows that it will need 
to purchase one million gallons of #2 home heating oil in a 
year. University could fix the cost of its oil purchase by en-
tering into a one-year forward contract to purchase the oil. 
Alternatively, University could fix the cost of its oil purchase 
by entering into a one-year cash-settlement forward contract 
for #2 home heating oil and purchasing the actual oil on the 
spot market. Under the contract, the seller of the contract 
would agree to pay University the excess, if any, of the spot 
price of oil one year hence over the contract price, multiplied 
by one million gallons. In turn, University would agree to 
pay the seller of the contract the excess, if any, of the con-
tract price over the spot price multiplied by one million 
gallons. 
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Clearly, the forward price and the actual value at maturity of the 
forward contracts in Example 13 are dependent on, among other vari-
ables, the expected and actual rates of inflation, respectively. Despite 
the interrelationship, however, between the profit (or loss) on the 
contracts and the rate of inflation, no indexing is required. Indexing is 
not required because, as in the case of wage income, the parties have 
no investment or basis (either positive or negative) in the contract.17° 
As a result, their economic income from the contract is properly mea-
sured in current dollars at the time of payment. It is only where there 
has been a prior investment or payment that inflation produces a mis-
measurement of economic income. If, in the above example, Univer-
sity had made a prepayment towards its obligation under the forward 
contract, its prepayment would need to be indexed in order to prop-
erly compute its gain or loss on the contract.l71 
]. Notional Principal Contracts 
Notional principal contracts need to be indexed any time amounts 
are accounted for at a time other than when they are paid or received. 
For example, if a taxpayer purchases a interest rate cap, the premium 
for the cap must be accounted for over the life of the cap.l72 In order 
170 See Section V (discussing wages). 
171 See note 131 (discussing prepayments). 
172 See generally Reg. § 1.446-3 (taxation of notional principal products). An interest 
rate cap is an agreement to make periodic payments equal to a specified notional principal 
amount times the excess, if any, of the level of an interest rate index over a specified rate. 
See Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(4) (ex. 1) (providing an example of an interest rate cap). 
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to properly account for the cap premium, the premium must be in-
dexed both by the purchaser and writer of the cap agreement. 173 
Assuming full-scale indexation, indexing notional principal products 
would be straightforward. Greater difficulties would arise if Congress 
were to decide to index capital assets, but not debt. In such a circum-
stance , it might be difficult to decide whether a particular notional 
principal contract was more like an asset or a debt instrument. 
K. Assets Taxed on a Full Accrual Basis 
In certain circumstances, taxpayers are required or permitted to ac-
count currently for gains and losses on assets without regard to a reali-
zation event.l74 Thus, for example, § 1256 requires taxpayers to 
accrue currently gains and losses on a mark-to-market basis on so-
called § 1256 contracts, including certain futures contracts, foreign 
currency contracts and options.175 Under a mark-to-market system, a 
taxpayer is treated as if he sold the property for its fair market value 
as of the end of the taxable year and immediately repurchased the 
property for the same price. Therefore, the deemed amount realized 
in each year becomes the deemed basis for the computation of gain in 
the following year. In general, proper inflation accounting requires 
that, as of the end of the first year, the taxpayer's cost basis be in-
dexed for the inflation that occurred since the purchase date. Addi-
tionally, as of the end of each subsequent year, the taxpayer's basis 
from the deemed purchase as of the beginning of the year must be 
indexed for the inflation that has occurred in the intervening year. 
Example 14: On July 1, 1990, Alec purchases for $1,000 an 
asset required to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis. The 
asset is worth $1,100 on December 31, 1990, $1,300 on De-
cember 31, 1991, and $1,400 on June 30, 1992, at which time 
Alec closes out the contract. Assume that there has been 5% 
inflation during the first half year 10% inflation during the 
next full year and 5% inflation during the last half year. 
Absent indexing, Alec would have taxable income of $100 
the first year, equal to the difference between the fair market 
value of the asset at the end of the taxable year and his 
173 Similarly, any amount paid for an off-market swap must be indexed. See Reg. 
§ 1.446-3( f)( 4) (Ex. 5) (providing an example of an off-market swap). See the discussion of 
partial indexing in Section IX. For a discussion of notional principal products and their 
taxation , see Shuldiner, note 79, at 247-83. 
174 See note 70 (discussing various provisions requiring or permitting full accrual 
taxation) . 
175 IRC § 1256. 
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$1,000 purchase price. With indexing, Alec would have taxa-
ble income of only $50, because his basis would be indexed 
for the one-half year that he held the contract.l76 In both 
cases, Alec's basis in the asset would be increased to $1,100. 
For the second year, without indexing, Alec would have in-
come of $200, equal to the difference between the asset's end 
of year fair market value of $1,300 and his new basis of 
$1,100. With indexing, Alec would have income of $90, equal 
to the difference between the fair market value of the asset 
and his basis indexed for an additional year.177 In both cases, 
Alec's basis in the asset would be increased to $1,300, the 
asset's fair market value. 
Upon disposition, Alec would have an additional $100 of 
gain without indexing and $35 with indexing.178 
585 
While the previous example demonstrates how indexing would 
work in general for assets that are taxed on a full accrual basis, there 
are additional problems raised by a broad category of transactions 
subject to § 1256, so-called regulated futures contracts_179 A regulated 
futures contract is defined as a contract traded under a system where 
gains and losses on the contract are paid on a daily basis.180 In gen-
eral, since regulated futures contracts are entered into at current mar-
ket prices and all gains and losses are paid currently, a party to a 
regulated futures contract has no basis in the contract and no indexing 
is required. The following example illustrates the lack of basis in a 
regulated futures contract. 
Example 15: On November 1, 1994, Emily enters into a reg-
ulated futures contract to buy 1,000 ounces of silver on 
March 1, 1995 at the then market futures price of $4 per 
ounce. Because the contract is priced at market, Emily pays 
nothing to enter into the contract and, as a result, has no 
basis in the contract.181 
On November 15, 1994, the futures price for March silver 
increases to $4.10 per ounce. Under the rules of the ex-
change, Emily's account is credited with $100, 1,000 times 
176 $50 = $1,100 - ($1,QQQ X 1.05). 
177 $90 = $1,300 - ($1,100 X 1.10). 
178 $35 = $1,400- ($1 ,300 X 1.05). 
179 IRC § 1256(a) applies to "section 1256 contracts," defined to include regulated fu-
tures contracts. IRC § 1256(b ). 
1so IRC § 1256(g). 
1s1 Emily may have to make a deposit with her broker to guarantee her obligations 
under the contract. Any such deposit would raise separate indexing issues. 
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the increase in the per-ounce price of silver. Assume the 
price of March silver remains at $4.10 through January 15, 
1995, at which time Emily closes out the contract. 
Under § 1256, Emily would be treated as if she sold her con-
tract for $100, its fair market value on December 31, 1994. 
Emily's initial basis in the contract would be zero, the 
amount she paid for the contract. Since her basis is zero, no 
indexing is required and she would be properly taxable on 
her gain of $100. In addition, since Emily already has re-
ceived payment of her $100 gain, she would still have a zero 
basis in the contract even after she has recognized gain. 
On January 15, 1995, Emily would have no amount realized 
of zero and a basis of zero and would have no further gain or 
loss on the contract.182 
L. Transferred and Exchanged Basis Transactions 
In certain nonrecognition transactions, a person acquiring an asset 
generally receives a transferred basis, that is a basis equal to the basis 
of the transferor of the asset. In general, the recipient of an asset in a 
transferred basis transaction should have a basis equal to the indexed 
basis of the transferor. For example, the recipient of a gift generally 
has a basis equal to the donor's basis in the gift.l83 Thus, the recipient 
of a gift should take a basis equal to the basis of the donor, indexed 
for the period between the donor's acquisition of the asset and the 
date of the gift. 
In other nonrecognition transactions, the acquiror of property is 
given an exchanged basis, that is, a basis equal to the basis of property 
182 Although a party to a regulated futures contract has no basis, she does have, for 
example, income throughout the period over which she was a party to the contract. In 
theory, it might be desirable to index her income so that her tax is paid in dollars that have 
the same value as the dollars in which she received or paid her income. Thus, in the exam-
ple in the text, Emily receives $100 on November 15, but does not take it into taxable 
income until December 31 and does not pay tax on it until some later date. This problem, 
however, is no different from the problem of a person who receives wages during the year 
and pays taxes on the wages at some later point. Absent high levels of inflation, it is not 
worth indexing income in this fashion. See note 195. 
183 IRC § 1015. If, at the time of the transfer, the transferor's basis in the property 
exceeds the property's fair market value, then for purposes of determining loss, the basis is 
the fair market value. Under indexation, the indexed carryover basis first would be com-
pared with the fair market value of the property to determine whether there is unrealized 
real loss at the time of the transfer. If there were unrealized loss, the transferee would 
have a basis for loss purposes equal to the fair market value of the property and a basis for 
gain equal to the indexed carryover basis. Both the basis for loss and the basis for gain 
subsequently would be indexed for any future inflation. 
• 
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given up in an exchange. In general, the acquiror of an asset in an 
exchanged basis transaction should have a basis equal to the indexed 
basis in the original asset. Thus, for example, in a like kind exchange, 
the taxpayer's basis in the new property should be equal to his basis in 
the old property indexed for the period beginning on the date he ac-
quired the old property and ending on the date of the exchange. 184 
With both transferred and exchanged basis transactions, it generally 
would be equally correct to give the acquiror of the new asset a basis 
equal to the original unindexed basis, but with a tacked-on holding 
period. The optimal rule depends on the precise administrative de-
tails of the indexing scheme adopted. The following example illus-
trates the equivalence of the two rules: 
Example 16: Quentin acquires an asset for $100 in 1990. In 
2000, Quentin gives the asset to Ely. Ely sells the asset in 
2005. Assume there has been 5% inflation throughout. 
Under current law, Ely has a transferred basis. 
Alternative 1: Ely would be treated as having received an 
asset with an indexed basis. Therefore, as of 2000, her basis 
would be $259, determined by indexing Quentin's cost basis 
for the 10 years that Quentin held the asset.l85 At the time of 
sale, Ely would index her $259 basis for the additional five 
years that she held the asset and accordingly, would have a 
basis of $418 at the time of sale.186 
Alternative 2: Ely would be treated as having received an 
asset with an unindexed basis, but her holding period would 
be deemed to have begun when Quentin acquired the asset. 
Under this approach, her basis at the time of sale also would 
be $418.187 
M. Cash 
In theory, cash should be indexed in the same manner as any other 
asset. Assuming 10% inflation, if a taxpayer receives $100 cash on 
June 1, 1994 and uses the cash to make a purchase on June 1, 1995, the 
taxpayer, in effect, has suffered a loss because the cost of the cash, 
184 More precisely, the taxpayer's basis in the new property would be the indexed basis 
of the property exchanged, decreased in the amount of any money received by the tax-
payer and increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss to the tax-
payer that was recognized on the exchange. IRC § 1031(d). The gain or loss recognized on 
the exchange would be determined after indexation. 
185 $259 = $100 X 1.1010• 
186 $418 = $259 X 1.105 
187 $418 = $100 X 1.1015 . 
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when measured in 1995 dollars, was $110.188 In essence, cash should 
be treated simply as a form of property and indexed accordingly. 
Given the administrative difficulty of tracking and indexing cash hold-
ings, it would be undesirable to index cash, absent extreme rates of 
inflation.189 Additionally, as inflation rates rise, taxpayers can protect 
themselves against inflationary losses from holding cash by reducing 
their cash balances.I9o 
V. INDEXING W AGES 
Wages and other compensation for services present perhaps the 
clearest example of a type of income for which no indexing is neces-
sary. To see that no indexing is required for wages, consider a simple 
example: 
Example 17: In 1993, Emily has taxable wages of $100,000. 
Assuming a tax rate of 33%, Emily's tax liability is $33,000. 
Over the following year, all prices (including wages) increase 
by 10%. In 1994, therefore, Emily has taxable wages of 
$110,000 and a tax liability of $36,300. 
As a result of inflation, Emily's tax liability increased by $3,300 or 
10%. Emily, however, is no worse off and the fisc is no better off than 
before the inflationary increases in prices because $1.10 paid in 1994 
has the same real value as $1.00 paid in 1993. In real terms, measured 
in constant 1993 dollars, Emily's liability has stayed constant at 
$33,000. (Alternatively, measured in 1994 dollars, Emily's liability has 
stayed constant at $36,300.) The proper test of Emily's real tax liabil-
ity is the amount of goods and services that Emily has had to forgo in 
each year to satisfy her tax liability. By definition, $33,000 would have 
bought the same amount of goods and services in 1993 as $36,300 will 
buy in 1994. Therefore, her real tax liability has been unaffected by 
inflation.191 
188 $110 = $100 X 1.10. 
189 Although it may seem perverse to treat cash as property, that is precisely the general 
rule with foreign currency. See generally IRC § 988; Reg. § 1.988-0 to -5. But see Reg. 
§ 1.988-1(a)(9) (removing foreign currency held for personal purposes from the application 
of § 988). 
190 Assuming that bank deposits were indexed, taxpayers could receive the protection of 
indexation by holding their cash as bank deposits. Also, depending on the details of imple-
mentation, cash balances held by entities are effectively indexed to the owner of the entity. 
For example, if a taxpayer transferred $100 in cash to a wholly-owned corporation, the 
taxpayer would receive the benefit of indexation on the $100 through the increase in his 
indexable basis in the stock of the corporation. 
191 The example assumes that the tax structure has been fully indexed. 
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In general , therefore , wages require no indexing because the mea-
surement of income from wages , as well as the resulting tax liability, is 
measured only in terms of current period dollars. It is only where the 
current determination of income is based on dollar values from previ-
ous periods that indexing is required to measure income accurately_192 
Moreover, the conclusion that indexing is unnecessary generally 
holds for deferred compensation as well as compensation that is paid 
when earned. In general , when an individual is paid deferred compen-
sation, the entire amount of deferred compensation is included in in-
come only when received. 193 In other words, the individual has no 
basis in the deferred compensation. As a result, the computation of 
income and the resulting tax liability is based on entirely what are 
current-period dollars when paid and indexing is unnecessary. 
Example 18: In addition to her current compensation, Em-
ily's employer agrees to pay her $30,000 in 1996 for the work 
she performed in 1993. In 1993, Emily's employer deposits 
into a qualified trust an amount sufficient to fund the 
$30,000. In 1996, Emily is paid $30,000 from the trust. Em-
ily's income for 1996 would include the full $30,000 deferred 
compensation payment without any basis offset. Since the 
entire computation of income in 1996 is based on an amount 
paid in 1996, there is no need to adjust for inflation. 
Although the amount of inflation between 1993 and 1996 would be 
relevant for determining the value of the payment expressed in 1993 
dollars, Emily's tax liability in 1996 is measured properly based on the 
value of the payment in 1996 dollars. 
Even in the case of wages, certain simplifying assumptions have to 
be made. Wages for any taxable year generally are received over 
time. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not correct simply to add the 
total wages for the year without adjusting for the time of each pay-
ment. Similarly, taxes on the wages are paid over time. To a signifi-
cant extent, however, these two factors cancel out because of wage 
192 If taxpayers were permitted to capitalize and amortize investments in human capital , 
they in essence would have a basis in wages and indexation would be necessary. 
193 Individuals generally are not taxable on deferred compensation paid through a quali-
fied pension plan. See generally IRC § 401 (defining a qualified trust) ; IRC §§ 402, 403 
(providing generally that benefici aries of qualified deferred compensation arrangements 
are taxable upon receipt of the deferred compensation); IRC § 408 (providing rules for 
individual retirement accounts) . Generally, in the case of deferred compensation through 
a nonqualified trust, individuals are taxable at the time contributions are made to the trust 
or, if later, when the contributions vest. See IRC §§ 402(b ), 83. In such cases, indexing 
would be necessary. 
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withholding.194 Thus, for example, if a taxpayer is paid weekly and 
the resulting tax liability is withheld contemporaneously, the two ef-
fects offset each other exactly. In any event, as long as inflation rates 
are relatively low, the effect of this type of mistiming is relatively in-
significant and generally can be ignored.195 
VI. INDEXING RENTS 
In general, rent involves only a current payment of income (or ex-
pense) that is properly measured in current dollars. Thus, there is no 
need to make an indexing adjustment. In other words, rent (the cur-
rent payment for the use of physical capital) should be treated in the 
same way as wages (the current payment for the use of human capi-
tal) .196 The fact that it is unnecessary to index rent is not always 
clearly understood. To see more clearly that no adjustment for infla-
tion generally is required, consider a simple case of a lease where the 
rent is reset each year to the current market rate. Each year the lessee 
pays for the current rental value of the property. Although the rent is 
measured each year in inflated dollars, the corresponding tax effects 
also are measured in equally inflated dollars and there is no need to 
194 IRC §§ 3401-3406 (providing, inter alia, for mandatory wage withholding); IRC § 31 
(providing a refundable tax credit for withholding). A similar relationship exists between 
self-employed income and estimated taxes. IRC § 6654 (providing penalties for failure to 
pay quarterly estimated taxes); IRC § 6315 (treating payments of estimated taxes as pay-
ments on account of income taxes). 
195 In a hyperinflationary economy, even the shortest lag between receipt of income and 
payment of tax can be critical. To take an extreme example, for the period 1989-90, Peru 
had inflation of 7,650%. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 249 (1991). At 
such a rate of inflation, a one-month delay between the receipt of wages and the payment 
of taxes would reduce the effective tax rate by over 40%. More recently, the former Yugo-
slavia reported an annual inflation rate of almost 200 billion percent. Barbara Demick, 
Yugoslavia Benumbed by 12-Digit Inflation, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 20, 1993, at Al. 
One circumstance where it may be inappropriate to ignore the time gap between the 
earning of taxable income and the payment of taxes is where a firm has a net operating 
loss. In general, a firm with a net operating loss is permitted to carry the loss back for up 
to three years and forward for up to 15 years. IRC § 172. Thus, a firm may be deducting a 
cost in one year that actually was paid 15 years earlier. At a 5% inflation rate, the cost will 
have lost about one-half of its value. The solution is to index net operating loss carry backs 
and carryforwards. Under indexation, a net operating loss carried back would be reduced 
by dividing the amount by the appropriate indexation factor to reflect the greater value of 
the dollar in the earlier year. A net operating loss carried forward would be increased by 
the appropriate indexation factor to reflect the lesser value of the dollar in the future year. 
Of course, net operating losses that are carried forward also lose value because of the real 
discount rate. In general, similar considerations apply to any provision that permits car-
ryforwards or carrybacks. See, e.g. , IRC § 39 (business credits); IRC §53 (alternative min-
imum tax credit) ; IRC § 465 (at-risk rules) ; IRC § 469 (passive losses); IRC § 904(c) 
(foreign credit) ; IRC § 1212 (capital losses). 
196 See Section V (demonstrating that wages do not require indexation). Although this 
Section refers to rent and the use of physical capital , the discussion applies with equal force 
to royalties and other payments for the use of intangible capital. 
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make any type of indexing adjustment. The essential fact 1s that all 
computations are made in current dollars.l97 
One source of confusion with rents is that in a competitive market 
in long-run equilibrium, rents are equal to the interest cost of carrying 
the property plus depreciation.1 98 Given that it is necessary to index 
both depreciation and interest,199 it seems logical that it would be sim-
ilarly necessary to index rent. The apparent logic is, however, decep-
tive. Consider first the rent on nondepreciable land in the absence of 
inflation with no carrying costs other than interest. Assume that a 
lessor owns land worth $1,000 and the real (and nominal) interest rate 
is 4%. The cost of carrying the land for one year is 4% and, therefore, 
the market rent would be $40. Now assume that there is also 6% in-
flation and that the nominal interest rate is 10%.200 Unlike the case of 
a lender whose principal is repaid in nominal currency and needs to 
charge sufficient interest to cover the loss of real principal, the lessor's 
"principal" is repaid in real goods, the land, and there is no need to 
add an inflation component to the rent.2°1 Thus, despite the presence 
of inflation and the higher nominal interest rate, the rent on the land 
should remain unchanged at $40 for the year. In the second year, the 
rent increases by 6% to $42.40 to reflect the increased nominal value 
197 The discussion in the text ignores differences between the time that the rent accrues 
during the year, the time payment is made and the time that taxes are paid. Thus, for 
example, if rent is received on July 15 and the resulting tax liability is paid on the following 
April 15, the taxpayer has the privilege of paying taxes in reduced dollars as well as bene-
fiting from the real interest savings on the deferral. This timing problem arises throughout 
the tax law and largely is dealt with by the estimated tax provisions. See note 194. 
198 See, e.g., Robert E. Hall, Tax Treatment of Depreciation, Capital Gains, and Interest 
in an Inflationary Economy, in Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of Income from 
Capital 149 (Charles R. Hulten ed., 1981) (hereinafter Depreciation and Inflation] (show-
ing that absent tax distortions, the rental price of capital goods is the real interest rate plus 
real depreciation); David F. Bradford & Don Fullerton, Pitfalls in the Construction and 
Use of Effective Tax Rates, in Depreciation and Inflation, supra, at 251; Dale W. Jorgen-
son & Martin A. Sullivan, Inflation and Corporate Capital Recovery, in Depreciation and 
Inflation, supra, at 171. Market rents also would include any other carrying costs of the 
property, such as insurance and maintenance. The real interest rate is the nominal interest 
rate minus the rate of inflation. The nominal interest cost is computed by reference to the 
value of the property, not by the amount of debt secured by the property. If the property 
is fully debt financed, the nominal interest cost is the actual nominal interest paid. To the 
extent that the property is not fully debt financed, the nominal interest cost represents the 
opportunity cost of continuing to hold onto the property, rather than selling the property 
and investing the proceeds at the market rate of interest. 
199 See Sections VII, IX. 
200 The assumption that the nominal interest rate would rise just by the amount of infla-
tion is equivalent to the assumption that the Fisher rule holds. See note 226. 
201 If the land is fully debt financed, the lessor has a net cash outflow of $60 ($100 inter-
est expense minus $40 rental income), but is compensated by the $60 increase in the nomi-
nal value of the land (or, equivalently, by the decrease in the real value of her obligation to 
repay the principal on the debt) . 
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of the land.202 The increased rent, however, like the nominal increase 
in an individual's wages, is properly measured in current dollars and 
continues to require no inflation adjustment. 
The example is more complicated where the property depreciates, 
but the essential elements are the same. The lessor needs to be com-
pensated for the real cost of owning the property, which includes the 
real depreciation and the real interest cost. In nominal terms, these 
costs may increase with inflation, but the resulting rent is stated cor-
rectly in current dollars. Of course, the fact that depreciation and in-
terest are not indexed properly means that there may be tax-induced 
distortions in the pricing of rent, but adjusting the rent deduction 
seems a very indirect way of compensating for the mistaxation of de-
preciation and interest.2°3 Moreover, in an otherwise fully indexed 
world, the taxation of interest and depreciation already would be cor-
rected for inflation and no further adjustment would be appropriate 
for rent. 
The apparent discrepancy between the need to index debt (a loan of 
money) without the corresponding need to index a lease (a loan of 
property) follows from the differences between the fundamental ac-
counting rules adopted for leases and debts. In particular, the key 
difference between a borrower and a lessee is that the borrower is 
treated as the owner of the proceeds of the loan while a lessee is not 
treated as the owner of the underlying property. Thus, the borrower 
is treated as having basis in the loan proceeds (and any property 
purchased with such proceeds) while the lessee is not. This ownership 
interest and the resulting basis produce the need for indexing. Simi-
larly, the lessor is treated as the owner of the underlying property, but 
not generally as the owner of a separate leasehold interest.204 Accord-
ingly, there generally is no need to keep track of basis in the lease and, 
therefore, no opportunity to mismeasure basis in current dollars.205 
202 The nominal value of the land increases from $1,000 to $1,060. $42.40 = 4% x $1,060. 
203 In the absence of indexation, the lessor's interest deduction is overstated and the 
lessor's depreciation deduction is understated. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the over-
all effect on the market price of rents. 
204 See, e.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (refusing to permit taxpayer to 
allocate basis to a payment in lieu of rent). 
2os There are a variety of tax consequences that flow from the difference between a lease 
and a loan. For example, if at the end of the term of a loan, a debtor repays less than the 
full amount of a debt (whether in cash or property), the debtor has cancellation of indebt-
edness income, while, if at the end of the term of a lease the lessee returns property whose 
value has diminished, the lessee has no corresponding income. 
Another difference between a lease and a loan is that the parties' choice of timing on a 
lease is given substantially more deference than on a loan. Compare IRC § 467 (rent level-
ing in certain limited circumstances) with IRC §§ 1272-1288 (original issue discount and 
related provisions) . Professor George Mundstock has proposed removing the distinction 
between leases and loans by treating the lessee as an owner of the underlying property and 
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While generally neither a lessor nor a lessee has a basis in its lease-
hold interest, there are numerous exceptions. In such cases, there 
may be a need to make appropriate adjustments for inflation. For 
example, if a taxpayer purchases a leasehold interest, the interest gen-
erally is treated as an intangible asset and the lessor/purchaser is per-
mitted to amortize her basis.206 Under such circumstances, the 
amortization deductions should be indexed.207 
The preceding discussion is based on the assumption that the parties 
to the leasing agreement have allocated the rent over the term of the 
lease properly. By this I mean that the rent payable for each period is 
the arm's length rent for the period and not a deferred payment for an 
earlier period or a prepayment for a later period. In other words, the 
discussion assumes that all payments are current in an economic as 
well as a legal sense. Unfortunately, even where a lease is an arm's 
length transaction, there is no guarantee that the parties have allo-
cated the rental payments over the term of the lease properly. A lease 
essentially is an agreement by the lessor to permit the lessee use of 
property in exchange for a stream of payments. As an economic mat-
ter, the parties generally are indifferent between different payment 
streams with equal present values.208 Thus, for example, assume that 
the properly allocated rents for Blackacre are $1,000 per year. Given 
a 10% discount rate, the parties to a five-year lease would generally 
be indifferent between paying $1,000 per year, $3,791 at the com-
mencement of the lease (a prepaid lease), or $6,105 at the termination 
of the lease (a deferred lease). As an economic matter, a prepaid 
lease is essentially a lease combined with an implicit loan from the 
treating the rental payments as interest and principal on a loan. As the owner of the prop-
erty, the lessee would be entitled to depreciation deductions. George Mundstock, Taxation 
of Business Rent, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 683, 700-06 (1992). Under Professor Mundstock 's ap-
proach, the lessee's interest and depreciation expenses would need to be indexed. Id. at 
755. See the discussion of misallocated rent in text following note 207. 
206 See IRC § 167 (generally permitting amortization of depreciable assets); Reg. 
§ 1.167(a)-3 (clarifying that intangible assets are subject to depreciation); IRC § 178 (pro-
viding rules for determining the depreciable life of leasehold interests) . In some circum-
stances, a lessor who also owns the remainder interest in the property is permitted to 
separately allocate basis to the leasehold. Compare Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959 
(7th Cir. 1941) (permitting owner of both the leasehold and residual interest in property 
subject to a lease to separately allocate basis to the leasehold interest) with Moore v. Com-
missioner, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953) (prohibiting separate allocation of basis to lease-
hold interest by owner of residual interest). 
207 See Section VII (discussing indexing depreciation). 
20s The parties may not be indifferent as a tax matter. In addition, the appropriate dis-
count rate is a function of risk, which in turn is a function of the timing of payments rela-
tive to the timing of the use of the property. For example, when payments for any period 
are made after the period in question, the lessor loses any ability to restrict the lessee's use 
of the property for failure to make payment. 
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lessee to the lessor and a deferred lease is a lease combined with an 
implicit loan from the lessor to the lessee. 
Without regard to inflation, the failure to distinguish between de-
ductible rental payments and nondeductible principal on loans 
presents opportunities for tax avoidance.209 Congress responded to 
the problem of implicit loans in rental agreements by enacting 
§ 467 .210 In general, under § 467, payments under rental agreements 
that are made before or after the period to which the rents are prop-
erly allocable are treated as loans and interest is imputed.211 Once a 
209 See generally Mundstock, note 205, at 755. 
210 The problem of implicit loans arising from prepayments and deferred payments 
arises in almost any economic transaction. See, e.g., IRC §§ 483, 1274 (imputing interest 
with respect to deferred payments for property); IRC §§ 1272, 1273 (imputing interest with 
respect to deferred payments in a lending transaction); IRC § 467(g) (providing regulatory 
authority to impute interest with respect to deferred payments for services); Reg. § 1.446-
3(g)( 4) (imputing interest with respect to prepayments in certain notional principal con-
tracts) . For a discussion of the appropriate treatment of prepayments and deferred pay-
ments, see generally Halperin, note 131 ; Scarborough, Payments, note 131; Shuldiner, 
General Approach, note 79. 
211 IRC § 467(a)(2) . Strictly speaking, the statute only imputes interest when rent is 
deferred. Section 467(f) , however, provides regulatory authority to promulgate compara-
ble rules for prepaid rent. 
It is not sufficient to provide that interest will be imputed any time that a payment is 
deferred or accelerated without also providing a standard against which to determine when 
the payment should have been made. Thus, for example, the original issue discount rules 
adopt the constant yield assumption as such a framework . See Joseph Bankman & William 
A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking into Account the Term Structure 
of Interest, 44 Tax L. Rev. 335, 338 (1989); Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 267-
68; Theodore S. Sims, Long-Term Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and the Case for 
Accrual Taxation, 47 Tax L. Rev. 313, 316-17 (1992). Section 467 takes two different ap-
proaches to the allocation problem. In what are perceived to be nonabuse cases, § 467 
respects the parties' allocation of rents and merely puts both parties on the accrual basis 
and imputes interest when rental payments are deferred relative to the period to which 
they are allocated. IRC § 467(a), (b)(1). In abuse cases,§ 467 rejects the parties' alloca-
tion of rents and adopts the assumption that rents should accrue ratably over the term of 
the lease ("level rents"). IRC § 467(b)(2). A rental agreement is deemed to be abusive if 
1) it provides for nonlevel rents that do not meet certain safe harbors 2) the agreement is 
part of a sale-leaseback transaction or for a term exceeding 75% of the statutory recovery 
period of the property; and 3) a principal purpose for providing nonlevel rents is the avoid-
ance of taxes. IRC § 467(b )(3)-(5). 
Unfortunately, the level rent assumption is even less well-founded in economic reality 
than is the constant yield assumption in the case of interest. In real terms, generally rent 
would be level only in the case of property that was expected to maintain a constant value 
over time. Thus, for example, the level rent assumption might be appropriate for certain 
real estate, while it would clearly be inappropriate for equipment rentals where the fair 
market rental would be expected to decline over time as the equipment depreciates. In the 
presence of inflation, rent leveling would only be correct in the case of property whose real 
fair market rental was declining each year at a rate equal to the rate of inflation. Perhaps 
coincidentally, the level rent assumption may be reasonably accurate for depreciable prop-
erty at moderate rates of inflation. Thus, without inflation or at very low rates of inflation, 
it generally would be appropriate to adopt a declining rent assumption for equipment and 
a level rent assumption for real property; at moderate rates of inflation, it generally may be 
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rental agreement is accounted for as a loan, however, the problem of 
inflation reappears. In particular, it becomes necessary to index the 
implicit loan.212 
VII. I NDE XING D E PRECIABLE PROPERTY 
A. In General 
As with any other asset purchased in one period and accounted for 
in another period, depreciable property must be indexed for inflation 
in order to measure income properly.213 The effect of failing to index 
depreciation can be seen by comparing two simple examples, one 
without inflation and the other with moderate inflation. 
Example 19: David purchases a machine that without addi-
tional costs produces one widget a year for two years. The 
widgets can be sold immediately and costlessly for $100. 
Given the prevailing interest rate of 5%, David pays $186 for 
the machine.214 Once the machine has produced its first wid-
get, its value falls to $95, reflecting the fact that it is now 
expected to generate $100 in one year.215 The machine, 
therefore, depreciates $91 in its first year. Once the machine 
has produced its second widget it becomes worthless, depre-
ciating an additional $95. 
For his first year of operation, David reports gross income of 
$100 from the sale of the widget, takes a depreciation deduc-
appropriate to adopt a level rent assumption for equipment and an increasing rent assump-
tion for real property. 
On the other hand, the best justification for the level rent assumption in § 467 is that it is 
adopted for administrative convenience, not for economic reasons. Accordingly, there is 
no particular need to change the level rent assumption merely because inflation is taken 
into account. But see IRC § 467(b)(5) (permitting increasing rents determined by refer-
ence to price indices). 
Professor Mundstock would reject the level rent assumption altogether and essentially 
estimate economic rents based on depreciation and interest. See Mundstock, note 205. 
212 See the discussion of indexing debt in Section IX. 
213 See generally text following note 42. Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers esti-
mate that the failure to index depreciation accounted for between 7% and 38% of taxes 
paid by nonfinancial corporations during the period 1954 to 1977. Martin Feldstein & 
Lawrence Summers, Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector, 
32 Nat'! Tax J. 445, 449 (1979). The period over which they estimate the effect of inflation 
on depreciation precedes the substantial acceleration of depreciation provided by the ac-
celerated cost recovery system beginning in 1981 and, to a lesser extent, the modified accel-
erated cost recovery system beginning in 1987. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. 
L. No. 97-34, § 201 , 95 Stat. 172, 203; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201, 
100 Stat. 2085, 2121. See text accompanying notes 220-31 (discussing accelerated deprecia-
tion as a substitute for indexation). 
214 The present value of $100 per year for two years at a 5% discount rate is $186. 
215 The present value of $100 in one year at a 5% discount rate is $95. 
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tion of $91, and has taxable income of $9. For his second 
year of operation, David reports gross income of $100, de-
preciation of $95 and taxable income of $5. 
Example 20 shows the effect of moderate inflation on Example 19: 
Example 20: Assume the same facts as in Example 19 except 
that there is 5% inflation between the first and second year. 
Thus, the second widget is sold for $105, rather than $100. 
For his first year of operation, David again reports gross in-
come of $100, depreciation of $91, and taxable income of $9. 
In the second year of operation, given the change in the price 
level, David reports gross income of $105 from the sale of 
widgets. Assuming that David is still permitted an 
unindexed depreciation deduction of $95, David's taxable in-
come is $10. 
Thus, in Example 20, a modest 5% inflation causes a 100% increase 
in taxable income, showing that the failure to index depreciation can 
have dramatic effects on the taxation of business profits. 
A preliminary question in indexing depreciable assets is whether 
the adjustment should be made annually or only upon final disposition 
of the asset.216 Given the general assumption that the nominal income 
generated by a depreciable asset is included in income currently, it is 
appropriate for the indexation adjustment also to be made 
currently.217 
Once the decision has been made to index currently, there are a 
variety of equivalent techniques that can be used to compute the 
amount of indexed depreciation. Economic depreciation is the de-
216 See text accompanying notes 102-09 for a general discussion of timing indexing 
adjustments. 
217 Depreciation generally is permitted on a current basis because it is presumed that the 
income from the asset also is taxed on a current basis; therefore, a current deduction is 
necessary to match income and expense properly. IRC § 167 (permitting a current deduc-
tion for depreciation); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 11 (1974) ("When the 
asset [being depreciated] is used to further the taxpayer 's day-to-day business operations, 
the periods of benefit usually correlate with the production of income. Thus, to the extent 
that equipment is used in such operations, a current depreciation deduction is an appropri-
ate offset to gross income currently produced."). When the income from the asset is 
deferred, depreciation generally is deferred. See IRC § 263A (generally requiring capitali-
zation of expenses, including depreciation, incurred in the production or resale of prop-
erty); Idaho Power, 418 U.S. 1 (holding that depreciation on equipment used in 
construction must be capitalized into the basis of the constructed property) . Permitting a 
current deduction for economic depreciation has the effect of making an income tax neu-
tral with respect to choice among asset lives. Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of 
Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 604 (1964). 
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cline in the real value of the asset over the taxable period.21 8 In the 
absence of inflation, depreciation, therefore, is equal to the difference 
between the value of the property at the beginning and end of the 
period. In the presence of inflation, it is necessary to measure the 
decline in value in constant dollars. Thus, stated in terms of end-of-
period dollars, depreciation for the period is equal to the value at the 
beginning of the period, adjusted upwards for inflation, minus the 
value at the end of the period. 
Example 21: Emily purchases an asset for $1,000 to use in 
her business. The asset depreciates in real terms at the rate 
of 30% per year. In the absence of inflation , the asset would 
be worth $700 at the end of the first year. Accordingly, Em-
ily should be entitled to a depreciation deduction of $300 for 
the first year. 
Assuming 10% inflation, however, at the end of the first 
year, the asset would be worth $770. Emily's indexed basis 
for the asset, however, would be $1,100. Accordingly, Emily 
should be entitled to a depreciation deduction of $330. Her 
remaining indexed basis in the asset should be $770. 
Equivalently, depreciation could be indexed simply by first indexing 
the taxpayer's basis and then multiplying the taxpayer's indexed basis 
by the depreciation rate. 
Example 22: In the absence of inflation, Emily's deprecia-
tion deduction in Example 21 could be determined by multi-
plying Emily's basis, $1,000, by the depreciation rate, 30%. 
Thus, Emily would be entitled to $300 of depreciation. 
With 10% inflation, Emily's depreciation deduction could be 
determined by multiplying Emily's indexed basis, $1,100, by 
the real depreciation rate, 30%. Thus, Emily would be enti-
tled to $330 of depreciation. Her remaining basis of $770 
would be determined by subtracting her indexed deprecia-
tion from her indexed basis.21 9 
218 See, e.g., Graetz, note 44, at 391. See text following note 220 for a discussion of 
accelerated depreciation. 
219 As a third alternative, depreciation could be indexed by permitting the taxpayer to 
multiply the otherwise allowable depreciation deduction by an indexing factor. The factor 
would be equal to the inflation index at the time the deduction was permitted divided by 
the inflation index at the time the property was purchased. Note that generally the appro-
priate starting point for purposes of computing the inflation adjustment would be the time 
that the property was purchased, not the time that the property was placed in service. 
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The marginal information and other administrative costs of index-
ing depreciation would be small because computing depreciation de-
ductions under current law already requires keeping careful track of 
the basis of assets. 
B . Accelerated Depreciation 
An argument against indexing depreciation is that accelerated de-
preciation provides a simpler and adequate substitute to indexed de-
preciation.220 Table 5 demonstrates the relationship between 
accelerated depreciation and indexed real depreciation using a hypo-
thetical $1,000 asset that is assumed to depreciate in real terms on a 
straight-line basis.nl 
Table 5 
Comparison of indexed and accelerated depreciation 
A B c D E F G 
Indexed Economic 
Depreciation 
Economic 2 % 5% 10% Accelerated One-Shot 
Year Depreciation Inflation Inflation Inflation Depreciation Depreciation 
1 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 375 $909 
2 200 204 210 220 325 0 
3 200 208 221 242 200 0 
4 200 212 232 266 100 0 
5 200 216 243 293 0 0 
Total 1,000 1,041 1,105 1,221 1,000 909 
PV-7% 876 909 934 909 
PV-10% 831 909 909 909 
PV-15% 765 909 871 909 
220 The failure to index depreciation as part of the 1986 Act likely was due in part to a 
concern over complexity. Treasury I and Treasury II recommended indexing depreciation. 
2 Treasury I, note 122, at 152-72; Treasury Dep't, The President's Tax Proposals to the 
Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity 138-49 (1985) [hereinafter Treasury II]. The 
House bill provided for indexing by one-half of the amount by which inflation exceeded 
5%; the Senate bill eliminated indexation entirely in favor of continued use of accelerated 
depreciation, and the House receded in conference. See H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 154-55 (1985) (describing the House bill indexation procedure); S. Rep. No. 313, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-105 (1985) (describing the Senate depreciation rules); and H .R. 
Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess II-45 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 
4) 45 (indicating that the conference agreed to follow the Senate provision). See generally 
Halperin & Steuerle, note 103, at 347 (discussing accelerated depreciation as an ad hoc 
solution to indexation). 
221 For ease of exposition, I assume that each year's depreciation deduction is taken at 
the beginning of the year. The straight-line assumption is adopted for convenience; expo-
nential depreciation generally is considered a more realistic assumption. See Charles R. 
Hulten & Frank C. Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Depreciation, in Depreciation 
and Inflation, note 198, at 93 (econometric study showing that depreciation tends to be 
exponential). 
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Column B shows the economic depreciation for the asset measured in 
constant dollars. Column D shows the depreciation that would be 
permitted under indexed economic depreciation with 5% inflation. 
As can be seen in Column D, each year the depreciation deduction is 
increased by the inflation rate to reflect the declining real value of the 
dollar. At the bottom of each column is the total amount of deprecia-
tion permitted over the life of the asset and the present discounted 
value of the depreciation allowances using various discount rates. In 
particular, note that the row labeled "PV-10%" shows that the present 
value of indexed depreciation under 5% inflation and an assumed real 
interest rate of 5% would be $909.222 
As an alternative to indexed depreciation, consider the hypothetical 
accelerated depreciation schedule shown in Column F.223 As shown 
in the table, the present value of the accelerated depreciation, at the 
10% discount rate, is $909, exactly equal to the present value of the 
indexed depreciation in Column D. Thus, the example in Table 5 
demonstrates that an accelerated depreciation schedule can be chosen 
to be equivalent in present value terms to indexed economic 
depreciation.224 
There are, however, a variety of problems with using accelerated 
depreciation in lieu of indexing.225 The primary problem is that accel-
erated depreciation can at best compensate for expected, not actual 
inflation. If, after the accelerated depreciation schedule has been set, 
the inflation rate changes, the two approaches lose their equivalence. 
Consider first an increase in the inflation rate to 10% and assume that 
222 The 10% discount rate reflects the assumed combination of 5% inflation and a 5% 
real interest rate. The exact discount rate used was 10.25%, reflecting annual com-
pounding. 10.25% = [(1 + 5%) x (1 + 5%)] - 1. See Section IX for a discussion of the 
effect of inflation on interest rates. 
223 The accelerated depreciation schedule in Table 5 was chosen arbitrarily from the 
infinite number of accelerated depreciation schedules that have the same present value as 
the indexed real depreciation. The choice of accelerated depreciation schedules is depen-
dent on assumptions as to the expected real interest rate and the expected inflation rate. 
In the table, both rates are assumed to be 5%. 
224 Column G in Table 5 shows the result under so-called one-shot depreciation. One-
shot depreciation is described in the text at note 268. 
225 See Martin Feldstein, Adjusting Depreciation in an Inflationary Economy: Indexing 
Versus Acceleration (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 395, 
1979) (comparing accelerated depreciation and indexed depreciation). I do not mean to 
suggest by the comparison between indexed real depreciation and accelerated depreciation 
that the use of accelerated depreciation should be seen solely as an attempt by policymak-
ers to compensate for inflation. To the extent that accelerated depreciation is intended to 
act as a subsidy for capital investment, the failure to index the accelerated depreciation 
blunts the incentive effects. Of course, if Congress wished to provide incentives for invest-
ment in depreciable assets, it always would be possible to provide for indexed accelerated 
depreciation. The advantage of indexed accelerated depreciation over unindexed acceler-
ated depreciation is that with indexation, the amount of the incentive is not dependent on 
the level of inflation. 
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the real interest rate remains constant at 5%.226 Column C shows the 
depreciation that would then be allowed. Note that the present value 
of the indexed depreciation, now computed at a 15% discount rate 
(PV -15% ), remains constant at $909, while the present value of the 
accelerated depreciation declines to $871.227 Correspondingly, as 
shown in Column B, if the inflation and discount rates were to de-
crease to 2% and 7% (PV-7%), respectively, the present value of the 
indexed economic depreciation would remain constant at $909 while 
the present value of the accelerated depreciation would increase to 
$934.228 As the example in Table 5 shows, accelerated depreciation 
designed to compensate for an expected inflation rate of 5% would be 
inadequate to deal with an actual inflation rate of 10%.229 Similarly, 
the accelerated depreciation would be overly generous if the inflation 
rate dipped to 2%.23° Thus, at times of relatively high inflation, fixed 
accelerated depreciation will encourage taxpayers to under invest in 
depreciable equipment, and at times of relatively low inflation fixed 
226 The assumption that the real interest rate remains constant at 5% is consistent with 
the strict version of the Fisher rule for interest rates. Under the strict Fisher rule, the 
nominal interest rate, and therefore the discount rate, increases by approximately 1% for 
every 1% increase in the inflation rate. Under the modified Fisher rule, the nominal inter-
est rate would increase by more than 1% for every 1% increase in the inflation rate. See 
Section IX. If the modified Fisher rule is empirically correct, then the effect of inflation on 
the value of accelerated depreciation would be magnified. 
227 The discount rate increases to 15% to reflect the higher inflation rate. The exact 
discount rate used is 15.5%. 15.5% = [(1 + 5%) x (1 + 10%)]- 1. 
228 The discount rate decreases to 7% to reflect the higher inflation rate. The exact 
discount rate used is 7.1 %. 7.1% = [(1 + 5%) x (1 + 2% )] - 1. 
229 See, e .g., Dale W. Jorgenson & Kun-Young Yun, Tax Reform and U.S. Economic 
Growth, 98 J . Pol. Econ. S151 (1990) (discussing effect of inflation on cost of capital). 
230 Changes in the inflation rate after a taxpayer invests in equipment should be distin-
guished from changes after Congress sets the accelerated depreciation schedule, but before 
the taxpayer invests. If the inflation rate changes after the taxpayer has invested in the 
equipment, the change will affect his effective tax rate, but generally will not affect his 
incentive to invest. Therefore, concern primarily should be one of equity, not efficiency. If 
the inflation rate changes before the taxpayer has invested, it will affect his incentive to 
invest, raising an efficiency concern. Of course, the risk of changes in the rate of inflation 
may affect the taxpayer's level of investment even if the rate has not changed between the 
time that Congress sets the rate and the taxpayer considers making an investment. 
If the primary concern is with efficiency, an alternative to full scale indexing would be to 
have the Service publish new depreciation schedules each year indexed to changes in the 
inflation rate. Under such a system, taxpayers would bear the risk of increased or de-
creased inflation after they had made an investment, but the expected tax rate on invest-
ment would remain relatively stable. There are, however, a variety of serious problems 
with resetting depreciation annually. For example, if there were an increase in inflation 
and, therefore, an acceleration of depreciation schedules, taxpayers might have an incen-
tive to churn their investments. In addition, taxpayers would have an incentive to delay or 
accelerate investment to take advantage of or avoid expected changes in the depreciation 
schedules. Finally, such a system would increase the administrative burden on taxpayers 
and the Service. 
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accelerated depreciation will encourage taxpayers to over invest in de-
preciable equipment_231 
Perhaps more importantly, inflation generally will cause non-neu-
tral changes across asset lives. As a result, not only will taxpayers 
have the wrong incentive to invest in depreciable assets, but also given 
the amount of investment in depreciable assets, taxpayers will have 
the incentive to invest in the wrong mix of assets lives.232 The bias 
among asset lives not only affects the production mix within firms and 
sectors of the economy, but also affects the allocation of capital 
among production sectors.233 Overall, due to the inflation induced 
production inefficiency, for any given level of investment, the amount 
of goods and services produced will be less than could be produced 
with the optimal mix of investment.234 
231 To the extent that accelerated depreciation also is intended to provide an incentive to 
invest in depreciable equipment, the incentive will become larger than intended at times of 
low inflation and will become smaller than intended, and even perhaps negative, at times 
of high inflation. 
232 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Inflation and the Choice of Asset Life, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 
621 (1979); David F. Bradford, Issues in the Design of Savings and Investment Incentives, 
in Depreciation and Inflation, note 198, at 13 [hereinafter Issues]; Jane G. Gravelle, Capi-
tal Income Taxation and Efficiency in the Allocation of Investment, 36 Nat'! Tax J. 297 
(1983); Arnold C. Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives, in The Economics 
of Taxation 307 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980); see generally Charles R. 
Hulten, Introduction to Depreciation and Inflation, note 198, at 2. 
233 See, e.g., Don Fullerton, The Indexation of Interest, Depreciation, and Capital Gains 
and Tax Reform in the United States, 32 J. Pub. Econ. 25 (1987) (discussing effective total 
tax rates as a function of the inflation rate for structures, public utilities, land, inventories, 
owner-occupied housing and equipment); Feldstein & Summers, note 213, at 460-67 (esti-
mating the effect of inflation on corporate tax liabilities by two-digit standard industry 
code for 1976); Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton, The Taxation of Income from Capital 
243-57 (1984) (estimating effective tax rates for various sectors as a function of inflation). 
Jorgenson and Yun conclude that "potential gains in welfare from the 1986 reform are 
largely dissipated at moderate rates of inflation, such as those that have prevailed for the 
past decade. Insulating the U.S. tax system from the impact of inflation should retain high 
priority in future deliberations about tax reform." Jorgensen & Yun, note 229, at S191. 
234 Bradford, Issues, note 232, at 17. Throughout, it must be remembered that this is a 
problem of the second best. Id.; see also Alan J. Auerbach, The Optimal Taxation of 
Heterogeneous Capital, 93 Q.J. Econ. 589 (1979). In general, given that there are multiple 
inefficiencies in the economy, it is not necessarily the case that welfare is improved by 
correcting a single inefficiency. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory 
of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956). Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that 
the optimal depreciation policy would change in an apparently arbitrary fashion as a func-
tion of the rate of inflation. See text following notes 243-51. 
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Figure l 
Change in PDV of l'vlACRS deductions by property class as a 
fun ction of inflation; changes relative to 5% inflation. 
Inflation Rate 
One way to see how changes in inflation have a non-neutral effect 
on accelerated deprecation is to look at the effect of inflation on the 
current accelerated depreciation provisions in the Code (MACRS).235 
Assume that MACRS is intended to provide the equivalent of eco-
nomic depreciation for each class of assets given an expected rate of 
inflation of 5% .236 As discussed above, if inflation is less than 5% , 
MACRS provides a subsidy relative to economic depreciation; if infla-
tion is greater than 5%, MACRS penalizes holders of depreciable as-
sets relative to economic depreciation. The magnitude of the inflation 
effect can be measured by comparing the present value of the depreci-
ation deduction for each class of property at a given inflation rate to 
the present value at 5% inflation. Figure 1 shows the effect of infla-
tion on the various MACRS classes.237 Consider for example the line 
235 IRC § 168. 
236 I do not mean to suggest by the discussion in the text that MACRS was designed to 
provide for the equivalent of economic depreciation given a particular expected rate of 
inflation or that such rate was 5%. My use of these assumptions merely is to illustrate the 
sensitivity of unindexed depreciation to changes in the inflation rate. Michael Durst sug-
gests that MACRS was designed for an assumed inflation rate of about 4%. Michael C. 
Durst, note 236, at 1266. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. , Sum-
mary of H.R. 3838 (Tax Reform Act of 1985) 85-86 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter Joint 
Committee Report] (explaining that the choice of an 8% discount to evaluate alternative 
depreciation proposals was based on a 4% inflation forecast in the Administration's 1986 
budget). 
237 The MACRS classes are defined in§ 168(c). For each class of property, depreciation 
is determined using the fastest permissible depreciation method and the shortest permissi-
ble recovery period. In the case of 3-year through 20-year property, the half-year conven-
tion is used. In the case of real property (27.5-year and 39-year), it is assumed that the 
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labeled "3-yr" that shows the effect of inflation on the present value 
of depreciation on three-year property relative to the present value 
given 5% inflation.238 If inflation falls from the target rate of 5% to 
2%, Figure 1 shows that the present value of tax depreciation in-
creases by about 6%. If inflation rises to 10%, the present value of 
tax depreciation drops by about 8% relative to the value at 5% infla-
tion. By contrast, consider the line labeled "39-yr" that shows the ef-
fect of inflation on depreciation for nonresidential real property.239 
Figure 1 shows that a decline in the inflation rate from 5% to 2% 
would lead to an almost 40% increase in the value of the depreciation 
deductions, and an increase in the rate from 5% to 10% would lead to 
a 34% decline in the value of depreciation. Thus, the magnitude of 
the effect is significantly greater for nonresidential real property than 
for three-year property. An alternative way to view the change in the 
present value of the depreciation deductions is to compare the 
changes in the value of depreciation to a gross investment tax 
credit.240 Assuming a tax rate of 35%, in present value terms, 
MACRS at 2% inflation is equivalent to MACRS at 5% inflation 
combined with an investment tax credit of 1.6% for three-year prop-
erty and 3.2% for nonresidential real property. Similarly, an increase 
in the inflation rate from 5% to 10% would be equivalent to a nega-
tive investment tax credit241 of 2.4% and 3.2% for three-year and non-
residential real property, respectively. Obviously, the present value of 
depreciation on the longer-lived property is more sensitive to inflation 
than is the present value on the shorter-lived property. While true, 
this observation may be misleading. In particular, comparing either 
the change in the present value of depreciation or the change in the 
equivalent gross investment tax credit rates does not indicate whether 
the changes are neutral with respect to asset class.242 
property is placed in service in the sixth month of the taxable year, thereby approximating 
the half-year convention. See IRC § 168( d). For ease of computation, it is assumed that 
the first depreciation deduction is permitted one year after the property is placed in 
service. 
238 All values are discounted under the assumption that the real interest rate stays con-
stant at 5% without regard to the level of inflation. The assumption of a constant real 
interest rate is consistent with the Fisher model. If the modified Fisher model were correct, 
the effect of inflation on depreciation would be magnified significantly. See note 226. 
239 The recovery period for nonresidential real property was increased from 31.5 years 
to 39 years by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
§ 13151(a), 107 Stat. 312, 448 (amending IRC § 168(c)(l)). 
240 The term "gross investment tax credit" refers to an investment tax credit that does 
not have to be deducted from depreciable basis. See text accompanying notes 243-51 for a 
discussion of a net investment tax credit. 
241 A negative investment tax credit is equivalent to a nondeductible excise tax. 
242 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, A Note on the Efficient Design of Investment Incen-
tives, 91 Econ. J. 217, 222 (1981) [hereinafter Design] (showing that a gross investment tax 
credit is non-neutral); E. Cary Brown, The "Net" Versus the "Gross" Investment Tax 
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Fortunately, there are a variety of relatively simple ways to measure 
whether a particular investment incentive or disincentive is neutral 
across asset classes. One approach is to measure the incentive in 
terms of a modified form of an investment tax credit, a so-called net 
investment tax credit. A net investment tax credit is a tax credit based 
on the cost of an asset minus the present value of depreciation permit-
ted with respect to the asset.243 Thus, for example, if there is a 10% 
net investment tax credit and the present value of depreciation on 
five-year property is $.91 per dollar of investment, a taxpayer purchas-
ing $1,000 worth of five-year equipment would be permitted a tax 
credit of $9 in addition to economic depreciation.244 Unlike the com-
Credit, in Depreciation and Inflation, note 198, at 133-34 (providing a mathematical proof 
that a uniform gross investment tax credit is not neutral with respect to asset life); Emil M. 
Sunley, Acceleration of Tax Depreciation: Basic Issues and Major Alternatives, in Depre-
ciation and Inflation, note 198, at 145-46 (comparing various measures of the economic 
impact of depreciation and investment tax credit changes and noting that " [a]lthough an 
equal percentage increase in the present value of tax savings from capital recovery may 
have some intuitive appeal as a criterion for neutrality, economic theory gives no underpin-
ning for this measure."). 
243 Brown, note 242, at 134. 
244 $9 = (10% x $1,000) x (1.00- 0.91). An equivalent approach to a net investment tax 
credit is an equal gross credit combined with a required basis reduction equal to the deduc-
tion equivalent of the credit. The deduction equivalent of the credit is the amount of the 
credit divided by the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Thus, for example, if the taxpayer in the 
example in the text faces a 35% marginal tax rate, under the gross credit with basis reduc-
tion, she would be entitled to a credit of $100 (10% x $1,000) and would be required to 
reduce her basis by $286 ($100/35% ). It is easy to demonstrate that the net investment tax 
credit is equivalent to a gross credit with basis reduction on a present value basis. Define 
Vn as the present value of all benefits under a net credit, z as the present value of economic 
depreciation, 't as the marginal tax rate, and k as the amount of the credit. Under a net 
credit, the value of the credit plus depreciation per dollar of investment is: 
Vn = k X (1 - z) + (z X 't) (1) 
Equation (1) can be rewritten: 
Vn = k + Z X ('t- k) 
Dividing the second term in Equation (2) by 't, one obtains: 
k 
Vn = k + Z X (1 - - ) X 't 
't 
(2) 
(3) 
Equation (3) , however, is precisely the formula for Vg, the present value of all benefits 
under a gross credit with full basis offset. Thus, the two forms of credit are equivalent. 
Congress has vacillated on the question of basis reduction. When the credit was intro-
duced in 1962, taxpayers were required to reduce basis by the amount of the credit. Reve-
nue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 48(g), 76 Stat. 960, 970. The basis reduction 
requirement was repealed in 1964. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 203(a)(1), 
78 Stat. 19, 33. In 1982, Congress reinstituted a partial basis reduction, requiring taxpayers 
to reduce their basis by one-half of the amount of the investment tax credit. IRC § 48( q) 
(added by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 205(a), 
96 Stat. 324, 427). Given the then top corporate tax rate of 46%, IRC § ll(b) (1982), in 
order for a uniform gross credit to be equivalent to a uniform net investment tax credit, the 
basis reduction would have had to have been approximately twice the credit. Of course, 
the investment tax credit was also non-neutral because it was not uniform across asset 
types. IRC § 46(c)(2) (1982) (reducing the investment tax credit for short-term property); 
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bination of economic depreciation and a uniform gross investment tax 
credit, the combination of economic depreciation and a uniform net 
investment tax credit is neutral with respect to asset choice.245 Corre-
spondingly, if different classes of assets are permitted different net in-
vestment tax credits, neutrality is lost.246 
IRC § 48(a) (1982) (defining eligible property to exclude generally real estate). Moreover, 
while Congress has flirted with a basis reduction, it has never offered neutrality as an ex-
cuse. The basis reduction originally was included as a Senate amendment to the House 
proposal. The Finance Committee noted that since the credit acted to reduce the cost of 
property, there should be an offsetting basis reduction. S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 17, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 725. The House acceded to the Senate provision without 
comment. H.R. Rep. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1962) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1962-3 C.B. 1142. The provision was repealed in 1964 on the grounds of complexity and 
reduction in the incentive effect of the credit. H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong. , 1st Sess. 37 
(1963) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1964-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 161. The partial basis reduction was 
reintroduced in 1982 so that the net effect of the credit plus ACRS deductions would not 
be more beneficial than expensing. Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 
General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982, at 35-36 (Comm. Print 1982). 
245 Brown, note 242, at 134; Auerbach, Design, note 242, at 222. 
246 The net investment tax credit also can be restated in terms of an alternative measure 
of accelerated depreciation, the "incentive depreciation index." See Joint Committee Re-
port, note 236, at 90. To understand the incentive depreciation index, compare a pure 
consumption tax to a pure income tax. Under a consumption tax, an investment in depre-
ciable property would be fully expensed (that is, the entire cost of the capital investment 
would be fully deductible at the time the investment is made). See generally William D . 
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 
(1974); Bradford, Untangling, note 42, at 59-99. Permitting the expensing of the invest-
ment effectively removes the income from the investment from the tax base. See, e.g., 
Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 
(1979); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash-Flow Personal 
Income Tax, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 931 (1975). Thus, relative to an income tax with economic 
depreciation, a consumption tax provides an incentive for investment. Moreover, expens-
ing is a neutral incentive; if all investment income is tax-exempt, there is no tax incentive to 
invest in one type of asset over another. Not only are both expensing and economic depre-
ciation neutral with respect to asset type, but so is any linear combination of the two. See, 
e.g., Auerbach, Design, note 232; Bradford, Issues, note 232, at 27; Harberger, note 232, at 
307. 
In other words, if taxpayers are permitted to expense a percent of the cost of an asset 
and are permitted economic depreciation for the remaining (1 - a)% of the cost of the 
asset, the resulting depreciation is neutral with respect to asset life. Define such a depreci-
ation scheme as "incentive depreciation" and define the percentage of expensing, a, as the 
"incentive depreciation index." When the incentive depreciation index, a, is equal to one, 
incentive depreciation is equivalent to expensing, and when the incentive depreciation in-
dex is equal to zero, incentive depreciation is equivalent to economic depreciation. The 
index, a, also can be less than zero or greater than one. If a is greater than one, taxpayers 
effectively are permitted to expense more than the cost of the asset, but are required to 
take "negative depreciation" into income over the life of the asset. Putting aside questions 
of inflation, if a is greater than one, investments are subject to a negative effective tax rate. 
If a is less than zero, taxpayers effectively are required to take an amount into income 
upon the purchase of an asset, but are permitted to depreciate more than the cost of the 
asset. Ignoring the effects of inflation, if a is less than zero, the investment is subject to an 
effective tax rate in excess of the statutory rate. 
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The neutrality property associated with a net investment tax credit 
suggests a straightforward procedure to test whether inflation has a 
neutral effect across asset classes. Just as it is possible to measure the 
incentive effect for each asset class in terms of an equivalent gross 
investment tax credit for that class, it is possible to measure the effect 
in terms of an equivalent net investment tax credit for each asset 
class.247 Thus, one can test whether a particular accelerated (or decel-
erated) depreciation scheme is neutral across asset classes by replac-
ing it with an equivalent net investment tax credit plus economic 
depreciation for each asset class; If the net investment credits so de-
termined are uniform, the accelerated depreciation, and hence the ef-
fect of inflation, is neutral. If the net investment credits are not 
uniform, then the effect of inflation is non-neutral. 
For a given tax rate, 't, and net investment credit, k, it is straightforward to show that 
there exists an incentive depreciation index, a, such that incentive depreciation is 
equivalent to economic depreciation combined with the specified net investment credit. 
Define Va as the value of incentive depreciation on a one dollar investment, given incen-
tive depreciation index a and z as the present value of economic depreciation on such an 
investment. 
Va = 't x (a + (1 - a) x z) (1) 
Similarly, as in note 244, Equation 3, define V" as the present value of all benefits under a 
net credit, k. 
V" = k X (1 - z) + (z x 't) 
Setting Va equal to V"' and simplifying, one obtains: 
k 
a=-
't 
(2) 
(3) 
Therefore, a net investment credit of k% is equivalent to an incentive depreciation index, 
a, equal to k divided by the tax rate, 't. 
247 In order to compute the net investment tax credit that, when combined with eco-
nomic depreciation, is equivalent to a given degree of accelerated depreciation, define vn 
as the present value of all benefits under a net credit, z as the present value of economic 
depreciation, 't as the marginal tax rate, k as the amount of the credit and d as the present 
value of the accelerated depreciation. The net credit, k, must satisfy the condition: 
d = Vn (1) 
Substituting V" from Equation (1) in note 244 one obtains: 
d = k x (1 - z) + (z x -r) (2) 
Rearranging terms, k, the incentive equivalent net credit must equal: 
(3) 
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Figure 2 
Equivalent net investment credit by MACRS asset class as function of 
inflation; relative to 5% inflation . 
Inflation Rate 
Figure 2 shows the effect of different inflation rates on each 
MACRS asset in terms of an equivalent net investment tax credit. 
First, consider the point on the horizontal axis indicating 5% inflation. 
If the inflation rate is 5%, by assumption, the equivalent net invest-
ment tax credit is zero.248 Therefore, all of the lines on the graph 
cross the horizontal axis at 5%. Now consider the effect of a decrease 
in inflation. As inflation decreases, the value of the unindexed 
MACRS depreciation increases for each class, but at different rates. 
In particular, consider an inflation rate of 2% , and the three-year and 
39-year MACRS classes. In the case of three-year equipment, at 2% 
inflation, MACRS is equivalent to economic depreciation plus an ap-
proximately 10% net investment tax credit. By contrast , in the case of 
nonresidential real property (39-year property), at 2% inflation, 
MACRS is equivalent to economic depreciation plus an approxi-
mately 4% net investment tax credit. Thus, under the assumption that 
MACRS is neutral given 5% inflation, MACRS loses its neutrality as 
the inflation rate drops. In particular, as inflation drops, MACRS acts 
as a relative preference for short-lived property. As can be seen by a 
glance at Figure 2, the preference for short-lived over longer-lived 
property as inflation falls extends to all MACRS classes.249 
248 The computations underlying Figure 2 assume that for each class of assets, MACRS 
at 5% inflation is equivalent in present value terms to economic depreciation with no in-
vestment tax credit. 
249 See note 251 (showing that the relationship in the text between inflation and asset-
life preference does not hold for all possible asset lives). 
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Similarly, consider the effect of an increase in inflation. If inflation 
rises to 10%, MACRS depreciation on three-year property is 
equivalent to economic depreciation with a 14% negative net invest-
ment tax credit. By contrast, with nonresidential real property, the 
effect of 10% inflation is equivalent to only a negative 4% net invest-
ment tax credit. Thus, as inflation rises, MACRS acts as a relative 
preference for long-lived property.250 Again, Figure 2 shows that the 
preference for long-lived property with increases in inflation extends 
to all MACRS classes.2s1 
In summary, even if Congress has provided accelerated deprecia-
tion to compensate for an expected rate of inflation, changes in infla-
tion not only will have the effect of making the given degree of 
acceleration either inadequate or overly generous, but also will have 
incentive effects that vary by asset life, thereby inducing additional 
inefficiencies.252 
A further problem with using accelerated depreciation in lieu of in-
dexed economic depreciation is that front-loaded deductions increase 
the chance that firms will be unable to use the deduction currently 
because of net operating losses.253 If firms are forced to defer the 
250 The relationship between inflation and the preference for short- or long-lived prop-
erty is opposite what would be predicted by looking at the effect of inflation on the present 
value of the depreciation benefits or by computing an equivalent gross investment tax 
credit. See notes 235-42. 
251 While it is true that within the range of asset lives covered by MACRS, lower infla-
tion favors short-lived assets and higher inflation favors long-lived assets, this relationship 
between inflation and asset lives does not hold for all possible asset lives. To see this, 
consider the extreme cases of an asset that depreciates instantaneously (that is, is properly 
expensed under an income tax) and an asset that never depreciates. In the case of the 
instantaneous asset, the deduction would be taken immediately and, therefore, inflation 
would have no effect on the value of the deduction. Thus, the equivalent net credit would 
be zero without regard to the rate of inflation. Similarly, in the case of the nondepreciable 
asset, since the depreciation deductions are zero in every year, inflation has no effect on 
the value of depreciation and the equivalent net credit also would always be zero. Thus, as 
asset life becomes either very short or very long, the equivalent net credit approaches zero 
and becomes both uniform and neutral. See Bradford, Issues, note 232, at 34-35 (making a 
similar argument). 
252 One author has concluded that "[w]e ought to get on with [indexing] and not con-
tinue to allow policymakers to engage in what I think is a cruel delusion-that it is some-
how possible to deal with the problem posed by inflation in an income tax structure by 
means of accelerated depreciation." Dale Jorgenson, Comments, in Depreciation and In-
flation, note 198, at 56. 
253 The inability to use all of the deductions currently is particularly a problem for start-
up firms. It is possible to argue that it is appropriate to defer the deduction with a start-up 
firm because, if the firm is ultimately successful, it is likely that the firm was generating 
deferred income during the period that it had tax losses; if the firm is ultimately a failure, it 
is unlikely to ever pay taxes. See Steuerle, note 37, at 147 (noting that many start-up firms 
will be unable to use the benefit of accelerated depreciation) . Steuerle also notes that 
accelerated depreciation leads to misleading income reports that may cause incorrect deci-
sions. Id. 
l 
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deductions, the benefit of accelerated depreciation is forgone. 254 Con-
gress could solve the problem of deferred losses by establishing an 
efficient means of transferring losses, such as safe harbor leasing; but 
efficient transferability of losses generally has proven politically infea-
sible.255 Absent formal means of transferring losses, firms resort to a 
myriad of informal means including conventional leasing and mergers. 
Such informal means tend to be far less efficient, measured both by 
the percentage of the benefits retained by the transferor and by the 
private and public resources expended in planning, executing and at-
tempting to discourage such transactions. 
Another difference between accelerated depreciation and indexed 
real depreciation is the consequences of the disposition of a deprecia-
ble asset that has not yet economically depreciated completely.2s6 The 
difference can be seen best by comparing several examples, the first 
for indexed real depreciation and the second for accelerated deprecia-
tion without indexation of basis:257 
Example 23: Hal purchases a depreciable asset for $1,000. 
Economically, the asset depreciates by 20% in the first year. 
Hal, therefore, is permitted a first-year depreciation deduc-
tion of $200. After one year, Hal decides to sell the asset. 
Given that there has been 5% inflation, the asset sells for 
$840.258 After adjusting for depreciation and for inflation, 
Hal's basis in the asset also would be $840 and, therefore, 
254 The inability to use deductions currently would be less important if net operating 
losses were indexed. See note 195 (discussing the need to index net operating losses). 
255 Former IRC § 168(f)(8) (before repeal by Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 209(a), 96 Stat. 324, 
442 (1982) (providing a type of safe harbor leasing) . While politically unpopular, safe har-
bor leasing proved to be a highly efficient means of transferring tax losses. See Reed 
Shuldiner, Markets in Taxes (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T.) (showing that 
under safe harbor leasing, transferors were able to capture approximately 95% of the tax 
benefits). For a contrary view, see Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 
Analysis of Safe-Harbor Leasing 17 (Comm. Print 1982) (estimating that transferors were 
able to capture only about 75% of the tax benefits). 
Alternatives to permitting the transfer of losses include making losses refundable or ac-
cruing interest on net operating losses. Congress has shown no interest in either approach. 
To the contrary, Congress generally has tightened the restrictions on using losses. See IRC 
§ 382 (as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99 -514, § 621, 100 Stat. 2085, 
2255) (tightening the restrictions on the use of losses after a change in corporate control). 
256 Implicit in the discussion that follows is the assumption that if indexing were permit-
ted for computing depreciation, indexing also would be permitted for computing gain or 
loss on the sale of depreciable assets. If indexing were permitted for the former, but not 
for the latter, the benefits of indexing effectively would be partially recaptured upon sale 
or other disposition. If indexing were permitted to determine gain or loss upon sale, but 
only unindexed economic depreciation were allowed, taxpayers would have an incentive to 
churn assets in order to receive the benefits of indexation. 
257 The examples are based on Table 5. 
258 $840 = ($1,000- $800) X 1.05. 
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Hal would have no gain or loss upon the disposition of the 
asset. Thus, Hal would have the benefit of the full $200 first-
year depreciation without recapture. 
Example 24: Assume the same facts as in Example 23 except 
assume that Hal is permitted first-year accelerated deprecia-
tion of $375 and that indexing of basis is not permitted.2 59 
Hal's basis after the first year is, therefore, $625. Upon sell-
ing the asset for $840, Hal has gain of $215. Valued as of the 
first year, the $215 recapture in the second year is equivalent 
to income of $195.260 Therefore, taking into account both 
the initial deduction of $375 and the recapture of $215, the 
net present value of the accelerated depreciation as of the 
time the asset is originally purchased is only $180.261 
Thus, Examples 23 and 24 demonstrate that, in a case where acceler-
ated depreciation and indexed economic depreciation are set to be 
equivalent under the assumption that the taxpayer will hold the asset 
for its entire economic life, if the taxpayer disposes of the asset after 
only one year, the present value of indexed depreciation (as of the 
time of purchase) exceeds the present value of accelerated 
depreciation. 
In an attempt to remedy the problem of early disposition, it would 
be possible to combine accelerated depreciation with indexation by 
indexing the owner's adjusted basis at the time of disposition. 
Example 25: Assume the same facts as in Example 24 except 
that the taxpayer is permitted to index his adjusted basis. 
Prior to indexation, Hal's adjusted basis is $625. With index-
ation, his indexed adjusted basis would increase to $656.262 
Accordingly, he would have a taxable gain upon disposition 
of $184.263 As of the first year, the present value of the $184 
recapture in the second year would be $167.264 Therefore, 
taking into account both the initial deduction of $375 and the 
recapture of $184, the net present value of the accelerated 
259 The accelerated depreciation is chosen so as to be equivalent to indexed economic 
depreciation with 5% inflation. See Table 5. 
260 The present value computation assumes a discount rate of 10.25%. $195 = $215/ 
1.1025. 
261 $180 = $375 - $195. The $180 figure is the equivalent deduction, not the tax savings, 
which would depend on Hal's marginal tax rate. Hal's tax rate is assumed to be constant. 
262 $656 = $625 X 1.05. 
263 $184 = $840 - $656. 
264 $167 = $184/1.1025. 
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depreciation, as of the time the asset was originally 
purchased would be $208.265 
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Thus, if a taxpayer is permitted both to use accelerated depreciation 
and to index his adjusted basis, in some cases the combination upon 
early disposition would be more favorable than indexed deprecia-
tion.266 In any case, accelerated depreciation loses its equivalence to 
indexed depreciation when taxpayers dispose of depreciable assets 
prematurely.267 
C. Alternatives to Conventional Accelerated Depreciation 
There are alternatives to indexed depreciation that solve some of 
the problems of conventional accelerated depreciation. One such al-
ternative is to permit a single deduction at the time of asset purchase, 
so called one-shot depreciation. Under one-shot depreciation, the 
owner of a depreciable asset would be entitled to take a single depre-
ciation deduction in the first year of ownership equal to the present 
value of the future real depreciation of the asset.268 The major advan-
tage of one-shot depreciation over accelerated depreciation is that, as 
shown in Column G of Table 5, the present value of the one-shot de-
preciation deduction is invariant to inflation because the deduction is 
265 $208 = $375 - $167. 
266 Another variant would be to permit taxpayers to index their unadjusted basis prior 
to subtracting depreciation. Such a rule would be even more attractive to taxpayers. For 
example, under this rule, in Example 25, Hal would have an adjusted indexed basis imme-
diately before sale of $675 ($675 = (($1,000 x 1.05) - $375). He would have gain of $165 
with a present value of $150. The net value to him would be $225. 
267 The 1992 House Bill combined unindexed depreciation with indexing for purposes of 
determining gain on sale by denying indexing for purposes of determining the amount of 
any depreciation recapture, but permitting indexing of the taxpayer's unadjusted basis for 
purposes of determining any additional gain. H.R. 4210, note 73, at § 2101. The commit-
tee report provided the following example: 
[Assume that] [a ]n individual purchases depreciable property at a cost of $100 
for use in his trade or business, claims $60 of depreciation, and then sells the 
property for $175. The applicable inflation ratio is 1.500. The taxpayer has $60 
of gain attributable to recapture . The remaining gain is determined by using a 
$150 basis (i.e. , $100 (the sum of $40 basis before recapture plus $60 recapture) 
multiplied by 150 percent). Thus, in addition to the $60 of recapture, the tax-
payer has $25 of capital gain. 
H .R. Rep. No. 461, note 73, at 358. The bill also would have modified§ 1250 (recapture of 
gain on disposition of real property) to provide that the entire amount of prior deprecia-
tion is subject to recapture on the disposition of indexable § 1250 property. H .R. 4210, 
note 73, at§ 2101(c). 
268 Alan J. Auerbach & Dale W. Jorgenson, Inflation-Proof Depreciation of Assets, 
Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Dec. 1980, at 113-18. See also Joseph A. Pechman, Tax Policies for 
the 1980's, 11 Tax Notes 1195, 1202 (Dec. 22, 1980) (suggesting that the idea of one-shot 
depreciation originated with Nicholas Kaldor). 
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taken at the same time the asset is purchased.269 Thus, the cost of the 
asset and the depreciation deduction are not measured in different 
dollars. The determination of the amount of the one-shot deduction, 
however, depends upon assumptions as to the real interest rate.270 As 
a result, the appropriate depreciation rate depends on events that oc-
cur after the depreciation rate has been set. In particular, if the rate 
of inflation affects the real interest rate, one-shot depreciation no 
longer is equivalent to indexed economic depreciation.271 
There are additional problems with one-shot depreciation. For ex-
ample, large initial deductions are likely to cause more firms to be in 
loss positions, thereby undoing at least some of the advantage of the 
approach.272 Additionally, under one-shot depreciation it would be 
necessary to make special provisions for the treatment of sales of de-
preciated assets.273 
An additional alternative to conventional accelerated depreciation 
would be to provide for depreciation equal to expected indexed real 
depreciation. Under such a scheme, Congress would provide for de-
preciation deductions equal to the deductions that would be allowed if 
there were indexed real depreciation and inflation were at an assumed 
rate. Thus, in the example shown in Table 5, if Congress expected 
inflation to continue at 5%, it could provide for the depreciation 
schedule shown in Table 5, Column D. A taxpayer would be entitled 
to the stated depreciation schedule without regard to the actual rate of 
inflation. In essence, Congress would be indexing for expected, but 
not actual inflation.274 
269 Presumably the deduction would be permitted when the asset was placed in service, 
not when it was purchased. Cf. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-10(b) (providing that the period for depre-
ciation begins when an asset is placed in service). 
270 For example, if the real interest rate fell from 5% to 2%, the one-shot depreciation 
deduction would increase from $909 to $962. 
271 See Don Fullerton, Andrew B. Lyon & Richard J. Rosen, Uncertainty, Welfare Cost 
and the "Adaptability" of U.S. Corporate Taxes, 86 Scandinavian J. Econ. 229 (1984) 
(showing how different depreciation schemes are affected by inflation). See note 226 and 
Section VIII for a discussion of the relationship between inflation and the real rate of 
interest. It is likely, however, that one-shot depreciation would be less sensitive to infla-
tion than conventional accelerated depreciation. 
272 See text accompanying note 253 (discussing the problem of accelerated depreciation 
and loss firms). 
273 See text accompanying notes 256-67 (discussing the problem of sales of depreciated 
assets in the context of accelerated depreciation) . The Auerbach-Jorgenson proposal 
would deal with dispositions by not requiring a seller of depreciable assets to include the 
entire sales proceeds in income. In essence, they would tax a seller as if its amount realized 
were equal to the one-shot depreciation permitted to the purchaser of the asset and the 
seller's basis were equal to zero. 
274 It also would be possible to combine expected indexed depreciation with a catch-up 
at disposition based on actual inflation over the holding period. Such an approach would 
have little advantage over indexed depreciation. 
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VIII. INDEXING INVENTORIES 
As is generally the case with buying and selling assets, income from 
transactions in inventory is mismeasured under inflation. The effects 
of inflation on inventory can be seen from a simple example. 
Example 26: A hardware store purchases a hammer for $2 
on June 1, 1994, and sells the hammer on June 1, 1995 for $3. 
Under conventional accounting, the hardware store would 
be considered to have $1 in gross profit from the purchase 
and sale of the hammer. 
If inflation were 10% during the year that the hammer was in 
inventory, the store's profit would be overstated. Properly 
stated in 1995 dollars, the store would have an indexed cost 
of goods sold of $2.20275 and would have an indexed gross 
profit of only $.80. 
The failure to index inventories has had a significant effect on the 
amount of taxes collected from the business sector.276 
While Treasury has recommended indexing inventories,Z77 Congress 
has been unwilling to do so. In part, the pressure to index inventories 
has been reduced by the existence of the last-in, first-out (LIFO) 
method of accounting for inventories which acts as an ad hoc method 
of indexation.278 Under first-in, first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting 
275 $2.20 = $2 X 1.10. 
276 Feldstein and Summers estimate that the failure to index inventories for inflation 
raised taxes on nonfinancial corporations in 1977 by $7 billion, approximately 12% of the 
corporations' total tax liability for the year. Feldstein & Summers, note 213, at 446. As 
with capital gains, the failure to index inventories is ameliorated to the extent that income 
is deferred with respect to inventories. The deferral of income with respect to inventories 
has been reduced by the enactment of the uniform capitalization rules, IRC § 263A. See 
text accompanying note 42 (discussing the relationship between deferral and indexing of 
capital gains). 
277 See Treasury II, note 220, at 174-78 (recommending indexing inventories); Treasury 
I, note 152, at 189-92 (same). 
278 See, e.g., Halperin & Steuerle, note 103, at 356 (describing LIFO as ad hoc indexa-
tion) . LIFO accounting is authorized by § 472. LIFO was not authorized originally in 
order to compensate for inflation. LIFO's origin can be traced to the initial reporting of 
inventories under the income tax law. 1 Leslie J. Schneider, Federal Income Taxation of 
Inventories § 9.01 (1993). The LIFO method derived from the "base stock method" of 
inventory valuation, where the taxpayer was assumed to carry each year at its original cost 
a base amount of inventory as if it were a fixed asset. Id. Under the base stock method, 
taxpayers were assumed to liquidate their base inventory only if sales in a given taxable 
year exceeded purchases. LIFO discards the base quantity concept and completely 
reverses the flow of goods assumption not only as to beginning inventory but also as to 
purchases occurring during the taxable year. Id. In 1930, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Lu-
cas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264, 267 n.4 (1930), endorsed the position 
taken by the Service in T.B.R. 65, 1 C.B. 51 (1919), that the base stock method was not an 
acceptable method of inventory valuation for tax purposes. Faced with an adverse 
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a taxpayer treats sales of inventories as coming out of the oldest in-
ventory on hand.279 Under LIFO a taxpayer is permitted to treat sales 
of inventory as occurring from the most recently purchased inven-
tory.280 In periods of rising costs, FIFO tends to minimize costs of 
goods sold and hence maximize taxable income. Similarly, LIFO 
tends to maximize cost of goods sold and, hence, minimize taxable 
mcome. The operation of LIFO can be seen from a simple 
example.281 
Example 27: Assume that the hardware store in Example 26 
purchased an additional hammer in 1995 for $2.20. Under 
LIFO, the store would be permitted to treat the hammer sold 
during 1995 as being the hammer that was purchased during 
Supreme Court decision and the continuous objection of Treasury, taxpayers in support of 
the base stock method and the LIFO variant successfully turned to Congress for legisla-
tion. The Revenue Act of 1938 permitted the use of the LIFO method for tanners, smelt-
ers of nonferrous metals and producers of elementary brass and copper products. Revenue 
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 22(d) , 52 Stat. 447, 459. The method initially was re-
stricted to these industries because it was felt that the LIFO inventory flow assumption 
more accurately reflected income for these industries. 83 Cong. Rec. 5043 (1938) (state-
ment of Sen. Lonergan). This restriction, however, was done away with quickly a year 
later as the Revenue Act of 1939 amended§ 22(d) to permit all taxpayers to use the LIFO 
method for tax purposes. Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-155, § 219, 53 Stat. 862, 
877. The 1939 Act also added the financial accounting conformity rule, which requires 
taxpayers electing LIFO for tax purposes to use LIFO for their financial statements. At 
the time of the 1939 Act, an influential group in the Treasury believed that the conformity 
rule would act as a sufficient deterrent such that very few taxpayers would adopt the LIFO 
method. Richard B. Barker, Practical Aspects of Inventory Problems Under Current Con-
ditions: LIFO, Involuntary Liquidations, 10 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n, 511, 513 (1952). Those 
theorists were quickly proven wrong in 1941, however, when the rapid rise in prices occur-
ring during that year resulted in a large number of taxpayers first realizing the tax advan-
tages made possible by the use of LIFO during times of inflation. Id. at 513. Interestingly, 
some early theorists looked to LIFO as an income averaging device, rather than as a means 
of compensating for inflation. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy 
Case for Progressive Taxation 17 (1963) (describing LIFO as an "averaging" device); 
Henry C. Simons, Federal Tax Reform 106 (1950) (noting that LIFO is a complicated and 
ineffective averaging scheme). 
279 Treasury II, note 220, at 174. 
280 IRC § 472(b)(1) (treating inventory remaining on hand as being first from the tax-
payer's opening inventory). 
281 The actual operation of the LIFO rules are extremely complex. Anyone who doubts 
the complexity of the LIFO rules should look at Reg. § 1.472-1, -2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, and 
Schneider, note 278, at§§ 9-17. The complexity of LIFO was apparently recognized early 
on. Henry C. Simons argued that: 
[i)f LIFO is not the most complicated of averaging schemes, and the least ef-
fective , my judgment on tax issues (as many readers will perhaps readily agree) 
is worthless. Any crude scheme of averaging rebates, not to mention flexibility 
in inventory procedure, would enable us to get rid of an unlovely contribution 
of uninspired statistical empiricists to our tax edifice. 
Simons, note 278, at 106. 
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1995. As a result, the store would have a cost of goods sold 
of $2.20 and would have gross profits of $.80. 
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As illustrated in Example 27, LIFO can produce results that are the 
same as indexed inventory accounting.282 There are, however, a vari-
ety of problems with the use of LIFO in lieu of indexation. First, par-
ticularly in the case of small firms, LIFO's complexity is believed to 
discourage its use.283 Second, the conformity requirement, which pro-
hibits the use of LIFO unless the taxpayer uses it for financial ac-
counting purposes, also discourages its use.284 Because LIFO 
depresses profits, firms may be reluctant to use it for reporting profits 
to shareholders.285 Third, LIFO is not available to all taxpayers. For 
example, security dealers are required to mark their inventories to 
market and thus are unable to use LIF0.286 Whatever the cause, 
282 The term "indexed inventory accounting" is not well defined because there are many 
methods of accounting for inventory. For purposes of the discussion in the text, I assume 
the use of indexed FIFO accounting. See Treasury II, note 220, at 175 (proposing indexed 
FIFO accounting). 
283 Id. Congress has twice responded to the complexity of LIFO by providing simplified 
LIFO rules for small business. In 1981, Congress added an election for small business to 
use a single inventory pool. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 
§ 237(a), 95 Stat. 172, 252-53 (adding IRC § 474). See also Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n , 
97th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 
149 (Comm. Print 1981) ("Since LIFO is the current method of accounting for inventory 
that most effectively mitigates the effect of inflation on businesses engaged in the purchase 
and sale of merchandise the Congress believed that the LIFO method should be simplified 
and made more available to all taxpayers."). In 1986, Congress replaced § 474 with a new 
provision providing a simplified dollar-value LIFO method for certain small businesses. 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 802(a) , 100 Stat. 2085, 2348. To the extent 
that LIFO is used despite its complexity, the fact remains that it is a complex costly system 
under which firms spend substantial real resources. 
284 IRC § 472(c)(requiring reporting on a LIFO basis to owners and creditors); Reg. 
§ 1.472-2( e )(providing rules governing the conformity requirement). 
285 Treasury II, note 220, at 175 (noting that some firms are unwilling to use LIFO be-
cause of the conformity requirement). While it is widely believed that the conformity re-
quirement reduces the use of LIFO, such a belief is inconsistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis . Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 295 
(4th ed. 1991) (discussing various forms of the efficient markets hypothesis); see also Louis 
Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 249, 288-89 (1983) (suggesting that corporations remain on FIFO because 
they do not believe in efficient markets and that when they do switch to LIFO, they pick a 
year of increased earnings so that the earnings hit from the change will be less noticeable); 
Shyam Sunder, Stock Price and Risk Related to Accounting Changes in Inventory Valua-
tion, 50 Acct. Rev. 305, 314 (1975) (showing that stock prices increase in the 12 months 
preceding a change to LIFO). 
286 IRC § 475. See text accompanying note 71 (arguing that indexation is particularly 
important for taxpayers using mark-to-market accounting). See also text accompanying 
notes 174-82 (discussing procedure for indexing assets accounted for on a mark-to-market 
basis) . 
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Treasury has estimated that as of 1981, 70% of inventories were val-
ued using FIFO, rather than LIFO or some other method.287 
Additionally, LIFO is not a perfect substitute for indexed deprecia-
tion. To begin with, LIFO does not exclude inflationary gains, but 
merely defers the realization of inflationary gains. When overall 
levels of inventory are reduced, taxpayers using LIFO effectively are 
required to take their deferred inflationary gains into income.288 The 
taxation of deferred inflationary gains when inventories contract pro-
vides a noneconomic incentive to maintain inventories and, in some 
cases, to merge corporations so as to prevent taxation of such deferred 
gains.289 
Finally, because LIFO generally operates based on changes in the 
price of the inventory, rather than changes in the overall price level, 
LIFO either will overcorrect or undercorrect for inflation to the ex-
tent that prices have risen more quickly or slowly in the inventoried 
goods than overall.290 The divergence between LIFO and indexed 
FIFO can be clarified by a couple of examples. 
Example 28: Assume the same facts as in Example 27, ex-
cept that the price of hammers remained unchanged at $2.00, 
despite a generallO% inflation. Using LIFO (or FIFO), the 
store would have a cost of goods sold of $2.00 and gross prof-
its of $1.00. The taxpayer's real income, however, would be 
only $.80. 
Thus, where overall inflation is greater than the change in the price of 
the inventory item, LIFO overstates the taxpayer's real income. 
Example 29: Assume the same facts as in Example 27, ex-
cept that while the price of hammers increased to $2.20, 
overall prices remained constant. Using LIFO, the store 
would have a cost of goods sold of $2.20 and gross profits of 
$.80. The store's real profits, however, would be $1.00. 
287 Treasury II, note 220, at 178 (using data from 1981 corporate income tax returns). 
288 Id. at 175. The inflationary gain begins to be recaptured when the taxpayer has sold 
all inventory purchased in the current year and begins to sell (or is treated as selling) 
inventory purchased in previous years. 
289 Id . T. Nicolaus & Donald P. Thcker, The Tax Treatment of Business Profits under 
Inflationary Conditions, in Inflation and the Income Tax, note 29, at 41-42 (1976). 
290 IRC § 472(b )(2) (providing that the inventory is inventoried at cost). In some cir-
cumstances, taxpayers are permitted to value LIFO inventories based on price indices. See 
IRC § 474 (providing a simplified dollar-value LIFO method for certain small businesses); 
Reg. § 1.472-8 (permitting dollar-value pricing of LIFO inventories). Even where price 
indices are used , however, they are generally for a specific category of goods. See, e.g., 
IRC § 474(b) (permitting retailers to use a general expenditure category of the Consumer 
Price Index Detailed Report) . 
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Thus, Example 29 demonstrates that where overall inflation is less 
than the change in the price of the inventory item, LIFO understates 
the taxpayer's real income. 
In summary, LIFO provides only a partial solution to the problem 
of inflation. Moreover, given the complexity of the LIFO method, it is 
not clear that explicitly indexing inventories would pose greater ad-
ministrative burdens than does LIFO. 
IX. INDEXING DEBT 
As with other investments, a holder's basis in a debt instrument 
must be indexed in order to measure income properly.291 Similarly, 
proper measurement of the borrower's income requires indexing the 
principal amount of a loan.292 
Example 30: B borrows $100 from L and promises to pay 
back $115 in one year. In the absence of inflation, B would 
have a $15 interest deduction and L would have $15 in inter-
est income. If, however, there was 10% inflation, the in-
flated principal amount of the debt would be $110 and when 
B repays $115, in economic terms she would be repaying 
$110 in inflated principal and $5 in interest. Therefore, B 
should have an interest deduction of only $5 and L should 
have corresponding interest income of $5. 
A. Timing of the Inflation Adjustment 
Generally, in the case of debt, indexing adjustments could be made 
either when principal is repaid ("indexing principal") or when interest 
is paid ("indexing interest").293 If principal were indexed, at maturity 
the debtor would have income equal to the difference between the 
indexed and unindexed repayment of principal and the creditor would 
have a corresponding loss. If interest were indexed, each interest pay-
ment would be treated partially as a return of indexed principal and 
partially as interest. The amount of the payment that was treated as a 
return of indexed principal would be equal to the inflation adjustment 
291 For a good discussion of the need to index debt, see Joel Mick, A Proposal for the 
Indexation of Debt for Inflation, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051 (1992). 
292 Indexing the principal amount of the loan is similar to indexing the amount realized 
in the writing of an option. See text accompanying notes 134-38. 
293 The terms "indexing principal" and "indexing interest" are used for convenience. In 
both cases, it is the outstanding principal balance that is being adjusted for inflation. 
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since the last payment of interest. The remaining payment, if any, 
would be treated as interest.2 94 
Example 31: B issues at par a $1,000 debt instrument with a 
10-year term bearing 15% interest at a time when inflation is 
10% a year. 
Alternative 1: If principal were indexed, B would be permit-
ted an interest deduction for the entire $150 payment each 
year. At maturity, B would have income of $1,594, equal to 
the difference between $2,594,295 the indexed principal, and 
$1,000, the amount of principal repaid. 
Alternative 2: If interest were indexed, the $150 annual pay-
ment would be treated partially as a return of indexed princi-
pal and partially as interest. Initially, the loan has a $1,000 
principal balance. At the end of the first year, the loan bal-
ance, properly indexed, would have increased to $1,100. In 
other words, the lender would now need a payment of $1,100 
in principal, in addition to any interest, in order to be made 
whole. The remaining balance on the loan is, of course, only 
$1,000. Accordingly, $100 of the interest payment would be 
treated as a repayment of principal. The remaining $50 
would be treated as interest. Similar computations would be 
made for each year of the term. Since indexed principal 
would be treated as repaid each year, there would be no 
lump-sum adjustment to income at maturity.296 
Presumably, under either alternative, the lender generally 
would be treated in the same manner as the borrower. 
Overall, it is preferable to index interest, rather than principal.297 
Indexing interest more closely approximates true economic income by 
taking into account both the interest payments and the real change in 
principal on a current basis.298 Moreover, indexing interest makes the 
taxation of the debt more nearly independent of the rate of infla-
294 Since the inflation adjustment is based on actual inflation, rather than expected infla-
tion, the adjustment could be in excess of the interest payment. See text accompanying 
notes 309-11. 
295 $2,594 = $1,000 X 1.1010. 
296 Under Alternative I, indexing only at maturity, the total indexation adjustment in 
Example 31 is $1 ,594. Under Alternative 2, indexing annually, the total indexation adjust-
ment is only $1,500 (10 x $150). The $94 difference between the two adjustments reflects 
the compounding that occurs when the indexing adjustment is not made currently. 
297 The indexing adjustment also could be made when interest is deemed paid. See the 
discussion of original issue discount below at text accompanying notes 320-27. 
298 See text accompanying note 48 (discussing timing of inflation adjustments in 
general). 
-· 
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tion.299 Indexing interest also avoids large fluctuations in income by 
taking inflation into account on a regular basis. While, in the case of 
installment debt where principal is paid over the term of the debt, 
there is no particular administrative advantage to indexing principal 
rather than interest, when the entire principal balance of the debt is 
payable at maturity, indexing principal is administratively simpler.3oo 
B. Distinguishing Between Actual and Expected Inflation 
A lender must set an interest rate that is high enough to cover both 
the real interest rate and expected losses due to inflation.301 Thus, a 
lender planning to lend P dollars who demands a real return of r and 
expects an inflation rate of rre, must set an interest rate of i, such that 
the present value of the interest and principal payments, stated in con-
stant dollars, Z equals the amount lent. In other words, i must satisfy 
the following equation: 
p = P(1 + i)/(1 + nn 
(1 + r) 
Equation (3) easily can be solved for i:302 
(3) 
(4) 
If r and ne are small, their product r x ne can be ignored, leading to the 
classic Fisher equation:303 
299 The taxation of the debt would still depend on the difference between expected and 
actual inflation. 
300 Indexing principal also raises questions of whether the income to the borrower due 
to indexation should be treated as cancellation of indebtedness income. In particular, bor-
rowers might argue that they were entitled to the various forms of relief offered to taxpay-
ers with cancellation of indebtedness income. IRC § 108. Given that, economically, the 
income arises out of the fact that the borrower has taken excess interest deductions, rather 
than because the borrower is unable to repay the stated principal on the loan, such relief 
generally should not be offered. 
301 For simplicity, the discussion in this Section ignores the effect of risk on interest 
rates. Also, the derivation of the Fisher equation that follows ignores the presence of in-
come taxes. See Section IX.E for a discussion of the effect of income taxes on the real 
interest rate. 
302 One way to interpret Equation (4) is to think of the first term, r, as compensation for 
the use of the principal, the second term, n', as compensation for the fact that the principal 
is repaid in inflated dollars, and the third term, r x n', as compensation for the fact that the 
real interest, r, is repaid in inflated dollars. 
303 Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest: Its Nature, Determination and Relation to Eco-
nomic Phenomena 270-85 (1907) [hereinafter Interest] (explaining the relationship be-
tween interest and inflation); Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by 
Impatience to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest It 61-227 (1930) (same). For a 
more modern presentation, see Brealey & Myers, note 285, at 558-61. 
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(5) 
Thus, for example, if the real interest rate is 5% and the expected rate 
of inflation is 10%, a lender must charge approximately 15% in order 
to be compensated both for inflation and for the real cost of funds. 304 
The discussion so far, however, has assumed that indexing would be 
based on actual, not expected, inflation. The fact that the theory sug-
gests that interest rates generally are based on expected, not actual, 
inflation raises the question of whether indexing should be based on 
expected or actual inflation. Over the life of the debt, as with other 
assets or liabilities, it is clear that indexing should be based on actual, 
not expected inflation, in the same way that the ultimate taxation of 
income on any investment is based on actual, not expected, earnings. 
Prior to the disposition or retirement of a debt instrument, however, 
the Code generally taxes on the basis of expected income, not actual 
income.305 Thus, for example, if a taxpayer purchases at par a 10-year 
bond with a 10% interest coupon and $1,000 principal, the taxpayer is 
presumed to have income of $100 per year. If, as of the end of the 
first year, however, market interest rates have dropped to 8%, the 
value of the bond will have increased to $1,125. Therefore, the tax-
payer will have $125 in appreciation in addition to the $100 interest 
coupon. Under current law, the $125 would not be taken into income 
immediately.306 
The fact that income on debt generally is taxed on an expected basis 
suggests that, to be consistent, indexation adjustments during the term 
of the debt instrument should be made on the basis of expected infla-
tion and the difference between expected and anticipated inflation 
should be taken into account upon redemption. While such an ap-
proach may have some intellectual appeal, it should be rejected on 
several grounds. First, it would require knowledge of the expected 
inflation rate, a figure that is essentially unknowable. Second, it 
would be significantly more complex, requiring both ongoing adjust-
If the inflation rate and the real interest rate are compounded continually, Equation (3) 
in the text becomes: 
(1) 
which in turn implies: 
i = r + rc' (2) 
as in Equation (5) in the text. Fisher, Interest, supra, at 360-61. Unless noted otherwise, I 
assume annual compounding. 
304 The exact rate given by Equation (4) is 15.5%. 
305 Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 268 (arguing that the original issue dis-
count rules can be viewed as taxing expected income). 
306 The appreciation would be recognized over the life of the debt instrument as part of 
the now above-market interest coupons. Thus, in a sense, the failure to tax on the basis of 
actual income is largely self-correcting prior to maturity. If inflation were adjusted for 
currently on an expected basis, it would not be self-correcting prior to maturity. 
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ments and a final adjustment at maturity. Finally, it would increase 
the timing option.307 Where inflation was less than expected and, 
therefore , the holder of the debt instrument had an unanticipated 
gain, the holder would be able to defer the gain by continuing to hold 
the instrument. Where, on the other hand, inflation was more than 
expected and the holder of the debt instrument had an unanticipated 
loss, the holder would be able to recognize the loss currently by dis-
posing of the instrument.3os 
One disadvantage of basing the annual indexation adjustment on 
actual inflation is that the adjustment can exceed the amount of nomi-
nal interest. For example, consider a $1,000 debt instrument with a 
10% interest coupon and an actual inflation rate of 12%. The infla-
tion adjustment would be $120,309 although the interest coupon would 
only be $100. The correct approach would be to treat the borrower as 
having zero interest expense and $20 of income. Correspondingly, the 
lender should have zero interest income and a $20 loss. As an alterna-
tive, the inflation adjustment in any year could be limited to the 
amount of otherwise determined interest income or expense.310 Any 
remaining adjustment could be carried forward. 311 Upon final pay-
ment on the debt, any deferred gain or loss could be recognized. 
C. Specific Issues Arising with Debt Indexation 
1. Secondary Purchases of Debt Instruments 
As with the purchaser of any asset, a secondary purchaser of a debt 
instrument should index by reference to his basis in the instrument, 
rather than by reference to the face amount of the instrument. Since, 
however, under current law, holders of debt instruments generally are 
307 Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 255 (discussing the timing option). See 
also Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale 
L.J . 1817 (1990); George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal 
Tax, 51 Econometrica 611 (1983) . 
308 Of course, the same argument about the timing option can be a critique of the reali-
zation doctrine in general. See generally Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 243. 
The point is that there is no reason to expand the timing option merely for the sake of 
theoretical consistency. 
309 $120 = $1,000 X 12%. 
310 It may be seen as too radical an idea to provide that borrowers have income when 
they pay interest and lenders get a deduction when they receive interest. Moreover, it 
might be difficult to enforce, given that existing reporting rules are premised on the as-
sumption that borrowers deduct and lenders include interest. See, e.g., IRC § 6049 (requir-
ing certain payors of interest to report the amount of interest paid); IRC § 6050H 
(requiring lenders to report the amount of interest received on home mortgages). 
311 The amount carried forward should itself be indexed for subsequent inflation. See 
note 296 (noting that if the inflation adjustment is deferred, it must be increased to reflect 
subsequent inflation). 
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permitted to defer the inclusion of market discount, it may be appro-
priate to defer some portion of the indexation adjustment.312 
Example 32: X Co issues at par a $1,000, 10-year, 5% annual 
coupon bond. The next day, new inflation figures are re-
leased indicating that the inflation rate has increased from 
3% to 8% and the market interest rate rises to 10%. Sarah 
purchases an X Co bond yielding 10% for $693.313 At the 
end of the first year, Sarah is paid $50 in interest on the 
bond. The inflation rate is 8% the entire time that Sarah 
holds the bond. 
Assuming no further changes in interest rates, in nominal terms, 
Sarah has income in the first year of $69, or 10% of her investment. 
Because inflation is 8%, she should have an inflation adjustment of 
$55, and, therefore, should have net real income of $14, or 2% of her 
investmenP14 
Under current law, however, Sarah would have current taxable in-
come of only $50, the amount of the coupon.315 In nominal terms, she 
would be taxed, therefore, as if the instrument were yielding 7.2%.316 
The remaining $19, or 2.8% of her 10% yield, would be deferred. If 
she were permitted to take the entire inflation adjustment of $55 cur-
rently, she would have a current $5 loss,317 as opposed to her eco-
nomic income of $14. 
A simple solution to the problem of market discount bonds would 
be to defer any net loss from the inflation adjustment until the market 
discount was recognized. Thus, in Example 32, Sarah would be per-
mitted to offset her entire $50 of current interest with an inflation 
adjustment, but would not be able to take a loss. Limiting the infla-
tion adjustment to the amount of the interest income would be overly 
generous in cases such as Example 32 where there was a change in the 
inflation rate before the bond was purchased, and overly harsh where 
the loss was due to an unanticipated increase in inflation. A more 
312 IRC § 1276 (taxing market discount as ordinary income upon disposition) . But see 
IRC § 1277 (requiring the deferral in some circumstances of interest expense on debt in-
curred or continued to purchase or carry a market discount bond); IRC § 1286 (requiring 
market discount on a stripped bond to be included in income currently); IRC 
§ 860C(b)(1)(B) (requiring a REMIC to include market discount currently). 
313 The present value, using a 10% discount rate, of the principal and interest payments 
due on the bond is $693. 
314 If the indexation adjustment were computed with regard to the face amount of the 
instrument, rather than Sarah's basis in the instrument, Sarah would have an $80 adjust-
ment, incorrectly giving her net income of - $11. 
315 IRC § 1276. 
316 7.2% = $50/$693. 
317 ($5) = $50- $55. A $5 loss would represent a -0.8% yield on the bond. 
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exact solution would defer a portion of the inflation adjustment, de-
termined by reference to the deferred portion of the yield. To do so, 
however, would necessitate computing the total yield on the bond; if 
the total yield on the bond was being computed anyway, there would 
be little reason not to tax it currently.318 
2. Installment Obligations 
An installment obligation is a debt instrument where the principal is 
repaid in installments over the term of the loan.319 In the case of an 
installment obligation, indexing should be based on the outstanding 
principal balance in the loan over the relevant period. Example 33 
illustrates the indexation of an installment obligation. 
Example 33: Alex borrows $1,000, promising to repay $100 
in principal each year plus 10% interest on the outstanding 
balance. Inflation is 6%. 
At the end of the first year, Alex pays $100 in interest and 
$100 in principal. Because the outstanding principal balance 
was $1,000 over the first year, Alex would have an inflation 
adjustment of $60 and, therefore, would be treated as paying 
$40 in interest. Alex would have a remaining principal bal-
ance of $900. 
At the end of the second year, Alex pays $90 in interest and 
$100 in principal. Because the outstanding principal balance 
was $900 over the second year, Alex would have an inflation 
adjustment of $54 and would be treated as paying $36 in in-
terest. Alex would have a remaining principal balance of 
$800. 
3. Original Issue Discount Obligations 
In general, original issue discount obligations are taxed in each pe-
riod as if the issuer makes a payment of current interest and the 
holder reinvests the amount of the deemed interest payment.320 The 
holder's basis in the obligation is increased by the amount of the 
318 In cases where market discount is created by a significant decrease in the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, there are independent arguments for permitting deferral. 
319 A home mortgage is a common example of an installment obligation. 
320 IRC § 1272(a)(l) (requiring current inclusion of original issue discount); IRC 
§ 163(e) (permitting issuer a current deduction for original issue discount); IRC 
§ 1272(a)(4) (adjusting issue price for prior accruals) . 
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deemed reinvestment-321 With indexation, the issuer would be treated 
as if it made a combined payment of interest and indexed principal 
and the holder reinvested both the deemed interest and the deemed 
principal payment. Thus, the amount of the original issue discount 
inclusion would be reduced by the inflation adjustment, but the 
holder's basis, or adjusted issue price, would be increased by the full 
amount of the deemed payment. The following example demon-
strates the indexing of an original issue discount bond. 
Example 34: Y Co issues a two-year zero-coupon bond with 
a face amount of $1,000 for $826. The bond has a yield to 
maturity of 10%.322 
Under current law, the holder of the bond would have OlD 
income of $83 for the first year and would increase its basis 
in the bond to $909. The holder would have income of $91 in 
the second year and would increase its basis to $1,000. The 
holder would have no further gain or loss at maturity. 
Assume that inflation was 6% for the first year and 8% for 
the second year. Under indexation, the holder would have 
an inflation adjustment of $50 for the first year323 and would, 
therefore, have net OlD income of only $33. The holder's 
basis in the obligation, however, would increase by $83, the 
combined amount of the inflation adjustment and the net 
original issue discount. 
For the second year, the holder would have an inflation ad-
justment of $73324 and would have net OlD income of $18. 
The holder's basis in the obligation would increase by $91 to 
$1,000. The holder would have no further gain or loss at 
maturity. 
This discussion of OlD obligations assumes that the income on the 
obligation accrues currently. While generally the OlD rules require 
the current accrual of income, where there is contingent interest the 
rules generally provide for deferral until the contingency is re-
solved.325 If, under the applicable rules, the income from a debt obli-
321 IRC § 1272(d)(2) (increasing the holder's basis for prior accruals). 
322 $826 = $1,000/l.lef. The example assumes an annual accrual period. 
323 $50 = $826 X 6%. 
324 $73 = $909 X 8%. 
325 The Service and Treasury have struggled with the appropriate treatment of contin-
gent obligations. The original proposed regulations generally provided for the deferral of 
contingent interest until fixed. Prop. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(e), (f) (1986). The proposed regula-
tions were modified in 1991 to require that certain contingent instruments be separated 
into a noncontingent debt instrument and a contingent financial product and that the issue 
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gation is deferred, it generally would be appropriate to defer the 
indexation adjustment until the income is realized. The more difficult 
case is where some of the interest is accrued currently and some of the 
interest is deferred. Thus, for example, an obligation might pay a cur-
rent return of 4% and have a contingent payment that is expected to 
provide an additional yield of 5%. As with the case of stock that pays 
a current dividend and returns a portion of the yield as capital gain, it 
generally would be appropriate in such a case to match the inflation 
adjustment with the deferred return, thus deferring the adjustment 
until the contingency is resolved and the income accrued. 326 Defer-
ring the indexation adjustment on some, but not all, debt instruments, 
however, raises the further problem of identifying when a sufficient 
portion of the yield on a debt instrument is deferred such that the 
indexation adjustment also should be deferred.327 
4. Indexed Debt 
It is possible to issue debt that is economically indexed to inflation. 
In general, as suggested by the following example, it would be 
straightforward to index for tax purposes debt issued in indexed form. 
price of the instrument be allocated between the two instruments. Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-
4(g) (1991). Under the modified rules, the contingent financial product generally is not 
treated as a debt instrument. Prop. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(g)(4)(i) (1991). The effect of there-
vised proposed regulations generally is to increase the amount of interest that accrues cur-
rently on obligations covered by the rules. In January 1993, Treasury released a revised set 
of proposed contingent interest regulations that would have required current accrual in a 
broader class of cases. Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (Jan. 19, 1993) (filed but not published in the 
Federal Register Jan. 19, 1993). The proposed regulations, however, were withdrawn as 
part of a general decision by the Clinton administration to review new regulations. See 
Leon E . Panetta, Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in 
Section 1(d) of Executive Order 12291 (Jan. 25, 1993) (requesting the withdrawal of all 
regulations not yet published in the Federal Register), 93 TNT 18-30, Jan. 26, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File; Rita L. Zeidner, At Least Two Tax Regulations 
Caught Up in OMB Review, 93 TNT 18-2, Jan. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Li-
brary, TNT File (reporting that the proposed contingent interest regulation was withdrawn 
by the Service). The Service has yet to issue revised contingent interest regulations. See 
also Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79 (suggesting a general approach to the taxation 
of contingent instruments). 
326 See text accompanying notes 106-20 (discussing the appropriate timing of indexation 
adjustments with debt and stock). 
327 To the extent that taxpayers are required to bifurcate debt instruments into a contin-
gent and noncontingent component, a reasonable solution would be to permit a current 
indexation adjustment with respect to the amount of the issue price allocated to the non-
contingent component, while deferring the adjustment with respect to the amount of the 
issue price allocated to the contingent component. See Prop. Reg. § 1.1275-4(g) (1991) 
(requiring the allocation of issue price between the contingent and noncontingent pay-
ments on a debt instrument). 
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Example 35: In 1990, B issues a five-year debt instrument for 
$1,000. Under the terms of the instrument, the principal bal-
ance of the debt is increased each year by the amount of in-
flation. In addition, B pays annual interest equal to 5% 
times the indexed principal amount. At maturity, B repays 
the indexed principal. Assuming a 10% inflation rate each 
year, the following table shows the interest payable each 
year and the principal balance of the debt: 
Indexed 
Year Principal Interest 
1991 $1,100 $55 
1992 1,210 61 
1993 1,331 67 
1994 1,464 73 
1995 1,611 81 
Under current law, the taxation of an indexed obligation such as the 
instrument described in Example 35 is uncertain and complex. If debt 
were indexed for tax purposes, however, the taxation would be 
straightforward. Each year the issuer would be permitted a deduction 
for the interest payment on the note. Correspondingly, the holder 
would take the interest into income. Because the principal is indexed 
for inflation, there would be no inflation gain or loss.328 While in-
dexed debt instruments are uncommon in the United States, it is likely 
that if debt were indexed for tax purposes, the use of such instruments 
would increase. 329 
328 The discussion in the text assumes that the index used for the debt instrument was 
the same as the index used by the Code to determine income. It is unlikely that issuers 
would choose to use a different index at the cost of substantially increased complexity. It 
would also be possible for the Code to respect the use of different indices as long as they 
met certain general criteria. 
329 Treasury generally has opposed the issuance of indexed Treasury obligations. In tes-
timony, Treasury noted that both the interest payments and the indexation adjustments to 
an indexed obligation currently would be taxable under the OlD rules. Treasury strongly 
opposed making the inflation adjustment tax-free on such bonds while the implicit inflation 
adjustment remains taxable on other obligations. Inflation-Indexed Treasury Debt as an 
Aid to Monetary Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and 
Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
105-21 (1992) (statement of Jerome H. Powell, Under Sec. of Treas. for Finance). 
During the 1980's, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was 
involved in developing a self-amortizing indexed residential mortgage called a Price Level 
Adjusted Mortgage (PLAM). Under a typical PLAM, a borrower's monthly mortgage 
payment initially would be determined based on the amortization schedule for a 4% mort-
gage. At regular intervals, both the monthly payment and the remaining principal balance 
would be indexed to changes in the consumer price index. From a borrower's perspective, 
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5. Home Mortgages 
The administrative problems of indexing home mortgage debt are 
not particularly severe. The determination of the amount of interest 
paid on a home mortgage is, even without indexing, beyond the ability 
of most homeowners and is dealt with successfully by lender report-
ing.330 Given the existing reporting requirements, the marginal cost of 
requiring lenders to report indexing adjustments is quite smalJ.331 Op-
timally, an adjustment should be based on the average balance of the 
mortgage during the year. For most level-payment, self-amortizing 
mortgages, little accuracy would be lost by indexing based only on the 
ending balance with appropriate adjustments for mortgages outstand-
ing for less than an entire year. 
The real problem with indexing home mortgage debt is political. As 
the following example demonstrates, indexing home mortgage debt 
would limit the benefit of the home mortgage deduction significantly. 
Example 36: A taxpayer in the 36% bracket has a 30-year, 
$200,000 mortgage at 10%. Under current law, the after-tax 
cost of the interest on the mortgage in the first year is ap-
PLAMs would have offered the advantage of low initial mortgage payments, while from a 
lender's perspective, PLAMs would have been attractive investments for entities, such as 
pension plans, with liabilities that themselves are linked to inflation. The Service issued 
temporary regulations treating PLAMs as variable rate debt instruments. Temp. Reg. 
§ 1.1275-6T (withdrawn Feb. 2, 1994). HUD, however, never gave final approval to the 
Federal Housing Administration insuring PLAMs. A Caution From Kemp, Money, July, 
1990, at 11. Despite HUD's failure to go ahead with PLAMs, at least one private company 
has originated PLAMs. PLAMs Make Comeback, Nat'! Mortgage News, Feb. 18, 1991, at 
11. 
330 IRC § 6050H (requiring reporting to the Service and the borrower the amount of 
interest paid on home mortgages). 
331 Nevertheless, it is likely that lending institutions would resist any such reporting re-
quirement in the same way that they resisted a proposal to have lenders report average 
balances on mortgages so as to assist with compliance with § 163(h)(3) (limitation on home 
mortgage interest). See Announcement 87-73, 1987-33 I.R.B. 39 (Aug. 17, 1987) (announc-
ing that the Service intends to issue regulations requiring lending institutions and other 
·parties to report the average balance on home mortgages); Letter from Wendy S. 
Schonman, Tax Counsel, National Council of Savings Institutions to Lawrence Gibbs, 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, 87 TNT 190-28, Sept. 30, 1987, available in 
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (requesting a postponement of the average balance re-
porting requirement); BNA Daily Report for Executives G3 (Aug. 24, 1987), 87 TNT 171-
12, Sept. 2, 1987, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (reporting the objections of 
the American Bankers Association and the Consumers Bankers Association to the average 
balance reporting requirement); Announcement 87-110, 1987-49 I.R.B. 37 (Dec. 7, 1987) 
(announcing that the average balance reporting requirement would not be imposed for 
interest received before January 1, 1989); and Announcement 89-61, 1989-20 I.R.B. 146 
(May 15, 1989) (announcing that the average balance reporting requirement would be in-
definitely postponed). 
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proximately $12,800.332 Assuming 5% inflation, if the mort-
gage were indexed, the after-tax cost would be approxi-
mately $16,400, a 28% increase.333 
Even if, as is likely, indexing applied only to new mortgages, by raising 
the after-tax cost to homebuyers, indexing mortgages might well de-
press housing prices causing existing homeowners to suffer losses.3 34 
It is, of course, possible that mortgage interest rates would fall to re-
flect the lower taxes on lenders.335 It is not at all clear, however, that 
interest rates would fall enough to offset the entire burden of index-
ing. In Example 35, interest rates would have to fall from 10% to 
7.2% to compensate the homeowner for indexing.336 
The question of the effect of indexing on existing homeowners is 
part of a much larger problem of transition rules.337 Even, for exam-
ple, if it is accepted that the current subsidy for housing has caused 
inefficient overinvestment in housing stock and is distributionally sus-
pect, care must be given to reducing the subsidy without causing ex-
cessive dislocation. To use the transition problem as a permanent bar 
to improvements in the tax system, however, makes little sense. All 
332 The interest payable in the first year would be approximately $20,000. ($20,000 = 
$200,000 x 10% ). The $20,000 interest payment would be entirely deductible and would 
save the taxpayer $7,200 in taxes ($7,200 = 36% x $20,000). The after-tax cost therefore 
would be $12,800 ($12,800 = $20,000 - $7,200). 
333 A $10,000 inflation adjustment would reduce the $20,000 first year interest payment 
($10,000 = $200,000 x 5% ). The remaining $10,000 interest deduction would save the tax-
payer $3,600 in taxes ($3,600 = $10,000 x 36% ). The after-tax cost therefore would be 
$16,400. $16,400 is approximately 28% greater than $12,800 (28% = ($16,400 - $12,800)/ 
$12,800). 
334 The current federal income tax treatment of housing generally is assumed to subsi-
dize housing significantly. See, e.g., Treasury Dep't, Report On Integration of the Individ-
ual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once 127 (1992) (noting that 
among major categories, the cost of capital is lowest for owner-occupied housing); Harvey 
S. Rosen, Public Finance 113 (3d ed. 1992) (noting the magnitude of the federal subsidy for 
housing and questioning the arguments in favor of such a subsidy and its distributional 
effects); Patrie H. Hendershott, Tax Reform and the Slope of the Playing Field, in Taxes 
and Capital Formation 51 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1987) (showing that the cost of capital is 
lowest for owner-occupied housing and arguing that it is inefficient); Fullerton, note 233, at 
25 (showing that the cost of capital is lowest for owner-occupied housing); Let's Slay An-
other Sacred Tax Cow, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1981, at A24 (arguing in favor of limiting the 
federal tax subsidy for housing). 
335 See text accompanying notes 357-84. 
336 At a 7.19% interest rate in Example 35, the homeowner's pretax interest cost would 
be $14,375. Taking into account the $10,000 indexing adjustment, his interest deduction 
would be $4,375, which would give him a tax savings of $1,575. His after-tax cost would be, 
therefore, $12,800. 
337 See generally Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in In-
come Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47 (1977) (discussing the retroactive effect of tax 
laws and appropriate transitional considerations); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of 
Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986) (developing an economic theory of transi-
tion rules). 
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actions of government, whether legislative, administrative or judicial, 
create winners and losers. To suggest that improvements cannot be 
made because there will be losers in the process of change would 
freeze the status quo in an unacceptable manner and prevent benefi-
cial changes. Nevertheless, abrupt change can have significant real 
costs and should be avoided where practical. Thus, in introducing in-
dexing, as with other changes to the tax law, care should be given to 
avoiding unnecessary disruption. In particular, in some circumstances, 
grandfathering of existing assets and liabilities and gradual phase-ins 
of indexing provisions would be appropriate. In addition, the overall 
distributional impact of indexing should be examined and adjustments 
in rate schedules should be made as appropriate. 
If it were decided to exclude home mortgage borrowers from index-
ation, it would not necessarily be correct also to exclude home mort-
gage lenders. If, for example, a bank's obligations were indexed 
(thereby reducing its interest deductions), but the mortgages it held as 
assets were not, its income would be grossly overstated.338 Thus, if all 
assets and liabilities were indexed other than home mortgage debt, 
there still would be strong arguments in favor of indexing home mort-
gage debt on the lender's side. Of course, indexing home mortgages 
for lenders, but not for borrowers, would have a significant revenue 
cost. The cost, however, would be an accurate reflection of the cost of 
subsidizing home ownership. 
6. Consumer Debt 
Indexing consumer debt, such as credit cards and personal lines of 
credit, should not impose significant burdens on the tax system. From 
the borrower's side, interest on such debt generally is not deductible; 
as a result, no indexing is required. 
From the lender's side, conventions could be adopted to simplify 
indexing. For example, it would be reasonable to index based on the 
average balance of the debt during the taxable year. Since interest on 
consumer debt generally is based on average balance, most lenders 
already track this information. The incremental burden of multiplying 
the average balance times the inflation factor would be small. 
7. Bank Deposits 
As with consumer credit, bank deposits could be indexed based on 
their average balances. From the bank's perspective, indexing would 
338 Even if overall interest rates did not drop under indexation, it is likely that home 
mortgage rates would be higher relative to other interest rates if home mortgages were the 
only form of debt not indexed for lenders. 
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require the incremental burden of tracking average balances. The in-
dexing adjustment for the depositor generally would be the same as 
for the bank and could be reported by the bank easily along with the 
gross amount of interest paid.339 In the case of checking accounts, the 
amount of the indexation adjustment to the consumer could be lim-
ited to the amount of interest paid as an ad hoc method of accounting 
for the income from services provided by the bank.340 
8. Government and Corporate Bonds 
Indexing would pose a small incremental burden on issuers of cor-
porate bonds and no additional burden on issuers of government 
bonds. The administrative details of indexing could prove trouble-
some for individual holders of corporate and government bonds due 
to complexity. To a large extent, however, the burden could be placed 
on the broker community, though the costs of doing so should be eval-
uated carefully. In particular, in order to know the correct indexing 
adjustment, a broker would need to know the holder's basis in the 
bond. Currently, brokers do not always know the holder's basis and 
therefore, additional reporting rules would be required.341 
9. De Minimis Rules 
De minimis rules could simplify the burden of indexing in the case 
of small debts and would be particularly appropriate for purposes of 
small debts between individuals. Thus, for example, no indexing 
could be required on loans between individuals of less than $10,000.342 
Similarly, de minimis rules could be explored for a broader class of 
loans where one or more parties is not an individual. In designing de 
minimis rules, it is important to remember that it is not necessary that 
both the borrower and the lender be treated symmetrically.343 
339 Banks are required to report interest paid on Form 1099. IRC § 6049. 
340 See C. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of Interest Pay-
ments and Receipts, 30 Wayne L. Rev. 991, 995-96 (1984) [hereinafter Tax Arbitrage] (dis-
cussing financial services received in lieu of interest payments). 
341 If brokers were required to know basis, it would be a small incremental burden to 
require brokers to report gain and loss on the sale of bonds, rather than just gross pro-
ceeds. Cf. IRC § 6045 (requiring brokers to report gross proceeds). See text accompany-
ing note 150 (recommending reporting of gain on mutual fund shares). 
342 Cf. IRC § 7872(c)(2) ($10,000 de minimis exception for certain below-market loans). 
343 Compare § 163(h)(1) (disallowing a deduction for interest on debt used for personal 
purposes) with § 61(a)(4) (including interest in income without regard to the use of the 
proceeds of the debt). 
l 
~ 
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D. Use of Approximate Indexation 
Just as indexing capital gains can be approximated by the use of an 
exclusion, indexing debt can be approximated by the use of a partial 
interest exclusion. For example, as part of its 1984 tax reform propos-
als, Treasury recommended the use of a fractional exclusion 
method.344 Under the Treasury methodology, lenders and borrowers 
would have excluded a specified fraction of their interest income or 
expense each year. The fract ion, which would have been the same for 
all taxpayers, would have been determined annually based on the rate 
of inflation and an assumption as to the real interest rate .345 Table 7 
shows the fractional exclusions under the Treasury proposal as a func-
tion of the inflation rate. 
Table 7 
Fractional exclusion a ssuming 6% real interest ra te 
Inflation Rate 
(%) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Fractional Exclusion 
(%) 
0 
14 
25 
33 
40 
45 
50 
54 
57 
60 
62 
65 
67 
As with a capital gains exclusion, a fractional exclusion has the advan-
tage of simplicity and the disadvantage of being inexact,346 
344 2 Treasury I, note 152, at 193-200. 
345 The proposed fractional exclusion was equal to the inflation rate divided by the as-
sumed nominal interest rate based on a 6% real interest rate. Id. at 195-98. Treasury 
apparently computed the fractional exclusion based on the assumption of continuous com-
pounding. See note 303 (discussing continuous compounding). 
346 Although a fractional exclusion for debt is inexact, it is superior to a capital gains 
exclusion for several reasons. First, because debt instruments generally are taxed cur-
rently, there is no need to compensate for deferral, and the size of the appropriate exclu-
sion does not change with the holding period . Second, the fractional exclusion takes into 
account changes in the rate of inflation. Third, although the fractional inclusion fails to 
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The principal problem with a fractional exclusion is that it does not 
take into account differences in real rates of return. 347 For example, 
with a 5% inflation rate and a 6% real interest rate, the fractional 
exclusion as shown in Table 7 would be 45% . If the real rate, how-
ever, were only 2%, the correct fractional exclusion would be 71%, 
and if the real rate were 10% , the correct fractional exclusion would 
be only 33%.348 As can be seen from the following example, the fail-
ure of a single frac tional exclusion to take into account differences in 
real rates of return is particularly acute in the case of financial 
institutions. 
Example 37: Bank Co has deposits of $1 million on which it 
pays 3% interest and has consumer loans outstanding of $1 
million on which it is paid 18% interest. The inflation rate is 
5%.349 In nominal terms, Bank Co has interest income of 
$180,000, interest expense of $30,000 and net income of 
$150,000. In real terms, moreover, its income is also 
$150,000, because its inflationary loss of $50,000 on its assets 
is exactly offset by its inflationary gain of $50,000 on its 
liabilities. 350 
Under a fractional exclusion of 45%, however, Bank Co 
would be able to exclude 45% of its gross income, or $81,000, 
but would lose only 45% of its interest expense, or $13,500. 
In net terms, it would be able to exclude $67,500 of its net 
income. Its taxable income, therefore, would be only 
$82,500, rather than $150,000. 
Thus, in Example 37, the bank's real income would be underreported 
by 45%, the full amount of the fractional exclusion. To the extent that 
the financial institution was equity financed, the understatement of its 
income would be reduced, but not eliminated. 
take into account differences in real yield, the range of real yield generally is smaller for 
debt instruments than it is for other capital assets. Additionally, because, unlike the capital 
gains exclusion, the fractional exclusion applies to both sides of a transaction, the market 
may have some ability to correct for errors in the exclusion rate. Of course, a capital gains 
exclusion is politically more popular than a fractional exclusion for debt because the capi-
tal gains exclusion generates only winners, whereas the fractional exclusion generates 
losers as well as winners. 
347 See 2 Treasury I, note 152, at 198 (noting that a correct fractional exclusion would 
take into account the difference in real rates between lenders, but arguing that a single 
fractional exclusion is more accurate than no exclusion). 
348 71% = 5%/(2% + 5%). 33 % = 5%/(10% + 5%). See note 345 (explaining computa-
tion of the fraction al exclusion). 
349 For simplicity, the bank is assumed to have no equity. 
350 $50,000 = $1,000,000 X 5%. 
I 
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One possible soiution to the financial institution problem would be 
to require financial institutions to use exact indexing, while permitting 
other taxpayers to use a fractional exclusion. Any such proposal 
would require distinguishing between financial and nonfinancial insti-
tutions.351 Alternatively, a fractional exclusion could be permitted 
only for individuals and small entities, while all other entities could be 
required to use exact indexing. 
A fractional exclusion also does not work very well with debt that is 
not paying a current interest rate. For example, consider a taxpayer 
who buys a debt instrument in the secondary market with a 5% cou-
pon and a yield of 10%. Presumably, the fractional exclusion should 
be applied against his entire nominal income from the debt. Since, 
however, a portion of his income is deferred until maturity, it would 
be difficult to do so.352 Similarly, a fractional exclusion does not work 
well when the inflation rate changes after a debt instrument is 
purchased. For example, consider a taxpayer who holds a debt instru-
ment paying 6% that was purchased when the inflation rate was zero. 
If inflation increases to 5% and the taxpayer's real yield drops to 1%, 
he should get a fractional exclusion of 83%.353 He would be be per-
mitted, however, a fractional exclusion of only 45%. Finally, consider 
a taxpayer who holds a debt instrument paying 16% while inflation is 
10%. If inflation drops to 2% and his real yield increases to 14%, he 
should have a fractional exclusion of 13%.354 Under the Treasury pro-
posal, however, he would be permitted to exclude 25% of his interest 
income.355 
These examples are not intended to suggest that approximations are 
inappropriate. After all, the current system can be viewed as one 
where the fractional exclusion is always zero. Rather, the examples 
are intended to suggest that any approximations need to be designed 
with great care and may need to take into account some differences in 
circumstances. 
351 It would be possible to distinguish between financial institutions and nonfinancial 
institutions based on the percentage of their income from interest or the percentage of 
their assets in interest-bearing obligations. 
352 The taxpayer could elect to accrue market discount currently, IRC § 1278(b), thereby 
becoming entitled to the entire fractional exclusion. It also would be possible to apply the 
fractional exclusion against the current coupon income from the bond and also against the 
market discount income recognized upon disposition. IRC § 1276 (requiring taxpayers to 
treat market discount as ordinary income upon disposition). 
353 83% = 5%/(1% + 5%). 
354 13% = 2%/(14% + 2%). 
355 See Table 7. 
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E. Is Debt Indexation Unnecessary? 
The discussion of debt indexation so far essentially has ignored the 
effect of the failure to index debt on pretax interest rates. Opponents 
of debt indexation argue that because both lenders and borrowers un-
derstand that their tax liabilities are based on nominal, not real, inter-
est payments, interest rates adjust to take into account the 
overtaxation and that, therefore, indexation becomes unnecessary.356 
The theoretical ability of interest rates to adjust to take into account 
the fa ilure to index interest is demonstrated by the following example. 
Example 38: Assume that both the real interest rate and the 
inflation rate are 5% and that all taxpayers face a 30% mar-
ginal rate. Well aware of monetary illusion, but blind to fis-
cal illusion, Bank Co. sets its lending rate at 10% to cover 
both the real cost of its funds and inflation.357 Bank Co. 
lends $1,000 to Borrower for one year. Bank Co. expects to 
earn an after-tax real return of $35.358 
After one year, Borrower repays $1,100. Bank Co. pays 
taxes of $30359 on the interest, leaving itself with $1 ,070 after 
taxes. Its accountant points out that after adjusting for the 
356 For example, the committee report to the House Bill noted that "[t]he basis of debt is 
not indexed in order to avoid the complexity required to provide an inflation adjustment 
for both parties to the transaction." H.R. Rep. No. 461, note 73, at 357. The committee 
report to the indexing bill passed by the House in 1978 went further and argued that "[t]o 
the extent that inflation is anticipated correctly and interest rates are free to rise in the 
marketplace, the market interest rates should rise to reflect the fact that neither the bor-
rower nor the lender must make the inflation adjustment." H.R. Rep. No. 1445, note 73, at 
126, reprinted in 1978-3 C.B. (vol. 1) at 181, 300. Frederic W. Hickman argues that: 
[t]he failure to index interest does not affect the total amount of income in the 
system, but affects only the distribution of that income among taxpayers (using 
the word "taxpayers" here in a sense broad enough to cover exempt entities). 
The taxpayers involved, in the aggregate and through the marketplace, can and 
do adjust interest rates to offset distortions, albeit in a rough and imperfect 
way. 
Frederic W. Hickman, Interest, Depreciation, and Indexing, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 773, 805 (1986). 
Also, while acknowledging that there is some distortion and revenue cost from the failure 
to index debt, Hickman argues that "[i]t is thus quixotic to enact elaborate mechanisms 
that affect the bulk of taxpayers in petty but complicating ways in order to correct 'theoret-
ical' lapses, unless there is a persuasive showing of damaging distortions or clear unfair-
ness." Id. at 803. But see id. at 811 (comments by John E. Chapoton in panel discussion 
advocating indexing of interest even if it were not feasible to index other factors in the tax 
system). 
357 For purposes of clarity, the example ignores the term r x 1t in the Fisher and tax-
adjusted Fisher equations. See Equations ( 4) and (7). 
358 Absent inflation, Bank Co. would earn 5% before taxes and 3.5% or $35 after taxes. 
3.5% = 5% X (1- 30%). 
359 $30 = $100 X 30%. 
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$50 loss in value in its principal,360 Bank Co. has earned only 
$20 in real terms, rather than $35 as expected. 
No longer subject to fiscal illusion, Bank Co. raises its lend-
ing rate to 12.2%, charging $122 interest on its $1 ,000 loan to 
Borrower. After paying $37 in taxes, Bank Co. is left with 
$85 after tax.361 Adjusting for its $50 inflationary loss, Bank 
Co. has an after-tax real return of $35 or 3.5%.362 Similarly, 
Borrower has an after-tax real interest cost of $35.363 
635 
As shown by the example, in order to have an interest rate suffi-
cient to compensate both for the effect of inflation and for the failure 
of the tax system to index debt, a lender must set an interest rate that 
is high enough to cover the real interest rate, expected losses due to 
inflation and the tax penalty on the inflation premium. Thus, a lender 
planning to lend $P who demands a real pretax return of r, expects an 
inflation rate of 1te and has a tax rate of 't, must set an interest rate of i, 
such that the after-tax present value of the interest and principal pay-
ments, stated in constant dollars, equals the amount lent. In other 
words, i must satisfy the following equation: 
p = 
P X (1 + i(1 - 't))/(1 + 1te) 
(1 + r(1 - 1)) 
Equation (6) can then be solved for i:364 
= r + 
(1 - 't) 
(6) 
(7) 
If r and 1te are small, their product r x 1te can be ignored, leading to the 
tax-adjusted Fisher equation;365 
360 Bank Co. 's inflationary Joss is $1,000 times 5%, or $50. 
361 $85 = $122- ($122 X 30%). 
362 $35 = $85 -$50 = $1,000 X 3.5%. 
363 The analysis for the borrower is exactly symmetrical to the analysis for the bank. 
364 See, e.g. , Fiscal Aff. Dep't, Int'l Monetary Fund, Interest Rates and Tax Treatment of 
Interest Income and Expense, in Taxation, Inflation, and Interest Rates 3, 19-21 (Vito 
Tanzi ed., 1984) [hereinafter IMF Report] (describing tax-adjusted Fisher equation); 
Michael R. Darby, The Financial and Tax Effects of Monetary Policy on Interest Rates, 13 
Econ. Inquiry 266, 272 (1975) (deriving tax-adjusted Fisher equation); Martin Feldstein, 
Inflation, Income Taxes, and the Rate of Interest: A Theoretical Analysis, 66 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 809 (1976) (developing a model for which the tax-adjusted Fisher equation is a special 
case); Vito Tanzi , Inflation, Indexation and Interest Income Taxation, 29 Banca Nazionale 
Del Lavoro Q . Rev. 64, 73 (1976) (deriving tax-adjusted Fisher equation). 
365 Equation (8) is exactly correct if the inflation rate and the real rate are compounded 
continuously. See note 303 (discussing compounding). 
636 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48: 
(1 - 1:) 
(8) 
\ I i = r + 
Equations (7) and (8) differ from equations (4) and (5) in that the 
term ne has been replaced by the term n:e/(1 - 'T). The coefficient 1/(1 -
1:) can be thought of as grossing up the inflation adjustment to cover 
taxes . Since 1: is always less than one, 1/(1 -'t) will always be greater 
than one and, therefore, the interest rate determined by the tax-ad-
justed Fisher equation will always exceed the rate determined by the 
unadjusted Fisher equation. The application of the tax-adjusted 
Fisher equation is straightforward. For example, if, as in Example 38, 
rand n:e are 5% and 'tis 30%, the interest rate would have to be 12.2% 
in order to compensate the lender on an after-tax basis for inflation.366 
Some argue that if interest rates fully adjust to compensate for the 
lack of indexation, debt indexation is unnecessary, and since debt in-
dexation has a significant administrative cost, it should not be done.367 
In essence, the argument is that since no one, including the fisc, is hurt 
by the failure to index, indexation is just an academic exercise not 
worth the administrative cost.368 The tax-adjusted Fisher equation 
does not, on the other hand, imply that debt indexation would be in-
correct, at least in equilibrium. If debt were indexed, there would be 
no need or incentive for the market to adjust interest rates for the 
failure to index and the Fisher equation again would be expected to 
hold. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to make the indexation ad-
justment. It is only in the absence of indexation that interest rates 
include the tax factor and that, therefore, indexation is unnecessary. 
The argument against indexation of debt is thus two-fold. First, as a 
transition matter, current interest rates include the tax factor and, 
therefore, in the short run, indexation is incorrect and would lead to 
windfall gains and losses.369 Second, in the long run, the administra-
tive cost of indexation is unnecessary. 
366 12.2% = 5% + 5%/(1-30%). 
367 See note 356 (describing reasons for excluding debt from legislation indexing capital 
gains). Implicit in the argument against debt indexation is an argument for capital gains 
indexation. Essentially, the argument is that if debt indexation is unnecessary, capital gains 
indexation can be adopted without fear of tax arbitrage. See Section X.A (discussing par-
tial indexing). 
368 The fisc is presumed not to be hurt by the failure to index because it is assumed that 
both the borrower and the lender face the same marginal tax rate and, therefore, the bor-
rower's excess deduction is exactly compensated for by the lender's excess inclusion. But 
see text accompanying note 372 (discussing the fact that borrowers and lenders often will 
face different marginal rates). 
369 See Mick, note 291, at 2078-85 (discussing possible transition rules) . 
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Even if it were correct that borrowers and lenders take taxes into 
account, that is, there is no fiscal iliusion, there remain strong argu-
ments in favor of debt indexation. First, the tax-adjusted Fisher equa-
tion implies that interest rates would be more volatile without 
indexation. With indexation, the Fisher equation implies that a 1% 
increase in inflation will increase interest rates by 1%.370 Without in-
dexation, the tax-adjusted Fisher equation implies that a 1% increase 
in inflation will increase interest rates by 1/(1- t)%.371 Therefore, if 
the marginal tax rate is, for example, 34%, a 1% increase in inflation 
will increase interest rates by approximately 1.5%. Presumably, there 
are real costs to the increased volatility of interest rates.372 
Second, the derivation of the tax-adjusted Fisher equation assumes 
that all borrowers and lenders have the same marginal tax rate, t. As 
is well known, this assumption is false because different taxpayers 
generally face different marginal tax rates.373 Moreover, any given 
taxpayer may face different marginal rates with respect to different 
debts.374 Thus, there can be no unique interest rate that solves Equa-
370 See Equation (5) (Fisher equation). 
371 See Equation (8) (tax-adjusted Fisher equation). See also IMF Report, note 364, at 
37 (noting increased volatility); John H. Makin & Vito Tanzi, Level and Volatility of U.S. 
Interest Rates: Roles of Expected Inflation, Real Rates, and Taxes, in IMF Report, note 
364, at 110, 113 (examining the relationship between interest rate volatility, taxes and 
inflation). 
372 For example, increased volatility of nominal interest rates imposes risks on borrow-
ers and lenders. Moreover, in order to reduce such risks, borrowers and lenders must 
engage in costly hedging strategies thereby incurring significant transaction costs. The Fis-
cal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund noted that increased volatility 
means increased uncertainty and that: 
an increase in such uncertainty entails risk for savers and investors for which 
they must be compensated. Viewed in this way, increased uncertainty attend-
ant upon increased volatility of interest rates represents an additional cost of 
capital formation that lowers productivity growth and growth of real output 
and, in turn, enhances inflationary pressures. 
IMF Report, note 364, at 37. 
373 For example, corporations are taxable at marginal rates from zero to 35% and indi-
viduals are taxable at marginal rates from zero to 39.6%, while pension funds and foreign 
persons generally face a marginal rate of zero on interest income and expense. IRC § 11 
(corporations); IRC § 1 (individuals); IRC § 501(a) (pension funds); IRC § 871(h) (portfo-
lio interest received by nonresident alien individuals); IRC § 881(c) (portfolio interest re-
ceived by foreign corporations). 
374 For example, consider an individual who has five debts outstanding. The first debt is 
used for personal purposes, the second to purchase a passive investment that is not cur-
rently generating income, but is expected to generate income in the future, the third to 
purchase an investment, the fourth to purchase a home and the fifth for business purposes. 
Interest on the first debt would be nondeductible. IRC § 163(h)(1) (personal interest) . 
Interest on the second debt would be nondeductible currently, but may be deductible in 
the future in computing adjusted gross income. IRC § 469 (passive losses). Interest on the 
third debt may or may not be deductible currently depending on the individual's invest-
ment income and, when deductible, would be available only as an itemized deduction. 
IRC § 163( d) (investment interest). Interest on the fourth debt generally would be deduct-
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tion (6) for all borrowers and lenders. Given a real interest rate, r, 
expected rate of inflation, Tte, and nominal interest rate, i, a break even 
tax rate, -r*, can be defined as the marginal tax rate that implicitly 
satisfies Equation (6). Rearranging the terms of Equation (6), -r* can 
be expressed as follows: 
't* = 1 -
Tte 
(i - r - Tte) 
(9) 
If a borrower has a marginal tax rate less than -r*, her ability to 
deduct nominal interest is of reduced value and, therefore, she faces a 
higher real borrowing cost than she would with indexation. Con-
versely, a borrower with a marginal tax rate greater than -r* faces a 
lower real borrowing cost without indexation. Similarly, lenders with 
marginal tax rates greater than -r* receive lower real returns than they 
would with indexation and lenders with marginal tax rates less than -r* 
receive higher real returns. These differences both raise issues of eq-
uity and create deadweight loss by distorting borrowing and lending 
decisions.375 For example, lower income individuals generally will 
have lower marginal tax rates than will higher income individuals. As 
a result, lower income individuals will face higher real borrowing costs 
than will higher income individuals with respect to deductible loans. 
Efficiency issues are raised by the fact that the tax penalty on interest 
income will encourage institutions and individuals with low marginal 
rates to become net lenders and institutions and individuals with high 
marginal rates to become net borrowers. 
In addition to the theoretical critiques of the argument that debt 
indexation is unnecessary because market forces are able to adjust for 
the failure to index, there is also a strong empirical critique. The em-
pirical work suggests that -r* is not significantly different from zero, in 
other words, that market interest rates have not adjusted to take into 
account the payment of taxes on the inflation component of inter-
est.376 In terms of the debate between the Fisher equation (Equation 
ible currently below the line. IRC § 163(h)(3) (home mortgage interest). Interest on the 
fifth debt would be deductible currently above the line. IRC § 163(h)(2)(A) (trade or 
business interest). See also IRC § 62(a)(1) (determining whether deductions can be taken 
in computing adjusted gross income). As a result, the effective marginal tax rate with 
respect to each of the taxpayer'~ five debts, in general, would be different. 
375 See generally Vito Tanzi, Inflation and the Incidence of Income Taxes on Interest 
Income in the United States, 1972-81, in IMF Report, note 364, at 149-55 (estimating the 
incidence of the failure to index interest income for federal income tax purposes). 
376 See, e.g., Uri Ben-Zion, Recent Literature On the Impact of Taxation and Inflation 
on Interest Rates, in IMF Report, note 364, at 69 (survey of empirical literature finding 
that the effect of inflation on nominal interest rates is consistently less than predicted by 
the tax-adjusted Fisher model); Eugene F. Fama, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors 
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5) and the tax-adjusted Fisher equation (Equation 8), the Fisher equa-
tion appears to be a much more accurate representation of reality.377 
If market rates have not adjusted to take the inflation tax penalty 
into account, then real after-tax interest rates are affected strongly by 
inflation. Therefore, the argument against indexing based on the fact 
that for every debt there is both a borrower and a lender becomes, at 
best, an argument about revenue neutrality: Borrowers are helped by 
the tax penalty, lenders are hurt by the tax penalty, but at least the fisc 
of Inflation, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 269, 282 (1975) (concluding that real short-term interest 
rates were constant during the period 1953-71 and that nominal rates reflected all available 
information on future rates); Martin Feldstein & Lawrence H. Summers, Inflation, Tax 
Rules, and the Long-Term Interest Rate, 1978 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 61 (ar-
guing nominal rate changes less than one for one with inflation); Patrick J. Hess & James 
L. Bicksler, Capital Asset Prices versus Time Series Models as Predictors of Inflation, 2 J. 
Fin. Econ. 341 , 359 (1975) (rejecting Fama's conclusions that the expected real interest rate 
is constant and that short-term rates fully reflect the expected rate of inflation); Charles R. 
Nelson & G. William Schwert, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation: On 
Testing the Hypothesis that the Real Rate of Interest is Constant, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 478, 
485 (1977) (rejecting Fama's conclusion that the expected real interest rate is constant and 
that short-term rates fully reflect the expected rate of inflation); Lawrence Summers, The 
Nonadjustment of Nominal Interest Rates: A Study of the Fisher Effect in 
Macroeconomic Prices and Quantities: Essays in Memory of Arthur Okun 201, 207, 214 
(James Tobin ed. , 1983) [hereinafter Nominal Interest] (using a simple general equilibrium 
model to show the effect of inflation on real interest rates and concludes that "there is little 
reason to expect any stable relation between short-term movements in interest rates and 
inflation," id. at 207, and that there is "a very weak relationship between long swings in the 
rate of inflation and nominal interest rates," id. at 225); Vito Tanzi, Inflationary Expecta-
tions, Economic Activity, Taxes, and Interest Rates, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 12, 20 (1980) (an 
empirical study concluding that during the 1952-75 period, the fact that income taxes re-
duced the net-of-taxes expected real rate of interest had no effect on market interest rates). 
377 There are many reasons why the tax-adjusted Fisher model may not hold. Real inter-
est rates may be affected by the same macroeconomic factors that affect inflation; inflation 
may increase the taxation of equity, thereby driving down the real interest rate; inflation 
may increase the taxation of inventories and depreciable property, thus reducing the de-
mand for debt; the marginal holders of debt may be tax-exempt entities or foreign persons; 
and the presence of government debt and debt management policies may affect the real 
interest rate. See IMF Report, note 364, at 16-19, 21-22 (suggesting reasons why the tax-
adjusted Fisher equation would not hold); Martin Feldstein suggests that the basic Fisher 
model holds because of: 
(1) the additional tax burdens caused by inflation because of historic cost de-
preciation and inventory accounting rules; (2) the role of equity financing and 
the taxation of the return to equity; (3) the presence of government debt and 
debt management policies; and (4) the presence of other debt instruments that 
are not affected by inflation in the same way as the corporate bond market but 
that are close substitutes for corporate bonds in investors' portfolios (i .e., resi-
dential mortgages, state and local bonds, foreign bonds). 
Martin Feldstein, Inflation, Tax Rules, and Capital Formation 20 (1983); see also Martin 
Feldstein, Tax Rules and the Mismanagement of Monetary Policy, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. Pa-
pers & Proc. 182, 182 (1980) (arguing that interest rates have not risen as high as predicted 
by the tax-adjusted Fisher equation because of Federal Reserve Board policies); Summers, 
Nominal Interest, note 376, at 201 (suggesting reasons why the tax-adjusted Fisher equa-
tion would not hold). 
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is kept whole. Even, however, the claim that there is no revenue cost 
from failing to index debt collapses when it is recognized that borrow-
ers and ienders face different marginal rates.378 The failure to index 
debt has already put strong pressure on the tax treatment of debt and 
as a result, the rules concerning the tax treatment of interest already 
have been changed significantly to limit the ability to deduct the infla-
tionary component of debt. Thus, for individual borrowers, the disal-
lowance of consumer interest,379 the investment interest limitation,3so 
the at-risk rules ,381 and the passive loss rules382 all can be seen as ad 
hoc measures necessary in part to cope with the overstatement of in-
terest expense and the resulting tax arbitrage opportunities.383 In the 
case of corporations, much of the pressure on the debt-equity distinc-
tion is due to the failure to index interest deductions.384 Indexing debt 
378 Using 1981 data, Eugene Steuerle estimated that the aggregate federal income taxes 
saved by deducting interest exceeded the aggregate federal income taxes paid on interest 
income by $61 billion. Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, note 340, at 1008. The relative imbalance 
between interest deduction and interest inclusion is likely to have fallen given the restric-
tions on interest imposed by the 1986 Act. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 511(a) (amending IRC § 163(d) to no longer permit the deduction of $10,000 of 
investment interest in excess of net investment income); § 511(b ), 100 Stat. at 2246-48 
(amending IRC § 163(h)) (eliminating the deduction for personal interest); § 501(a), 100 
Stat. at 2233-41 (adding IRC § 469) (restricting the deductibility of interest allocable to 
passive activities). See also IRC § 163(i) (limiting the deductibility of interest on certain 
high-yield discount obligations); IRC § 163(j) (limiting the deductibility of certain interest 
paid to related foreign persons). 
379 IRC § 163(h) . 
380 IRC § 163( d) . 
38 1 IRC § 465. 
382 IRC § 469. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Taxes, Loans, and Inflation: How the Nation's 
Wealth Becomes Misallocated 170 (1985) [hereinafter Taxes] (arguing in favor of loss limi-
tations due to the failure to index interest and depreciation). 
383 See generally Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in Uneasy 
Compromise, note 103, at 208-18 [hereinafter Interest Deduction) (discussing limiting in-
terest deductions to restrict tax arbitrage); see generally Steuerle, Tax Decade, note 37, at 
30-36 (discussing the role of the failure to index for inflaticn in arbitrage transactions and 
tax shelters); Steuerle, Taxes, note 382, at 58-80, 95-106 (same). 
384 See IRC § 385 (authorizing Treasury to promulgate regulations providing rules to 
determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated as stock or indebtedness). 
Treasury has tried but failed to issue regulations under § 385. Final regulations originally 
were promulgated on December 31, 1980, with a prospective effective date of April 30, 
1981. See T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141. In response to public comments, Treasury several 
times postponed the effective date of the regulations, see T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168; T.D. 
7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; T.D. 7822, 1982-2 C.B. 84, proposed modifications, see Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking LR-75-81, 1982-1 C.B. 531 , and finally simply withdrew the regula-
tions on August 5, 1983, see T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69. Congress subsequently has ex-
panded Treasury's authority under § 385 by permitting regulations to treat an interest in a 
corporation as part debt and part stock. IRC § 385(a) (as amended by Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7208(a)(1), 103 Stat. 2106, 2337). Regu-
lations taking advantage of the increased authority have yet to be issued. More recently, 
Congress modified § 385 to provide that when a corporation has identified an interest in 
the corporation as either stock or indebtedness, a holder of such an interest must disclose 
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would take significant pressure off the tax system by reducing both the 
value of the interest deduction and the cost of holding debt. 
X. INDEXING ASSETS BUT NOT LIABILITIES: THE P ROBLEM OF 
ARBITRAGE 
A. Partial Indexation 
While in many respects, the case for indexing liabilities is as strong, 
if not stronger, than the case for indexing assets, the political reality is 
that there is pressure to index assets without indexing liabilities.385 
For example, the indexing proposal in the 1989 House Bill indexed 
assets without liabilities.386 More recently, there was significant pres-
sure on Treasury to issue regulations that would have permitted index-
ing of capital gains without dealing with liabilities.387 The primary 
on her income tax return any inconsistent treatment of the interest. IRC § 385(c) (added 
by Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1936(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3032). Provi-
sions dealing more obliquely with the debt-equity distinction include the high-yield original 
issue discount provisions and the interest stripping rules. IRC § 163(i) (limiting the de-
ductibility of interest on certain high-yield discount obligations); IRC § 163U) (limiting the 
deductibility of certain interest paid to related foreign persons). 
385 By the term "assets," I mean assets other than debt instruments. By the term "liabili-
ties," I mean debt instruments with respect to both the borrower and the lender. 
386 H.R. 3299, note 73. 
387 The public debate over indexing capital gains by regulation began with a column by 
Paul Roberts and an editorial in the Wall Street Journal and was supported by a study 
commissioned by the National Taxpayers Union Foundation and the National Chamber 
Foundation. Paul Craig Roberts, Instant Way to Cut Capital Gains Tax?, Wash. Times, Jan . 
22, 1992, at F1 (claiming that President Bush had the authority to index capital gains by 
regulation); Presidential Indexation, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1992, at A1 (urging President Bush 
to issue regulations indexing capital gains); Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin & Vin-
cent Colatriano, Memorandum: The Legal Authority of the Department of the Treasury to 
Promulgate a Regulation Providing For Indexation of Capital Gains (Aug. 17, 1992), 92 
TNT 175-43, Aug. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (providing a 
detailed legal argument for the proposition that the President has the authority to index 
capital gains by regulations defining the term "cost"). The memorandum was later pub-
lished as an article in the Virginia Tax Review. Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin & 
Vincent J. Colatriano, The Legal Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Promul-
gate a Regulation Providing for Indexation of Capital Gains, 12 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (1993). 
Despite an opinion of the General Counsel of the Treasury that such a regulation would be 
invalid and opposition from the bar and other sources, President Bush apparently seriously 
considered directing the Treasury to issue such a regulation. See Memorandum from the 
Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Jeanne S. Archibald, Re: Legal Authority of 
the Treasury to Issue Regulations Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation, 16 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel145 (Sept. 1, 1992) (referencing a legal opinion written by the General Counsel of 
the Department of the Treasury concluding that Treasury does not have authority to index 
capital gains by regulations) [hereinafter Memorandum for J .S. Archibald]; N.Y. St. Bar 
Ass'n, Tax Sec., Memorandum in Opposition to Proposal to Index Capital gains for Infla-
tion by Regulation (Feb. 13, 1992), 92 TNT 49-41 , Mar. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax 
Library, TNT File (arguing that indexing by regulation would be "terrible tax policy" and 
would be invalid); Harry G. Gourevitch, Congressional Research Service Report for Con-
gress: The Question of Indexing Capital Gains by Regulation (Mar. 18, 1992), 92 TNT 182-
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reason that indexing assets is more popular than indexing liabilities is 
that , for the most part, indexing assets creates only winners, while in-
dexing liabilities creates losers as well as winners. The secondary rea-
son is complexity. Opponents of indexing debt argue that the two-
sided nature of debt makes indexing both less necessary and more 
complex.388 Indexing assets without liabilities, however, enhances ar-
bitrage opportunities.389 Thus, while in isolation, asset indexation 
may be a good idea, asset indexation is less attractive in a system in 
which there is unindexed debt. 
To put the arbitrage problem in stark relief, consider a taxpayer en-
tering into an entirely debt-financed transaction. A fully leveraged 
taxpayer would have equal amounts of inflationary gain on the asset 
side and inflationary loss on the liability side. Therefore, ignoring tim-
ing differences caused by the realization requirement, her net income 
is as accurately measured by making no corrections for inflation as it 
is by fully correcting for inflation. Correcting for inflation on the asset 
side while failing to correct for inflation on the liability side causes her 
net income to be seriously understated. The following example pro-
vides a numerical demonstration of the problems caused by partial 
indexation. 
185, Sept. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (arguing that Treasury 
lacks authority to index by regulations); Lissa Fried, White House says Bush Considering 
Capital Gains Indexing, 92 TNT 181-3, Sept. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, 
TNT File (reporting September 3, 1992, statement by White House spokesman Marlin Fitz-
water that President Bush was considering issuing a regulation to index capital gains). 
President Bush finally rejected the idea of indexing by regulation after the Office of Legal 
Counsel issued an opinion agreeing with the Treasury opinion that the Treasury lacked that 
authority to issue such a regulation. Memorandum for J.S. Archibald, supra (opining that 
Treasury does not have the authority to index capital gains by regulation); White House 
News Release (Sept. 3, 1992), 92 TNT 182-61, Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax 
Library, TNT File. Without regard to the Treasury's raw authority to issue such a regula-
tion, the complexity of indexation as suggested by this Article indicates the imprudence in 
adopting indexation without appropriate legislative guidance. Moreover, even if Treasury 
had the authority to define the term "cost" in § 1012 to mean indexed cost, it is doubtful 
that Treasury would have the authority to deal with all of the collateral issues raised by 
indexation. See, e.g., note 409 and accompanying text (discussing the need for anti-arbi-
trage provisions if capital gains are indexed without indexing debt) . 
388 See note 356 (discussing congressional arguments that debt indexation is unneces-
sary) . See also text accompanying notes 355-85 (discussing whether interest rates will ad-
just so as to make debt indexation unnecessary). 
389 Indexing assets without liabilities also raises a variety of practical problems. For ex-
ample, it requires distinguishing between assets that are and are not debt instruments. The 
determination of whether an asset is a debt instrument can be difficult. See text at notes 
325-27 (discussing hybrid debt instrument) and note 384 (discussing § 385 and distinguish-
ing between debt and equity). Additionally, holders of debt instruments potentially can 
avoid rules prohibiting indexation of debt instruments by holding the debt instruments in 
an entity, the interest in which is itself indexed. Partial indexation thus raises the necessity 
of deve loping rules designed to thwart such avoidance techniques. 
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Example 39: Margot buys an asset for $100, fully financing 
the purchase with debt. The debt bears a 15% nominal inter-
est rate and the inflation rate is 10%. One year later, Margot 
sells the asset for $120, repays the debt with $115, and is left 
with $5. 
No indexing: Without indexing, Margot has $20 of gain, a 
$15 interest deduction and net income of $5 . 
Comprehensive indexing:390 If both the debt and the asset 
were indexed, Margot would have gain on the asset of only 
$10391 and an indexed interest deduction of only $5.392 Her 
net income again would be $5. 
Indexing assets but not liabilities: If only the asset were in-
dexed, Margot would have a gain of $5 and an interest de-
duction of $15 and, therefore , a net loss of $10. 
643 
As Example 39 demonstrates, under some circumstances, indexing as-
sets without liabilities produces the least accurate measurement of net 
mcome. 
Comprehensive indexing and no indexing are only equivalent when 
the taxpayer's basis in the indexed asset and the indexed liability are 
identical. More generally, where asset basis is in excess of liabilities, 
comprehensive indexing reduces taxable income as compared to no 
indexing and where asset basis is less than liabilities (as, for example, 
where liabilities are secured by appreciated property), comprehensive 
indexing increases taxable income.3 93 In either case, partial indexing 
has the effect of reducing taxable income relative to no indexing. 
Opponents of debt indexation argue that implicit in the arbitrage 
critique of partial indexation is the assumption that interest rates have 
not been adjusted to take into account the lack of indexation.3 94 In 
particular, the argument is that once interest rates have adjusted, 
there is no real arbitrage; there is, at most, only the appearance of 
arbitrage. Thus, the argument would be that a borrower's interest ex-
pense is implicitly indexed by virtue of the fact that she is forced to 
pay a higher pretax interest rate.39 5 Because the borrower's interest 
expense is implicitly indexed, there is no reason why the income from 
her asset should not be explicitly indexed. Moreover, the increase in 
390 I use the term "comprehensive indexing" to refer to indexing both debt and assets. I 
use the term "partial indexing" to refer to indexing assets without liabilities. 
391 $10 = $120 - ($100 X 1.10). 
392 $5 = $15 - ($100 X .10). 
393 See text accompanying notes 418-21. 
394 See sources cited in note 356. 
395 See text accompanying notes 357-84. 
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the interest rate on the debt means that the lender's income will be 
overstated due to the lack of indexation and that the lender's overpay-
ment of taxes will compensate for the borrower's underpayment of 
taxes, keeping the fisc whole. 
There are several responses to this argument against debt indexa-
tion. First, even if the argument is empirically correct, the appearance 
of arbitrage may have serious negative consequences for the tax sys-
tem. While viewing a borrower's excess interest payments as indirect 
taxes may mean that the borrower's "total" tax liability may be cor-
rect, the borrower's direct tax liability is disproportionately low rela-
tive to her economic income.396 The appearance of arbitrage may 
lead to a general perception that the tax system is unfair which may in 
turn erode public support for the income tax and lead to widespread 
noncompliance. 397 
Second, as an empirical matter, both the assumption that the lender 
is paying a proxy tax and the assumption that interest rates will have 
risen to account for the proxy tax are questionable. As a result of the 
clientele effect, lenders tend to be in lower tax brackets than do bor-
396 Arguing that someone else has paid your taxes for you is a bit like "the story of my 
great grandfather who used to serve in the Civil War-well, he didn't really serve in the 
Civil War, he paid someone else to serve in the Civil War." Comments at the Meeting of 
the Tax Structure and Simplification Comm. of the ABA Tax Sec. (May 15, 1992), 93 TNT 
33-135, Feb. 11, 1993, transcript available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (comments 
by Emil Sunley, attributing remark to David Brockway). Frederic W. Hickman notes that: 
[i]t seems fair to observe that the appearance problem is in large part gener-
ated and perpetuated by people telling each other that it exists, and most ordi-
nary voters would pay little attention if they were not constantly reminded 
that they are concerned. However that may be-whatever the origins of the 
lament-the political reality is that there is an appearance problem and that, 
human nature being what it is, the problem is not going to disappear. 
Hickman, note 356, at 775 (emphasis in original). 
397 An appearance of unfairness in the tax system may decrease overall compliance as 
taxpayers who feel they are bearing a disproportionate amount of the tax burden take 
steps to avoid paying taxes. The concern over the effect of the appearance of unfairness on 
compliance can be seen as one of the major impetuses behind the creation of the 1986 
Act's passive loss rules, which significantly limited the use of tax shelters. See S. Rep. No. 
313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 713 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 1, 713. Congress 
justified the enactment of the passive loss rules in order to stop taxpayers from "losing 
faith in the Federal income tax system," which in turn "undermines compliance." Id. at 
713-14. 
The committee believes that the most important sources of support for the 
Federal income tax system are the average citizens who simply report their 
income (typically consisting predominantly of items such as salaries, wages, 
pensions, interest, and dividends) and pay tax under the general rules. To the 
extent that these citizens feel that they are bearing a disproportionate burden 
with regard to the costs of government ... the tax system itself is threatened. 
Id. at 714. 
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rowers.398 Therefore, in general, the taxes paid by the lender fail to 
compensate for the taxes avoided by the borrower. Moreover, empiri-
cal studies suggest that nominal interest rates have not risen to com-
pensate for the taxation of the inflationary component of nominal 
interest.399 Therefore, not only are the wrong amount of taxes being 
paid, but, both as a matter of appearance and a matter of reality, they 
are being paid by the wrong party. 
One reason that interest rates have not adjusted to compensate for 
arbitrage is the existence of what has been referred to as pure arbi-
trage.400 In a pure arbitrage transaction, the same person acts as both 
lender and borrower. As a result, both the demand and supply of 
loanable funds are simultaneously increased and, therefore, there is 
no market pressure on interest rates to increase.401 A simple example 
demonstrates pure arbitrage:402 
Example 40: Kate has an individual retirement account 
(IRA) worth $100,000 and, in the absence of tax considera-
tions, has invested the entire account in the stock market. 
After consulting her tax advisor, Kate undertakes the follow-
ing transactions: 1) she arranges for her IRA to dispose of 
its entire stock portfolio; 2) she borrows $100,000 from her 
IRA; and 3) she invests the $100,000 in loan proceeds in an 
identical stock portfolio. 
Assuming that capital assets are indexed, but debt is not, Kate would 
have the advantage of both indexing and deferral on her stock portfo-
lio while being able to take full advantage of the failure to index debt. 
While, it is possible to attack such a transaction with anti-arbitrage 
rules, such rules often can be avoided. For example, if tax rules pre-
vent Kate from borrowing from her IRA and deducting the interest, 
she simply can borrow $100,000 from the bank and have the IRA in-
vest in certificates of deposit. If tax rules characterize the interest ex-
pense as investment interest and she has inadequate investment 
income, she can secure the loan with her personal residence and con-
398 The "clientele effect" refers to the fact that low-bracket taxpayers find it attractive to 
hold debt while high-bracket taxpayers find it attractive to borrow. See note 378 (discuss-
ing estimates of federal tax revenue loss due to the clientele effect). 
399 See note 376 (discussing empirical studies that indicate nominal rates tend to rise at 
most one for one with inflation). 
400 See Steuerle, Taxes, note 382, at 57-80 (comparing "normal " and "pure" arbitrage) . 
See also note 377 (discussing other theories as to why interest rates have not adjusted) . 
401 See Auerbach, Interest Deductions, note 383, at 204 (arguing that pure arbitrage 
exists "whenever it is possible to alter the amount of income excluded from the aggregate 
tax base without altering the underlying supply of real assets"). 
402 The example is similar to one provided by Steuerle, Taxes, note 382, at 71. 
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vert the interest into deductible home mortgage interest.403 If she has 
already used up her home mortgage interest,404 she can arrange for 
the debt to be traced to current business expenses, thereby converting 
the interest into fully deductible business interest.405 When all is said 
and done, the opportunities for arbitrage transactions outstrip the 
ability and the willingness of Congress and the tax collector to stop 
the arbitrage. 
Even admitting, however, that partial indexing would present arbi-
trage opportunities, defenders of partial indexing are able to point out 
that similar arbitrage opportunities are presented by a capital gains 
exclusion or preferential rate.406 Thus, while arbitrage is a real prob-
lem, they argue it is a problem with which the tax system is both famil-
iar and comfortable. 
Example 41: Assume in Example 39 that instead of indexing, 
Margot was permitted a 30% exclusion for capital gains. In 
that case, Margot's taxable income from the sale of the asset 
would be $14.407 When combined with her interest deduc-
tion of $15, she would have a net loss of $1, despite having 
economic income of $5. 
The fact is, however, that while the tax system is familiar with the 
problem of arbitrage, it is not comfortable. Congress in the past has 
enacted a plethora of anti-arbitrage rules, and shows every sign of 
continuing to do so in the future. 408 Such anti-arbitrage rules add sig-
nificantly to the complexity and administrative cost of the tax system. 
As an example of the type of new anti-arbitrage provisions that 
would be necessitated by partial indexation, the indexing proposal 
403 IRC § 163(h)(2)(D), (h)(3). 
404 Assuming that the debt was secured by the residence, but was not used to acquire the 
residence, the debt would be characterized as home equity indebtedness and would be 
limited to $100,000. IRC § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). If she had pla.nned ahead, she could have 
traced the proceeds of the debt to the acquisition of the residence. In that case, the debt 
would be limited to a total of $1,100,000. IRC § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (acquisition indebtedness 
limited to $1 million); IRC § 163(h)(3)(C) (permitting an additional $100,000 to be charac-
terized as home equity indebtedness) . 
405 IRC § 163(h)(2)(A); Temp. Reg. § 1.163-ST. 
406 Although not defenders of partial indexation, Halperin and Steuerle correctly point 
out that "[t]he question should not be whether partial indexing provides opportunities for 
arbitrage, but whether it increases or reduces the arbitrage opportunities that would other-
wise exist." Halperin & Steuerle, note 103, at 360. 
407 $14 = $20 X (1 - .30). 
408 Most recently, Congress added § 1258, an attempt to limit the preferential treatment 
of capital gains by recharacterizing certain capital gains as ordinary income. A sampling of 
other arbitrgage provisions include § 163(d) (investment interest limitations), § 263(g) 
(capitalization of certain carrying charges), § 263A (uniform capitalization rules), § 469 
(passive loss rules) and § 1092 (straddle rules). 
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passed by the House in 1992 would have amended the investment in-
terest limitation to exclude all gain from the sale of indexed assets 
from the definition of investment interest.409 The proposal demon-
strates how difficult it is to craft an appropriate anti-arbitrage rule. 
The limitation on investment interest in the proposal is both under-
and over-inclusive.410 The limitation is under-inclusive because it only 
limits investment interest, but not trade or business interest (or, for 
that matter, home mortgage interest). The problem of debt arbitrage 
is equally present in the business as well as in the investment con-
text.411 In addition, it is under-inclusive because, to the extent that a 
taxpayer has sufficient investment income from sources other than in-
dexed gain to offset investment interest expense, the investment inter-
est limitation has no effect in limiting the taxpayer's ability to 
arbitrage by financing indexed capital gain with unindexed debt. In 
effect, the investment interest limitation permits taxpayers to use debt 
arbitrage to avoid tax on their investment income entirely, but does 
not permit the use of debt arbitrage to avoid taxes on business 
mcome. 
An investment interest limitation such as the one contained in the 
bill is over-inclusive because it does not permit the deduction of inter-
est expense incurred to finance an investment that turns out to yield a 
409 H.R. 4210, note 73, at § 2102(b ). The bill also would have permitted taxpayers to 
elect to include gains on the sale of indexable assets for purposes of§ 163( d) if they agreed 
to forgo the benefit of indexing. Id. The election would have been permitted on an asset-
by-asset basis. Id. 
Similarly, when Congress raised the top individual statutory marginal rate from 31% to 
39.6% while maintaining a 28% top statutory marginal rate on capital gains, it permitted 
taxpayers to elect either to exclude the entire amount of a capital gain from the computa-
tion of investment income or to include the entire gain, but forgo the benefit of the re-
duced rate. IRC § 1(a)-(e) (providing for a top rate on ordinary income of 39.6%); § 1(h) 
(reducing the net capital gain by any amount included as investment income under 
§ 163(d)(4)(B)(iii)); and § 163(d)(4)(B)(iii) (permitting taxpayers to elect to include net 
capital gain in the computation of net investment income). 
Interestingly, when the House passed a smilar indexing provision in 1989, it included a 
capital gains deduction for the period prior to the beginning of indexing. H.R. 3299, note 
73, at§ 11951(a). In order to limit the debt arbitrage problems caused by the capital gains 
deduction, the bill provided that the amount of the deduction would reduce the amount of 
investment income for purposes of § 163(d). Id. In other words, in the context of the 
capital gains deduction, the bill permitted the net capital gain taken into income to be 
offset by interest deductions. With respect to indexing, however, no gain from an indexed 
asset can be offset by an interest deduction. I d. at § 11961 (b). The difference between 
these two rules is puzzling. 
410 See Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 273-75 (discussing problems with 
§ 163(d)). 
411 Note also that § 163(d) does not apply to corporations. This was not a problem in 
the 1992 House Bill because the bill did not extend indexing to corporations. H.R. 4210, 
note 73, at § 2101(a). If, however, indexing is extended to corporations, further rules 
would be necessary. As a general matter, it is hard to understand why indexing should be 
permitted for individuals, but not corporations. 
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bona fide capital loss, thus resulting in a clear overmeasurement of 
income. Additionally, by excluding the entire gain on indexed assets 
from the definition of investment interest, the rule would tend to 
overstate investors' real income.412 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive solution to the problems of the in-
vestment interest limitation would require rules linking debt to spe-
cific investments413 and, ultimately, rules to determine the amount of 
inflation-induced overstatement of interest expense. Rather than de-
veloping and administering such rules, it would be simpler to index 
liabilities in the first place.4 14 
A final problem with partial indexing is that it puts further pressure 
on identifying debt. Already, the identification of an interest in a cor-
poration as debt versus equity is one of the most perplexing problems 
in the tax law.41 5 In a world where new financial products are created 
at the touch of a button, the problem only becomes worse.416 
In summary, partial indexing promises to be a cure worse than the 
disease.417 
412 Thus, for example, in Example 39, if such a rule were imposed, the taxpayer would 
have indexed income of $10, but would not be permitted any interest deduction. There-
fore, her taxable income would be $10, while her economic income is only $5. 
413 Compare the passive loss rules which permit a loss upon final disposition of an in-
vestment. IRC § 469(g). 
41 4 There is another significant disadvantage to excluding debt from indexation. In a 
comprehensive indexing system, interests in entities generally can be indexed at the inter-
est holder's level without regard to the composition of the assets and liabilities of the en-
tity. If debt is excluded, however, indexing cannot be done without information from the 
entity as to its mix of assets and liabilities . Where the entity holds debt instruments, index-
ing at the individual level without regard to the asset mix would overstate the indexing 
adjustment, leading taxpayers to hold debt instruments in such entities. Where the entity 
has liabilities, indexing at the individual level without regard to the existence of the liability 
would understate the indexing deduction, leading taxpayers to borrow at the individual 
level. 
415 See note 384 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing debt versus equity). 
416 See Henry T. C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Process of Financial Inno-
vation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1297-300 (1991) (argu-
ing that innovation in financial products is built into the system); Edward D. Kleinbard, 
Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 
69 Tex. L. Rev. 1319 (1991) (discussing the taxation of equity derivatives); Thomas A. 
Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected 
Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1431 (1991) (discussing legal 
constraints on innovation in financial products) ; Shuldiner, General Approach, note 79, at 
335 (discussing the difficulty in taxing financial products). See also Reg. § 1.446-3(g)(4) 
(treating a swap with significant nonperiodic payments as a combination of a swap and a 
loan). The problem of distinguishing between debt and equity is similar to the problem of 
distinguishing between ordinary income and capital gains. See IRC § 263(g) (preventing 
taxpayers from using certain financial products to create capital gains and ordinary interest 
expense); IRC § 1258 (preventing taxpayers from converting interest-type income into cap-
ital gains) . 
4!7 See text accompanying notes 59-73 (suggesting that given deferral, the failure to in-
dex capital gains is not serious) . 
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B. Global Indexation 
A potential alternative to both conventional full indexation and 
partial indexation is global indexation. In general, under conventional 
full indexation, a taxpayer's total indexation adjustment is the sum of 
the individual indexation adjustments for each asset and liability of 
the taxpayer. Putting aside questions of timing, a taxpayer's total in-
dexation adjustment could be determined by netting the taxpayer's 
assets and liabilities each year (using basis, not fair market value) and 
applying a single indexation factor. This equivalence suggests the use 
of global indexation, rather than asset by asset indexation. Under 
global indexation, a taxpayer would report the combined basis in all of 
its assets and the combined "basis" of its liabilities. The taxpayer 
would then net its assets and liabilities and apply a single indexation 
factor for the year. The resulting indexation adjustment simply would 
be added to or subtracted from its taxable income for the year. 
In the case of corporations and other business taxpayers, global in-
dexation would be based on numbers that are already readily avail-
able and has the advantage of extreme simplicity. A disadvantage of 
global indexation is that the indexation adjustment would automati-
cally be made currently for all assets, despite the fact that the income 
from some of the assets would be deferred.418 In addition, there are 
some assets, such as tax-exempt bonds, for which indexing adjust-
ments should be unavailable. It would be necessary, therefore, to ex-
clude the taxpayer's basis in such assets in the global computation.419 
Nevertheless, the potential administrative advantages of global index-
ing are enormous and should be pursued. 
For individuals, global indexing makes less sense. To begin with, 
individuals generally do not keep careful track of the basis in all of 
their assets and liabilities. More importantly, indexing is inappropri-
ate for a higher percentage of the assets and liabilities of individuals. 
Generally, if the income from an asset or the expense from a liability 
is not subject to tax, no indexing adjustment should be made with re-
spect to that asset or liability. Thus, for example, no adjustment 
should be made with respect to indebtedness used for personal pur-
poses because the interest on such debt is not deductible.420 Similarly, 
no adjustment should be made with respect to assets used for personal 
purposes because individuals generally are not taxed on the income 
from such assets. Even where gain is potentially taxable on assets 
418 See text accompanying note 102 (discussing timing of indexation adjustments). 
419 Similar issues would be raised, for example, where a U.S. corporation owned a for-
eign corporation, the income from which was deferred. Cf. IRC §§ 951-964 (subpart F) 
(requiring current inclusion of certain amounts earned by controlled foreign corporations). 
420 IRC § 163(h)(l) (personal interest). 
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used for personal purposes, such as residences, the taxation is uncer-
tain and generally significantly deferred.421 It is likely that the 
number of corrections and special rules that would be required to 
make global indexing work for individuals outweighs the potential 
simplification of the approach. In addition, global indexing would be 
more difficult than asset by asset indexing to enforce through third 
party reporting. 
XI. CoNCLUSION 
In Section II, I showed how, even at moderate rates, the effect of 
inflation in an unindexed tax system is to impose very high effective 
tax rates on income from capital, an unattractive feature in an income 
tax. Even for those who believe that the statutory tax rates on income 
from capital are too low, it is hard to argue in favor of a system where 
the tax rate is determined not by statute, but by the level of inflation. 
From an equity standpoint, the failure to index is at best peculiar. 
From an efficiency standpoint, such high rates of tax presumably lead 
to an inefficient amount of savings and to a more severe lock-in effect 
than otherwise would be the case. Moreover, the fact that inflation 
affects short-lived assets more severely than long-lived assets distorts 
decisionmaking in favor of longer-lived assets. 
On the other hand, as discussed in Section II, because of deferral 
(and the ability to accelerate losses relative to gains), the effective tax 
rate on assets with long holding periods may be quite low. While it 
would seem to be an unambiguous good to both index and solve the 
problem of deferral, without limiting the ability of taxpayers to defer 
gains the desirability of indexing becomes less clear. On the other 
hand, for short-lived assets, relief is clearly appropriate. Moreover, as 
Congress forces more transactions to be accounted for on a mark-to-
market basis, the scope of the inflation problem expands. 
On balance and in theory, indexation of capital assets is probably a 
good idea. In practice, the decision is less clear. At least initially, 
indexation would impose a tremendous administrative cost on the sys-
tem. In Section IV, I have tried to give some feel for the details of 
indexation. I have, however, only touched the surface of the adminis-
trative details of indexation. In particular, I have not discussed the 
421 IRC § 1034 (rollover of gain on sale of principal residence); IRC § 121 (one-time 
exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal residence by an individual aged 55 or older); 
IRC § 1014 (step-up in basis at death). 
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treatment of pass-through entities which would significantly compli-
cate indexation.422 
The other major uncertainty about indexing is whether debt would 
be included in any indexing scheme. In many ways, the arguments in 
favor of indexing debt are stronger than the arguments in favor of 
indexing other capital assets. First, consider debt as an asset. Debt is 
one of the few assets that is generally taxed on a current basis. As a 
result, the effect of inflation on debt is particularly pernicious. Sec-
ond, consider debt as a liability. As discussed in Section X, the failure 
to index debt greatly facilitates the use of debt for tax arbitrage pur-
poses. Indexation would significantly temper the attractiveness of ar-
bitrage transactions. By doing so, it would relieve pressure on the 
myriad of rules that have been established to prevent arbitrage. Thus, 
to some extent, the administrative burden of debt indexation would be 
tempered by the reduced administrative burden of enforcing arbitrage 
restrictions. 
One problem with debt indexation is the deductibility of home 
mortgage interest. There are basically three approaches to home 
mortgage interest. First, it could be unindexed for both borrower and 
lender. Second, it could be indexed for lenders, but not borrowers. 
Third, it could be fully indexed. Of the three alternatives, the last is 
clearly the best. It represents perhaps the best opportunity to treat 
home ownership in a more rational fashion. The second is the second-
best solution. It limits the damage to the homeowner and makes the 
revenue cost of the tax expenditure clear. The least attractive alterna-
tive is to create a class of unindexed debt in a world of indexation. 
The primary justification for the first approach over the second ap-
proach is revenue, but the revenue would be illusory because the vast 
majority of mortgage debt would end up in the hands of tax-exempt 
entities. 
Despite the fact that the theoretical case for indexing debt is at least 
as strong as the case for indexing capital gains, it is not unlikely that 
indexing would be adopted for assets, but not for liabilities. As dis-
cussed in Section X, indexing assets without liabilities would signifi-
cantly expand the arbitrage opportunities that are already available. 
While the tax law has evolved to deal with arbitrage in the past, index-
ing assets without debt would expand the pressure on the anti-arbi-
trage provisions. Over time, adequate responses likely would 
develop, but at the cost of further distortion and complexity. Overall, 
I believe that it would be a mistake to index capital assets without 
422 See N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n, Tax Sec., NYSBA Tax Section Opposes Indexing of Capital 
Assets, 90 TNT 138-8, July 2, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, for a 
discussion of some of the issues raised by pass-through entities. 
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indexing debt at the same time. On the other hand, I believe that 
indexing debt is sufficiently attractive that serious thought should be 
given to indexing debt, even if assets are not indexed at the same time. 
19931 
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APPENDIX I 
DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVE TAx RATE ON CAPITAL GAINS 
Table 2 shows the effective tax rate on capital gains with and with-
out indexing as a function of holding period. Without indexing, the 
effective rate is shown both as a nominal and a real figure. The com-
putations shown in Table 2 assume that the entire yield on the asset is 
reaiized at maturity. The effective tax rates also can be expressed as 
equations. The equations are provided below. 
Defining the following variables: 
n = number of periods before asset is sold 
1 = statutory tax rate 
r = real rate of return 
1t = inflation rate 
z = nominal growth rate 
'ten = nominal effective tax rate without indexing 
'ter = real effective tax rate without indexing 
'tei = nominal effective tax rate with indexing 
The nominal growth rate can be expressed as: 
z = rc + r + (r x rc) 
The nominal effective tax rate without indexing is: 
'ten = 
.!. 
(1 + z) - ((1 - 1) X (1 + zt + 1] n 
z 
The real effective tax rate without indexing is: 
.!. 
(1 + z) - ((1 - 1) X (1 + zt + 1] n 
(z - rc) 
The real effective tax rate with indexing is: 
!_ 
(1 + r) - [(1 - 1) X (1 + rt + 1] n 
1er = --------------
r 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
654 TAX LAW REVIEW (Vol. 48: 
APPENDIX II 
INDEXING AND THE LOCK-IN EFFECT 
I. INDEXATION AvAILABLE FOR ExiSTING AS WELL AS NEw AssETS 
In the body of the Article, I assert that with indexation, there re-
mains a positive lock-in effect for appreciated assets.423 In other 
words, assuming that indexing is available for both existing and newly 
purchased assets, a taxpayer holding an appreciated asset would have 
an incentive to continue to defer the recognition of gain on the asset, 
despite the fact that, by recognizing gain on the asset, the taxpayer 
would receive a stepped-up basis that would, in turn, lead to a greater 
indexation adjustment in the future. 424 To prove this proposition, de-
fine FVh as the future value of an asset, given that it is held to matur-
ity. FVh can be expressed as follows: 
FVh = (1 + nt x [FMV x (1 + rt - 't x [FMV x (1 + rt - B]] (14) 
where, 
FMV 
r 
1t 
n 
B 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
the current fair market value of the asset; 
the real rate of return; 
the rate of inflation; 
the number of years from the present until final 
disposition; and 
the taxpayer's basis in the asset.425 
Similarly, define FVs as the future value of the asset, given that the 
taxpayer sells and repurchases the asset.426 FVs is derived most easily 
by first defining FMVar, the after-tax proceeds from a current sale of 
the asset. FMVa1 can be expressed as follows: 
FMVat = FMV - 't x (FMV - B) (15) 
FVs can now be derived by first substituting the term FMVa1 for both 
FMV and Bin the expression for FVh given by Equation (14): 
423 See generally Section III.B.3 (discussing indexation and the lock-in effect). 
424 See Section II for a discussion of the effect of permitting indexation only on newly 
purchased assets. 
425 B could be either the taxpayer's cost basis or the taxpayer's cost basis indexed for 
prior inflation. In either case, as long as there is real gain, there would be a positive lock-in 
effect as shown below. 
426 The lock-in effect can be viewed as a question of whether a taxpayer would hold onto 
an existing asset rather than sell the asset and purchase an asset with a slightly higher rate 
of return . For simplicity, the discussion in the text assumes that the taxpayer simply repur-
chases the same asset. 
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FVS = (1 + nY X [FMVar X (1 + r)"-
t X [FMVar X (1 + r)" - FMVar] ] (16) 
Substituting the expression for FMVar from Equation (15) into Equa-
tion ( 16) and rearranging terms, one obtains: 
FV5 = ( 1 + 1t) n X [ ( 1 + r )" - t X [ ( 1 + r )" - 1]] X 
(FMV- t X (FMV- B)) (17) 
Given the expressions for FVh and FV" it is possible to define 8 to 
be the difference between the future value of the asset under the hold 
and sell strategies. 8 can thus be expressed as: 
(18) 
Substituting the expressions for FVh and FV5 from Equations (14) and 
(17), respectively, into Equation (18) and simplifying, one obtains the 
following expression for 8: 
8 = (1 + rr)" X t X (1 - t) X ((1 + r)" - 1) X (FMV- B) (19) 
Alternatively, the term Gain can be defined as the difference between 
the fair market value and the basis of the asset and 8 can be defined as 
follows: 
8 = (1 + 1t)" X t X (1 - t) X ((1 + r)" - 1) X Gain (20) 
Equation (20) is the same as Equation (1).427 As noted in the text 
following Equation (1), as long as both Gain and r are positive and the 
tax rate, t, is between zero and one, 8 will always be greater than zero 
and, therefore, there will be a positive lock-in effect. 
The lock-in effect shown by Equation (20) is expressed in terms of 
current dollars. The lock-in effect can also be expressed in terms of 
constant dollars. 
8 
8co!ISI = ---
(1 + n)" 
(21) 
Substituting 8 from Equation (20) into Equation (21): 428 
8co!ISr = t x (1 - t) x ((1 + r)"- 1) x Gain (22) 
427 See text accompanying note 85. 
428 Oconsr is defined in terms of dollars at the time the decision to sell or hold is made. 
Note that Equation (22) is the same as Equation (2). See text following note 89. 
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As can be seen from Equation (22) , bconst is independent of the infla-
tion rate, Jt. Thus, in real terms, with indexation, the lock-in effect is 
independent of the inflation rate. 
In the body of the Article, I also assert that the magnitude of the 
lock-in effect, 8, increases with the real growth rate, r.429 That o is an 
increasing function of r can be shown by differentiating Equation (20) 
with respect to r: 
~~ = (1 + nt X t X (1 - t) X (1 + r)"- 1 X n X Gain (23) 
Since the derivative d8/dr is always positive, 8 is an increasing function 
of r. 
II. INDEXING AvAILABLE FOR NEw AssETS ONLY 
In the preceding Section, I show that the lock-in effect remams 
when indexation is available for both new and existing assets. By con-
trast, if indexing is available for new assets only, the lock-in effect may 
disappear or become a lock-out or negative lock-in effect. Using the 
subscript "n" to denote that indexing is only available for new assets, 
define bn as the difference between the future value of the asset if it is 
held, FVhn, minus the future value if it is sold and repurchased, FVsn, 
given that indexation is available for new assets only. 
(24) 
Since indexing is available for new assets, FVsn is the same as FVs 
given by Equation (17). 
FVsn = (1 + nt X [(1 + r)"- t X [(1 + r)"- 1)] 
(FMV- t X (FMV- B)) (25) 
Indexing, however, is now unavailable for existing assets and, there-
fore, FVhn becomes: 
FVhn = (1 - t) X FMV X (1 + r)" X (1 + n)" + (t X B) (26) 
Substituting the expressions for FVsn and FVhn from Equations (25) 
and (26), respectively, into Equation (24) and simplifying, 8" becomes: 
bn = (1 + n)" X t X (1 - t) X [(1 + r)"- 1] X FMV 
- t X [(1 + n)" X [(1 -t) X (1 + r)" + t] - 1] X B (27) 
429 See text at note 89. 
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8, can be either positive, indicating a positive lock-in effect, or nega-
tive, indicating a negative lock-in effect, depending on the relative size 
of the parameters. In general , if the amount of gain is small , there 
would be a negative lock-in effect because the benefit of future index-
ation would outweigh the burden of the current tax. In the extreme 
case where there is no current gain, there is no cost to selling the asset 
and a clear benefit from future indexation. In equation form, when 
the basis, B , is equal to the fair market value, FMV, Equation (27) 
reduces to: 
8, = '! x FMV x (1 - (1 + n:)") (28) 
As long as the rate of inflation, n:, is greater than zero, 8, in Equation 
(28) will always be less than zero and there will be a negative lock-in 
effect. 
Correspondingly, at the opposite extreme where the taxpayer's ba-
sis is zero, it is irrelevant that there is no indexation of existing assets 
and, therefore, there is a positive lock-in effect. In equation form, 
when the basis is equal to zero, Equation (27) reduces to: 
8, = (1 + n:t x '! x (1 - -r) x ((1 + r)" - 1) x FMV (29) 
The expression for 8, in Equation (29) is the same as the expression 
for 8 in Equation (19) where B is also set to zero. Since 8 is always 
greater than zero, so is 8,. 
The implications of Equation (27) also can be seen using a numeri-
cal example. Assume that the fair market value of the asset, FMV, is 
$1,000, the real growth rate, r, and the inflation rate, n:, are both 5% 
per year, the asset is to be held an additional five years, and the tax 
rate,'!, is 50%. Given these assumptions, it is easy to see the impact of 
a relatively low or high basis on the lock-in effect. Consider first a 
high-basis case. If B is equal to $900, a high-basis case, 8, is equal to 
-116 and there is a negative lock-in effect. If, on the other hand, B, is 
only $100, 8, is equal to 66, and there is a positive lock-in effect. 
The breakeven point, where there is no incentive to either sell or 
hold the asset, can be determined by setting 8, in Equation (27) equal 
to zero and rearranging terms: 
B = (1 - -r) x (N- I) x FMV (30) 
(1 - -r) X (N - I) + (I - 1) 
where: 
N = (1 + n:)" x (1 + r)" (31) 
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and: 
I= (1 + ret (32) 
In Equation (30), N represents the total nominal growth in the price of 
the asset and I represents the pure inflationary growth in the asset 
price.4 30 In the above example, the breakeven point is when the tax-
payer has a basis of $390. Thus, in the example, if indexation is avail-
able to new assets, but not old assets, the taxpayer would have an 
incentive to sell the existing asset so as to receive an indexable basis if 
her basis was in excess of $390 and would have an incentive to hold 
onto the asset so as to continue to defer her gain if her basis was less 
than $390. 
When the inflation rate, re, is equal to zero, the right hand side of 
Equation (30) is equal to one, implying that the breakeven point be-
tween lock-in and lock-out is where the basis, B, is equal to the fair 
market value of the asset, FMV. Thus, without inflation, indexation is 
irrelevant and the conventional result holds: There is lock-in if the 
asset has appreciated and lock-out if the asset has depreciated. 
III. INDEXING NoT AvAILABLE FOR EITHER NEw OR ExiSTING AssETS 
In this Section, I prove two propositions in the absence of indexa-
tion. First, I show that there is always a positive lock-in effect with 
appreciated assets. Second, I show that in real terms the lock-in effect 
increases with inflation. Using the subscript "ni" to denote that no 
indexation is permitted, define 8n; as the difference between the future 
value of the asset under the hold and sell strategies where indexation 
is unavailable. The formula for 8n; can easily be derived by starting 
with the formula for 8, the difference between the future hold and sell 
values if indexation is permitted for both new and existing assets. As 
shown in Equation (19), with indexation 8 can be expressed as follows: 
8 = (1 + reY x 't x (1 - -r) x ((1 + rY - 1) x (FMV- B) (33) 
To derive 8n; from 8, consider what it means to be taxed without index-
ation. Without indexation, the tax law does not distinguish between 
real growth and inflationary changes in price. In other words, the tax 
law treats a taxpayer as if there were no inflation and there were real 
growth at the nominal growth rate. Thus, 8 can be derived from 8n; by 
substituting zero for the inflation rate, re, and substituting the nominal 
growth rate, g for the real growth rate, r: 
430 N is equal to one plus the nominal growth rate and I is equal to one plus the infla-
ti onary growth rate. 
.. 
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bni = 't X (1 - 1) X ((1 + gt - 1) X (FMV- B) (34) 
where: 
g=r+Jt+rxn (35) 
Substituting the expression for g from Equation (35) into Equation 
(34) , one obtains: 
bn; = 't X (1 - 't) X ((1 + r + 1t + r X nY- 1) X (FMV- B) (36) 
By inspection, it is clear that so long as the asset has appreciated (that 
is, FMV is greater than B), the tax rate is between zero and one, and 
the nominal growth rate is positive, bn; will be greater than zero and 
there will be a positive lock-in effect. 
To show that in real terms the lock-in effect increases with the rate 
of inflation, first define bni-consr as the difference between the future 
values of the asset under the hold and sell strategies stated in constant 
dollars:431 
bni 
bni-const = -( 1-+-1t-)-" (37) 
Substituting the expression for bn; from Equation (36) into Equation 
(37): 
(5ni-const 
= 1 x (1 - -r) x ((1 + r + 1t + r X nt - 1) X (FMV-B) (
3
S) 
(1 + n)" 
Taking the derivative of bni-consr with respect to the inflation rate 8 one 
obtains: 
dn 
n x -r x (1 - 't) x (FMV- B) = --------~~~~~------~-
(1 + n)"+1 
(39) dbni-const 
As long as the asset is appreciated, the tax rate is between zero and 
one, and there is positive inflation, the derivative is greater than zero 
and, therefore, the lock-in effect increases with the inflation rate. 
431 o.,,_c0 ,_,, is defined in terms of dollars at the time the decision to sell or hold is made . 
